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Abstract
 When a disaster the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon blowout and oil spill takes 
place, is it natural for the news media stories, investigative reports, and public deliberation to 
focus almost exclusively on finding the person or group responsible for such a horrendous scene. 
Rhetorically speaking, the discourse surrounding the event can be characterized as a reductive 
form of praise and blame rhetoric (epideixis). However, these efforts, while well-intentioned, are 
troublesome because searches for the one technical cause and the sole personal culpability are 
thwarted by the sheer complexity of the ecological, technological, scientific, institutional, and 
communicative network required for such a disaster to take place. Thus, to demonstrate the 
insufficiency of extant models of disaster in a variety of fields, which tend to privilege human-
centered approaches, Dead Man’s Switch: Disaster Rhetorics in a Posthuman Age explores the 
ontology, technical documentation, and rhetorical theory of disasters through a posthuman lens.  
 To find a more critical approach to understanding the nature of disasters in the twenty-
first century, I ask the following questions: How do rhetoricians and technical communicators 
account more fully for the human and nonhuman forces at work in the precipitation of disaster? 
How do rhetoricians and technical communicators find an approach to ecological catastrophe 
that goes beyond the mere “environmentalist rhetoric” characterizing the public response? 
Through the application of several posthumanist theories, my project develops an approach to 
disaster that complicates traditional ways of approaching causality and blame.
v
I use accident reports, news media stories, and popular literature as data for this project. By 
examining these texts, my project has broad implications for technical communication, rhetorical 
theory, and philosophy of rhetoric. 
vi
Chapter 1. Rhetoric, Agency, and Disaster
Introduction
 Not too long ago, I was out for an outdoor Sunday brunch with some acquaintances of 
mine in Sarasota, a beautiful town along the southwestern coast of Florida. It was the kind of 
restaurant where churchgoers flock decked in high quality, thin, oftentimes white, clothing, 
which only contributed more to my speculation of what it must have been like to live a 
privileged life in the south in the 1920s. Despite the high temperatures that spring morning, 
rounds of hot coffee brought about good conversation, which eventually led into their inquiring 
into the type of work I do as a teacher and scholar in the Department of English. After the usual 
back-and-forths about the state of literacy today and the group’s own personal predilections 
toward and experiences with English as a subject, they were pleasantly surprised to hear that my 
research project was dealing with a non-Shakespearean topic that actually hit relatively close to 
home: the “BP Oil Spill.”1 
 One of my acquaintances, June, a well-traveled and intelligent woman who was modest 
about the fact that she attended high school with Hilary Clinton, was particularly intrigued by 
this revelation. Having lived in the Gulf coast region for most of her life—or at least long enough 
to be comfortable in slacks and a cardigan at this time of year—she had known many people 
with various degrees of proximity to the oil industry. One person she knew in particular actually 
1
1 I prefer the Deepwater Horizon blowout as a descriptor of the event but the descriptor used here is much more 
conversation friendly.  
helped design the Deepwater Horizon rig, or did he help build it? Or ship it from Asia? She 
couldn’t remember. (This despite the fact that her occasional strained face and upward glances 
indicated to everyone how much she really wanted to.) She was visibly passionate about the 
topic and had much to say. My poor wife, having been the spectator in this exchange countless 
times, had resigned by this point to slightly lifting her head in a characteristically polite effort to 
maximize the amount of her neck exposed to the cool misting pipes outlining the outdoor ceiling. 
After excitedly asking me more about the nature of my project, June, two waiter visits later, with 
my wife still looking at the ceiling and with my sunglassed face now peering into my third cup of 
coffee, asked me a question in a manner not unlike a person eager to skip the preamble before a 
dose of bad news. “So,” she inquired, rather pointedly, “what really did in the rig: human error or 
faulty technology?”   
• • • 
 The explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, along with the subsequent spilling of oil 
from the Macondo 252 well in the northern part of the Gulf of Mexico, some 40 miles southeast 
of the Louisiana shoreline, was confidently labeled by President Obama at the time as “the worst 
environmental disaster in U.S. history.” From the moment of the explosion minutes before 10:00 
pm on the night of April 20th, 2010, to the 36 hours of ensuing fires on the rig causing the 
football field-sized rig to sink, to the free-flowing gushing from the deep water well, to the 
capping of the gushing well-head nearly three months later on July 15th, 2010, and to the 
continued relief and clean-up efforts driven by local, national, and international volunteers and 
the financial reparations levied on British Petroleum (BP), this “oil spill” can be best understood 
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as a totalizing event—and it will be labeled here as such. The Deepwater Horizon blowout2 
includes the explosion stemming from a pressure gauge; the subsequent oil spill resulting from 
the opening of the oil well from said explosion; and the ecological impacts reverberated 
throughout the Gulf waters, shorelines, and beyond. And while the event is colloquially referred 
to as the BP Oil Spill, the name only paints part of the picture. BP in this instance leased the 
Deepwater Horizon rig from Transocean, one of the few rigs in the world large enough to meet 
the requirements necessary of drilling at unprecedented depths. Halliburton was contracted to 
complete cement jobs around the pipeline itself for reinforcement purposes. Cameron, a parts 
company, sold the blowout preventer (BOP), which would play a major role in the precipitation 
of the explosion, to Transocean. Save for Cameron, each of the companies—BP, Transocean, and 
Halliburton—had employees working side by side aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig that night. 
 Contextually speaking, the origin of the Deepwater Horizon blowout can be traced back 
to the middle of the twentieth century, when drilling for oil in the Gulf really expanded. Federal 
policies instituted in the later 1950s and early 1960s placed quotas on oil imports and provided 
relief and support for otherwise high-priced domestic oil extraction (Priest). In coordination with 
the discovery of deep water wells and an excelling in technological capacity, hundreds and 
thousands of workers “flocked” to the Gulf as 411 tracts of leased land were granted, matching 
the total number up to that date in history (Priest). Despite the risk of hurricanes and the 
unprecedented number of rigging operations, the Gulf Coast saw its biggest industrial boom, 
even to this day. Yet, despite the fact that government and corporations were working together, it 
3
2 The cluster of events that precipitated the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig (leased through Transocean), 
which was drilling from a Macondo well, and which subsequently spilled BP oil goes by many monikers. I have 
chosen the “Deepwater Horizon blowout” because it is the initial release of hydrocarbons from the well that is 
pertinent for this project, and not necessarily the lingering effects of the continued spill and flow of oil from the 
well.    
was not to ensure public safety and environmental protection. The industrial boom expanded 
quickly, and government regulations were reactionary, often instituted after rig failures (cf. 
Union Oil, Santa Barbara, January 1969; Chevron, Main Pass Block, February 1970) and not 
before their creation. It was not irregular for installations to be left uninspected, as “federal and 
state regulatory bodies were unfunded and understaffed,”3 so much so that in 1969 only 12 
people were responsible for overseeing over 1500 platforms (National Commission Report). 
And, as one consultant noted in 1970, the supervisors and inspectors of these regulatory bodies 
lacked in experience and expertise and were even ordered on some occasions to “cut corners.” In 
that same interview, which is touched on in the 2010 National Commission report of the 
Deepwater Horizon blowout, the anonymous consultant relays his take of the precarious 
circumstances: “Each oil well has its own personality, is completely different than the next, and 
has it own problems. It takes good experienced personnel to understand the situation and to cope 
with it” (National Commission Report 28).
 Getting the experienced personnel necessary to understand the singular problems of the 
Deepwater Horizon rig did not take long. When the National Commission on the BP Deepwater 
Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling released its Final Report (herein referred to as NCR) to 
the President on January 11th, 2011, it was understood that the prestigious collection of 
engineers, scientists, and politicians who published the report would outline the event in high 
detail, culminating into a discourse of “blaming” characterized by singular technical causality. 
The expectation of accident reports is that experts and engineers would work tirelessly to 
diagnose, deduce, and attribute the causes of the spill to one instance, one fault that acted as the 
4
3 Neil R. Etson to President Nixon, March 18, 1970, Central Classified Files, 1968-1974, Box 71, RG 57, Records of 
the U.S. Geological Survey, NARA.
trigger to the deaths and destruction of so much, one artifact that did not live up to its expected 
performance so as to assign culpability for this injustice. 
  What the report inculcates in our understanding of the Deepwater Horizon blowout is 
that, like many other “accidents” or “incidents,” there were a networked series of actions—or 
inactions—that precipitated the event: the drilling fluid designed to detect gas in the muddy 
reservoirs under the ocean floor that was not used in testing procedures; the Deepwater Horizon 
oil rig itself, which was leased by BP from Transocean and that replaced a previous rig damaged 
by a minor hurricane and that which was continually understaffed; the underwater cement that 
only works when the drill is perfectly centered within the well opening, a setting that Deepwater 
operators overseen by BP supervisors ignored (Lustgarten 46); the muddy oil streaming from the 
Macondo well that was more potent, more concentrated with higher levels of gaseous 
hydrocarbons because of its 18,000-foot-deep living quarters; the decision to forego that testing 
of “mud” (or slurry) that was pre-approved by the U.S. Interior Department’s Minerals 
Management Service (MMS); the congressional standards of operability passed a few years 
before 2010 that kept the gap between industry-specific minimal practices and best practices 
quite cavernous; quality tests were not performed; gas pressures via mud removal from the 
Macondo well were not tested; and even the design of the drill itself—a singular tube, as 
opposed to a double-enforced one—all complicate the expectation that investigative accident 
reports should work reductively to assign causality to one technical factor. 
 Despite the complexity of disasters, industry experts (like those involved in the NCR 
report discussed above), courts, and news media outlets are tasked with identifying the 
responsible party, or at worst the most responsible party. Waters need to be cleaned, ecosystems 
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need to be recovered, small business need to be repaid, state tourist reputations need to be 
salvaged, and families of the victims who died on the rig need to be assuaged of their pain, both 
through judicial and monetary means. Someone needs to pay. These efforts of doling out 
responsibility take place within a variety of contexts important to technical communicators and 
rhetoricians. Governmental, non-profit, and corporate investigative commissions use industry 
experts to crack open the black box of the events and identify, within the genre of accident 
reports, the primary technical cause. State supreme court cases use forensic rhetoric to sort out 
eye-witness accounts and first-hand testimony. News media outlets do their best to reflect the 
public outrage, engaging in a mode of epideictic rhetoric. Regardless of the context, the post-
disaster rhetorics are all in one way or another couched rather haphazardly within a negotiative 
mode of inquiry that must acknowledge the daunting complexity of technical causality while still 
upholding the moral and/or ethical responsibility to identify and direct blame. This type of 
inquiry, manifest in many forms and genres, essentially grapples with a question that for some 
time now technical communication theorists and practitioners have found themselves seeking to 
answer: how can we better understand capacity for and scope of human agency within 
increasingly nonhuman collectives of technology and ecology?
 Now, the NCR does assign causality to one technical factor to an extent: it does identify 
the failed batteries of the blowout preventer (BOP) as the “primary cause” of the blowout. 
Identification of the primary technical cause is the obligation of industry specialists; such an 
identification plays a crucial role in the litigation following the disaster as the judicial 
proceedings seek to find culpability with the party “most responsible” for the single technical 
failure. The scope of human agency in the NCR is related inextricably to the technical failure of 
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the BOP, essentially ensuring a conflation of blame (human will) with causality (technological 
efficiency). For example, it was found that BP was criminally negligent because the specific 
tasks on ensuring energized batteries and conducting pressure tests after the Halliburton cement 
job fell upon their senior rig operator’s checklist. The way causality is framed in technical 
reports by the various stakeholders has a profound impact on the trajectory of legal proceedings 
and ultimately the state of the culpable corporation and the ecosystems affected as well as the 
policies resulting from the event (Sauer “The Dynamics of Disaster”). 
 How can technical communicators more aptly account for the emergent material forces at 
work in a multidimensional (technological, ecological, political) disaster? How can technical 
communicators balance the seemingly indistinguishable actions of humans and nonhuman 
objects? What is the role of the technical communicator in terms of articulating “degrees of 
agency” in terms of the causal forces precipitating the disaster? Much in the vein of the work of 
Slack, Miller, and Doak (1993), which reaffirmed the organizational authority of the technical 
author, these questions are posed under the assumption that technical communicators in the 
context of disaster have the potential to make a significant impact in the way agency is 
understood in the larger public context. While technical communicators find themselves in a 
variety of roles serving a variety of masters in a variety of organizational milieux, this project 
casts technical communicators as facilitating a certain scientific prudence or phronesis in the way 
publics coalesce around disaster. While many theories have been established in the rhetoric of 
science, this project adopts a complex theoretical lens to analyze the rhetoric about science,4 
specifically the science of disasters. The way past disasters are articulated frames the ability to 
7
4 This heuristic is loosely modeled after Carolyn Miller’s tripartite distinction among the three possible foci of study: 
the rhetoric with science and technology, rhetoric within science and technology, and rhetoric about science and 
technology. 
prevent future ones. As such, technical communicators play a key role in many ad hoc efforts to 
investigate and understand “what went wrong.”  This dissertation acknowledges this power and 
argues that careful attention to the distinction between material conditions and moralizing blame 
can provide more productive pathways for action in saving any one shareholder from being 
unfairly villainized, influencing legal proceedings, and educate stakeholders in ways that 
ultimately shapes public policy. 
The Problem  
 This dissertation then approaches the Deepwater Horizon blowout as a fundamentally 
rhetorical problem. This is not to say that the millions of gallons of oil in the Gulf of Mexico are 
harmfully percolating through countless ecosystems because of organizational communicative 
lapses, but rather that the current rhetorical approaches to avoiding such catastrophes are clearly 
insufficient. To echo the sentiment of disaster and risk communication specialist Beverly Sauer 
(2003), we keep having these problems. The publics affected by the disaster consistently 
misunderstand the nature of disaster, consistently misunderstand how to talk about and thus 
regulate disasters. 
 It is my belief that these failures stem from a consistent reductiveness in the way the 
relationships between human and nonhuman agency and causality and blame are depicted. This 
reductiveness is a symptom of a much more ubiquitous approach to ecological issues that 
resembles a modernist iteration of environmentalism. While there are myriad types and 
instantiations of environmentalism (Hay 32-33), one of the most defining characteristics of 
environmentalist discourse in North American culture is the ontological split between nature and 
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culture, locating the vast majority of agency and responsibility in humans as stewards and 
protectors of “the natural environment.” Again, while impossible to define broadly, 
environmentalist approaches oftentimes lack the pragmatic potential to enact real social change 
by choosing to disregard the deeply embedded material infrastructure already in place in favor of 
a humanistic ideal of ecologically-centered consciousness. Environmentalists who protest and 
who vouch for boycotting BP are being reductive by conflating technical causality with 
moralizing blame. Boycotting a single oil company resembles a single hit in a Whac-A-Mole 
game rather than a fundamental dismantling of the game itself. Or, more intellectually, “[even] 
the best-intentioned reformer who uses an impoverished and debased language to recommend 
renewal, by his [or her] adoption of the insidious mode of categorization and the bad philosophy 
it conceals, strengthens the very power of the established order he [or she] is trying to 
break” (Horkheimer and Adorno xiv). So long as objects of blame are identified, so long as 
single corporate entities are singled out and vilified for the consequence of an ever and always 
emerging collective of human and nonhuman forces, the underlying material infrastructure will 
not change. 
 In addition to unproductively conflating blame and causality, environmentalist discourses 
also tend to promote the modernist division between human agency and natural conditions. For 
example, disaster analyst Professor Andrew Hopkins recently released a book Disastrous 
Decisions (2012). In the book, Hopkins argues that what really matters in disaster accounts is 
knowing why they did it, why the decision-makers involved thought they were making the 
“right” choices when, in reality, they were taking the rig closer to the “brink of disaster.” 
Hopkins attempts to “get inside the heads” of decision-makers involved in the precipitation of 
9
the blowout and subsequent spill. Hopkins reflects the form of environmentalist discourse that 
pervades such ecological disasters. His work contributes to the notion that technological and 
ecological disasters are the result of a mishandling of nature and a failure to master technology. 
He is contributing to the mythos that disasters are ineluctably linked to the failure of human 
reason or conscience and thus theorizes disaster primarily in terms of morality: greed and 
efficiency as human dispositions result in catastrophe. 
 Undoubtedly, poor decisions by humans (that includes politicians and rig workers) played 
a role in the Deepwater Horizon blowout, and Hopkins does qualify his work by stating clearly 
that humans and organizations are merely a portion of the causes involved in the events. 
However, consistently locating the majority of meaning in disaster within the confines of Man’s 
reason and conscience too narrowly delimits the external, material agents involved not only in 
the initial blowout but also in the seemingly interminable summer of risk and cleanup that 
resulted.           
 The issue with environmentalist discourse is that, while it does reveal a genuine concern 
to improve our relations with “nature” and “the environment,” it does so within the larger 
framework of modernist thought (Hay 2002). While environmentalism does stem from an ethics 
of care and responsibility, it continually re-instantiates anthropocentric ontologies that heighten 
the impact humans have had on the world (MacDonald 8); further, the act of naming the 
“environment” as such creates an inevitable divide between people and the natural world (cf. 
Morton 4), implying that there is a way to separate the three ecologies5 that constitute this world. 
The ethics driving environmentalist discourse decries our failure as care-takers rather than 
10
5 Guattari’s The Three Ecologies (1986), in an effort to fight against the notion that “nature” is in decay, puts forth 
the idea that the issue resides deeply in all three “ecological registers”: the environmental, the social, and the mental. 
resisting the self-centeredness of human positioning, without recognizing, as Jane Bennett (2010) 
puts it, just how foreign we are. Environmentalist discourse gets located in the same arena as 
other other ideologically-driven “causes,” casting itself as a philosophy for nature as opposed to 
a philosophy of nature. As Jeffrey E. Foss (2009) notes, 
Environmentalism is a movement that has sprung up spontaneously from the soil of 
human concern and conviction, so it suffers from the weaknesses that afflict popular 
ideologies. It is not a system of thought, but a loose collection of putative facts, 
questionable creeds, and hastily conceived calls for action—fortified throughout with 
plain truths, worthy ideals, and sound plans. (8)      
Current instantiations of environmentalist discourse are ill-equipped to provide any longterm 
avenues for change in terms the oil industry because it engages in reductivist rhetoric and 
maintains a deep ontological division, somewhat paradoxically, between its adherents and the 
stuff they so long to protect. 
 Let’s return to June’s question from the opening anecdote of this chapter: “So, what really 
did in the rig: human error or faulty technology?” We see now that it is indeed a fair one, of 
course. But it’s much more than that. The reductive formulation of the question represents the 
human desire for clear-cut answers. The “or” represents on a much deeper level an ingrained 
ontological divide between human agency and technological or ecological determinism that so 
often characterizes and even at times caricatures the understanding of disasters, particularly in 
terms of causality. The Deepwater Horizon blowout and subsequent oil spill is, relative to other 
disasters investigated by the field of technical communication,6 one of the most multitudinous in 
11
6 See, for example, Challenger shuttle explosion, Air Midwest commercial airline crash (Zoetewey and Staggers), 
and mining collapses (Sauer). 
terms of its political, industrial, financial, ecological, and technoscientific7 impetuses and thus by  
its sheer complexity resists any sort of reductive approach that seeks to tease out where human 
action and culpability ends and where ecological risk and technological (dys)functionality 
begins. To do so would be akin to asking any of these impossible questions: Who’s responsible 
for the industry standard technology being overmatched by millions of years old hydrocarbons 
teeming with upward pressure below an uncertain and near-seismic topography? Which senior 
rig operator overseeing the cement job to secure the pipeline hours before the blowout should 
shoulder the burden of a century-old cutthroat competition between oil distributors? Which 
president’s reputation should be tarnished for his well-intentioned deregulation of industry safety  
protocols in favor of the continued extraction and championing of domestic oil? How many years 
should then British Petroleum (BP) CEO Tony Hayward spend in jail for the failed batteries in 
the all-important blowout preventer (BOP)? Adopting an either/or approach to the Deepwater 
Horizon blowout implies that one can easily distinguish between intent and action, that one is 
able to clearly identify the scope and degree of agency by analyzing human will and technical 
failure separately. The study of disaster requires a more complex lens through which to account 
for the overlapping and connected forces involved in an event of such magnitude. 
Agency in the Posthuman Age
 This question of human agency within larger material networks and organizations, 
according to Andrew Mara and Byron Hawk (2009) in a recent special issue in Technical 
Communication Quarterly, is a distinctly posthuman one. Posthumanism for Mara and Hawk “is 
12
7 This project uses Latour’s definition of technoscience since the distinction between technology and science in the 
context of the oil industry is rather weak. I also use this term because it gets at the larger apparatuses involved in its 
execution. 
a general category for the theories and methodologies that situate acts and texts in the complex 
interplays among human intentions, organizational discourses, biological trajectories, and 
technological possibilities” (3). Technical communication as a field finds a certain symmetry 
with N. Katherine Hayles’ (1999) assertion that “we have always been posthuman” (209), 
especially when considering that Carolyn Miller’s (1984) early groundbreaking work in the 
development of the field was essentially “trying to come to grips with the complex systems a 
writer, text, and reader encounter, affect, and live in” (Mara and Hawk 2-3). Hayles’ assertion 
resonates still as technical communication theory and practice continues to situate individuals in 
larger organizational (Spinuzzi, Hart-Davidson, and Zachry 2003; Zachry and Thralls 2007), 
methodological (Wysocki, Johnson-Eilola, Selfe, and Sirc 2004; Selber 2004), institutional 
(Hawk and Reider 2002; Knievel 2006), technological (Johnson-Eilola 2005; Wardrip-Fruin and 
Montfort 2003), pedagogical (Hart-Davidson and Grice 2002; Hawk 2004; Mara 2006), and 
communicational (Mirel 2003; Albers 2004) networks. By consistently extending the rhetorical 
situation beyond the mere sender and receiver to include the organizational and technological 
contexts in its triangle (Slack, Miller, and Doak 1993), technical communication is “perfectly 
situated” to adopt theoretical approaches that “counter theories that see human action and 
production from either the perspective of individual intention or the dominance of larger human 
discourses and mechanical structures” (Mara and Hawk 3, emphasis added). In this purview, 
disasters are not so much “caused” so much as they “emerge.” In terms of this project, a 
posthumanist approach to disaster creates a new task: to move beyond reductive human-centered 
notions of agency by exploring the ways in which nonhuman elements of the blowout exert 
themselves upon those involved.   
13
 Posthumanism, however, is an umbrella term and not a standalone “theory” readymade 
for rhetorical analysis. Beyond that, posthumanism, as defined by Mara and Hawk, does not go 
as far as other theories that also question the monopoly humans have on agency. Speculative 
Realism (Bryant et al.), Speculative Materialism (Meillassoux), Alien Phenomenology (Bogost), 
New Materialism (Braidotti and DeLanda; Coole and Frost), Object-Oriented Philosophy 
(Harman), and Actor-Network Theory (Latour) are all concerted efforts to move beyond human-
centered models of science and philosophy towards investigations and articulations about how 
individual nonhuman things actually have their own portion of agency through some variation of 
transactions. In the context of the Deepwater Horizon blowout, one can clearly see how 
significant the singular object of the blowout preventer (BOP) is in the post-disaster inquiries and 
subsequent deliberations. As stated above, it was BP’s proximity and relationship to the BOP that  
ultimately led to charges of criminal negligence and manslaughter. In the materialist, specifically 
Latourian sense, the BOP is granted some degree of agency because it contributed to the 
formation of a new actant: in the technical and judicial proceedings, BP was actively transformed 
by its association with the BOP from an oil company to a murderous group of careless, greedy 
individuals. Within the scope of posthumanism, a materialist reading of the Deepwater Horizon 
blowout encourages us to see how certain human groups and individuals are significantly 
affected by their relations to material objects. This reading makes it known that granting any one 
object that much power in an event as complex as this one is problematic at best. It also leads me 
to my driving research questions: How does the acknowledgement of the role of nonhuman 
objects in inquiry and deliberation affect or change our methods for communicating disaster? 
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And, further, how can this acknowledgement lead to real future change in the form of legal 
decisions and policy changes?
 This dissertation argues that posthumanist, specifically materialist approaches are better 
equipped to grapple with the situatedness of human action in technological and scientific 
landscapes because their scope of agency extends beyond the human and thus offers an 
opportunity for disaster rhetorics to move beyond the unreasonable blame game and the 
reductivist approaches to causality. The conflation of blame and causality is a vicious cycle, as 
the public urge for blame encourages reductive inquiries into causality and reductive inquiries 
into causality in turn limit the scope of responsibility doled out by the courts and news media, 
further stifling a pathway for large-scale improvement and change.   
Chapter Overviews
 Due to the magnitude of the Deepwater Horizon blowout and the weaving8 of several 
complex theoretical approaches, this first chapter has served as an “agency roadmap” of sorts. 
Within the cacophony of technical jargon and moral outrage surrounding the Deepwater Horizon 
blowout is the problematic configuration of agency that this project seeks to challenge: the 
conflation of blame with causality. In understanding agency as a rhetorical function and also as 
the driving force behind the judicial, epideictic, and technical inquiries into disaster, this chapter 
has laid out the complexity of the event and discussed the question of agency as it relates to 
rhetoric. 
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8 Perhaps Spinuzzi’s posthumanist move away from the metaphor of weaving and towards the metaphor of splicing 
would work here. 
 The next four chapters of my dissertation are organized according to discipline, but all 
pertain inextricably to investigating the presence and/or impact of nonhuman agency in the 
context of disaster. Threaded throughout is Mara and Hawk’s notion that “[a]s organizations 
become more complex, technologies more pervasive, and rhetorical intent more diverse, it is no 
longer tenable to divide the world into human choice and technological or environmental 
determinism” (3). As a whole, my dissertation structure reflects such multivalent inquiries of the 
disaster. 
 Complex events require complex theories, and chapter two does most of the theoretical 
heavy lifting. Having laid the groundwork in chapter one by showing the sheer complexity of the 
Deepwater Horizon blowout, this chapter challenges the theoretical underpinnings of 
environmental rhetoric by extending the rhetorical situation to include nonhuman agents with a 
thorough discussion and application of posthumanist methodologies. Modernist environmentalist 
discourses, further covered in chapter two, are unable to provide the necessary theoretical 
grounds for teasing out the distinction between blame and causality and fail to avoid the 
moralizing of technoscientific endeavors. This chapter, in the same vein as Timothy Morton’s 
concept of “ecology without nature,” explores the possibility of approaching ecological disaster 
without a predisposed environmentalist moral disposition. Further, and more importantly, this 
chapter provides this dissertation with the theoretical groundwork necessary to make subsequent 
arguments in the next three chapters. 
 Chapter three builds off of theory covered in chapter two by using nonmodern ontology 
to help fill a gap in the field of technical communication. This chapter examines the accident 
reports of the major stakeholders involved, specifically the National Commission Report and the 
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BP Report. Understood as rhetorical documents that promote a certain narrative and thus 
ontology about disaster, these reports are analyzed from a posthuman standpoint. I posit that 
framing disaster reports as posthumanist documentation provides an avenue for risk 
communication to further bridge what I am calling its “third divide,” that is, the divide between 
humans and nonhumans. My work complicates current theories and practices of stakeholder 
communication by exploring the notion of nonhuman, non-living entities as viable stakeholders 
in the event of disaster. In doing so, chapter three provides technical communication with a new 
understanding of accident reports, a genre that directly impacts public policies (Rude; Miller). 
 Disasters, by very definition statistical anomalies, provide glimpses into cultural values 
by serving as exigencies for those affected to attribute causality to the event. Disasters—be they 
“natural” or “non-natural,” distinctions clarified later—provide opportunities for those involved 
or affected to trace the forces at work in the political ecologies also and always involved.
Claims of attribution and causality, as discussed in chapters two and three, are normative 
ontological propositions in that they argue for a certain way of seeing the world. In chapter four, 
I turn the reader’s attention from technical communication to rhetorical theory, specifically 
Aristotle’s more neglected branch of rhetoric: epideictic. The epideictic genre, characterized as 
discourses of praise and blame that shape and maintain cultural values, has been applied to 
internal forms of scientific communication (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca; Sullivan) but not, as 
of yet, external, more public-oriented forms of scientific communication. Couched in a rereading 
of Gorgias’ seminal epideixis, Encomium of Helen, and using popular literature and news media 
as the field of analysis, this chapter posits understanding the epideictic genre as a rhetoric of 
agency. In doing so, rhetoricians can expand the rather limited understanding of the loosely 
17
defined epideictic genre and also move towards a more complex, less reductive, anthropocentric 
approach to causality and blame in the midst of ecological disasters. Epideictic rhetorics are so 
closely wedded to the notion of causality that a disruption or more accurately an expanding of 
the very notion of causality would necessitate a reassessment of how we assign praise and blame, 
specifically in the midst of disaster. Chapter four thus provides rhetorical theory with a 
contemporary rereading of a classical text and a new account of epideictic rhetoric as a rhetoric 
about science that seeks to maintain cultural ideologies in the midst of disaster.
 This fifth and final chapter explores what it means to integrate nonhuman entities more 
fully and meaningfully into political deliberation about and social action towards technoscientific 
problems in what Ulrich Beck calls a “world risk society.” This integration of nonhuman entities 
into the formation and circulation of publics sets better conditions for communication and thus 
for the development or productive democratic habits (phronesis). 
Conclusion
 Disasters are complicated. Disruptions in systems, be they systems of air travel, 
architecture, public safety, or natural resource extraction, have a tendency to reveal the inner 
complex workings more than the consistent functionality of systems tends to reveal. As I write 
this dissertation, BP is coping with the recent news that it has been charged with 11 counts of 
manslaughter and will pay upwards of $4.5B in settlement funds. This reality is based largely on 
our ideas of causality and how closely it is related to blame. Since accident reports, composed by 
technical communicators, play integral roles in the handing down of verdicts (Rude), we must be 
careful in our attempt to construct causality. 
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Chapter 2. (Re)Inventing Disaster
“My hypothesis is that the ecology movements have 
sought to position themselves on the political chessboard 
without redrawing its squares, without redefining the 
rules of the game, without redesigning the pawns.”
--Bruno Latour, Politics of Nature, p. 5
Introduction
 Deepwater Horizon’s roots can be traced back to the middle of the twentieth century, 
when drilling for oil in the Gulf really expanded. Federal policies instituted in the later 1950s and 
early 1960s placed quotas on oil imports and provided relief and support for otherwise high-
priced domestic oil extraction (Priest). In coordination with the discovery of deepwater wells and 
an excelling in technological capacity, hundreds and thousands of workers “flocked” to the Gulf 
as 411 tracts of leased land were granted, matching the total number up to that date in history 
(Priest). Despite the risk of hurricanes and the unprecedented number of rigging operations, the 
Gulf Coast saw its biggest industrial boom, even to this day. Yet, despite the fact that government 
and corporations were working together, it was not to ensure public safety and environmental 
protection. The industrial boom expanded quickly, and government regulations were reactionary, 
often instituted after rig failures (cf. Union Oil, Santa Barbara, January 1969; Chevron, Main 
Pass Block, February 1970) and not before their creation. It was not irregular for installations to 
be left uninspected, as “federal and state regulatory bodies were unfunded and understaffed,”1 so 
much so that in 1969 only 12 people were responsible for overseeing over 1500 platforms 
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1 Neil R. Etson to President Nixon, March 18, 1970, Central Classified Files, 1968-1974, Box 71, RG 57, Records of 
the U.S. Geological Survey, NARA.
(National Commission Report). And, as one consultant noted in 1970, the supervisors and 
inspectors of these regulatory bodies lacked in experience and expertise and were even ordered 
on some occasions to “cut corners.” In that same interview, which is touched on in the 2010 
National Commission report of the Deepwater Horizon blowout, the anonymous consultant 
relays his take of the precarious circumstances: “Each oil well has its own personality, is 
completely different than the next, and has it own problems. It takes good experienced personnel 
to understand the situation and to cope with it” (National Commission Report 28).
 What would it mean and look like to take the consultant’s words quite literally: to interact 
with the materiality around us in more “personable” ways? The consultant’s attempt to 
anthropomorphize oil rigs, to understand each rig as its own unique assemblage of parts and 
affective histories and locations makes a move in a meaningful direction—a direction that echoes 
Jane Bennett’s work on what she calls “vital materialism,”2 which is a version of posthumanist 
theory that emphasizes a more increased attunement to the active participation of nonhuman 
forces in events (2010). The consultant’s words, and Bennett’s work, question traditional 
conceptions of agency—conceptions that I think are highly rhetorical in nature. They call into 
question well-established notions of what it means to be a human agent in the context of a much 
larger assemblage of nonhuman (both technological and ecological) forces. To what extent do we 
as human agents exert control over our surroundings and to what extent do our surroundings 
exert “control” over us? Both questions are for Bennett equally difficult to answer as 
understanding the human, let alone the nonhuman, capacity for agency is always elusive: “No 
one really knows what human agency is, or what humans are doing when they are said to 
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2 This idea to see the potential agency imbued in material objects as an endeavor that has “virtues” is borrowed from 
Bennett’s articulation of the blackout that wiped the power grids for a few days in the northeastern parts of North 
America in August 2003. 
perform as agents. In the face of every analysis, human agency remains something of a mystery 
[...] If we do not know just how it is that human agency operates, how can we be so sure that the 
processes though which nonhumans make their marks are qualitatively different?” (34). One 
might, in the context of this discussion, even pose the question: How culpable or responsible is 
the Deepwater Horizon oil rig itself in relation to the engineers who were allegedly so careless in 
their execution of protocol? I’m not entirely sure what the answers to these questions are, and 
I’m not sure anyone else can be sure either. How workers and writers negotiate the delicate 
balances between human and nonhuman agency, difficult enough in even the most simple of all 
events let alone a disaster residing at the intersection of technological, ecological, political, and 
organizational realms, is the framework for this dissertation. The theories that in my mind get us 
closest to approaching these questions adequately are discussed in this chapter.
 More than just a philosophical excursus into posthumanist theory, this chapter focuses on 
the rhetorical nature of agency, particularly how agency is discussed and constructed in disaster 
discourse after the fact. This chapter lays the theoretical groundwork for the remainder of the 
dissertation by claiming that a significant problem with disasters, specifically in the oil industry, 
is actually one of rhetorical invention, or the lack thereof. This invention, I argue, has been 
restricted by mainstream or culturally dominant environmentalist taxonomies (Hay 2002), 
relegating the topoi used to anthropocentric approaches to accounting for disaster, and also by 
traditional understandings of the rhetorical situation. Aside from serving as the theoretical 
backdrop for the remainder of the dissertation, the purpose of this chapter is to show how 
disaster specialist Beverly Sauer’s articulation of the role of the rhetorician in risk and disaster 
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(as one who invents and “makes visible” the marginalized forces of disaster) can be applied to 
the material, nonhuman masses constituting and impinging upon the various rhetorics of disaster.
 This chapter is in essence broken up into two parts. The first part introduces the concept 
of disaster rhetorics (through the lens of narrative) and discusses the environmentalist and 
disaster studies taxonomies and categorizations that restrict rhetorical invention. The second part 
uses Sauer’s call as a springboard and outlines the theories that provide the necessary topoi of 
invention to discuss disaster from a posthumanist standpoint. The second part ends with a brief 
example of how Jenny Edbauer’s notion of rhetorical ecologies can help frame disasters as 
rhetorical events, as fundamentally rhetoric problems. Constructing disasters as rhetorical events 
is a necessary move before the in-depth analysis of the event begins in earnest in chapters three, 
four, and five. 
 
Post-Disaster Narratives
 In the aftermath of disasters there arise certain communicative patterns. These patterns 
are closely linked to what we as a culture think is important (Zoetewey and Staggers 2004): 
What single technical failure caused the disaster? Who is to blame for it? How can we prevent it? 
Will justice be served appropriately? There is a responsibility and thus a pressure by those 
investigating and covering the event to provide answers to these questions that are so deeply 
human but also highly political. By choosing to answer some questions over others, however, 
these parties are selectively framing the reality of the event. For example, Sauer (2002) notes that 
in her study of mining accidents the hardline inquiry into single technical cause relegates other 
“extenuating” but important factors in the accident such as communication practices to the 
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category of “unrelated” (130). It has been shown that risk is a public construct (Grabill and 
Simmons), so it follows that disastrous events—their causes, their impacts—are also constructs, 
delimited by certain teleological and ideological belief systems. This notion is also affirmed by 
Russell and Babrow (“Risk in the Making”) and their contention that news media narratives have 
the ability to construct a narrowly-focused view of risk and disaster: 
 In narrative formulations of risk, we selectively construct our sense of the way that 
 reality is structured in relation to our values, the forces that threaten our cherished 
 values, and the way we will live in the world as we have come to understand it. Telling 
 a story in a particular way by forming its temporal and configurational meanings 
 constructs our sense of the real and the good, thereby setting the boundaries of our 
 expectations, desires, and action. (Russell and Babrow 256)
Since this dissertation is being written over three years after the blowout and spill, there is the 
benefit of hindsight, of being able to look back and identify patterns and the ebb and flow of 
post-disaster discourse. Take, for example, an article written in The New York Times, on May 8, 
2010, about three weeks after the blowout and right during the midst of the continued leaking of 
oil from the main Macondo well. The lead reads:
	
 As Congress prepares to hold hearings into the April 20 explosion that sank the 
 Deepwater Horizon oil rig, a billion-dollar question is bobbing on the oil-slicked waves: 
 Whose fault is it? (Zeller Jr. 2010, emphasis added)
The article, titled “Is BP at Fault for the Deepwater Horizon Spill”?, discusses the fact that while 
BP was in most of the “spotlight” immediately following the disaster, mainly because of their 
shoddy track record, other companies involved (Transocean, Halliburton, and Cameron) may 
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have played a significant role in the faulty cement jobs, the failure of the blowout preventer 
(BOP), and the general operation of the extraction pipe and casing. While the level of uncertainty 
is understandably high, given that full-scale investigations had not been conducted at that time, 
the article does help narrow the public focus on blame solely at the major corporations involved 
in the Deepwater Horizon operations. To use the terminology of Russell and Babrow, the article 
constructs our realities and values about ecological disasters, specifically that oil spills result 
from human irresponsibility and that the most productive mode of public action is to direct as 
soon as possible legal and political claims of blame at those most irresponsible. 
 For rhetoricians and philosophers alike, such social constructions of events are 
understood as truisms, as echoing Jean-François Lyotard’s well-established articulation of grand 
narratives in helping describe how cultures make sense of their histories. In applying a similar 
approach, it can be understood that there are distinct patterns and narratives that arise in the 
midst of disasters, there are indeed “rhetorics of disaster.” Mainstream rhetorics of disasters are, 
in the case of Deepwater Horizon, delimiting and focus on the human mastering of technology to 
solve ecological situations. Since what our culture values are corporations that act responsibility 
with the great power given to them, the narrativization of something like an oil spill frames it as 
an issue of blame on the select individuals involved who the public sees as shirking their 
responsibility to take care of the ecosystems entrusted to them by the government, and thus, the 
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people. And while there are other variations of rhetorics of disaster,3 the features outlined above 
are part of a certain rhetoric of disaster, one that can be described as “Modern environmentalist”4 
for its linear account of technical causality and its over-attribution of responsibility to 
individuals’ wills and senses of morality.
Environmentalist Taxonomies
 These post-disaster narratives that dominate so much of the news media and investigative 
technical inquiries are framed and constrained by much larger, perhaps hegemonic views on 
environmental philosophy that permeate Western culture. In his seminal and comprehensive 
book Main Currents in Western Environmental Thought (2002), Peter Hay outlines what he 
identifies as the most influential taxonomy of environmentalist thought. The taxonomy was 
created by Warwick Fox (1992), and was developed from the more original taxonomy created by 
Rodman (1995), and includes four categories organized from least satisfactory to most 
satisfactory (explanations adapted from Hay 32-34):
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3 The attribution of causality and subsequent doling out of praise and blame is a characteristic of a certain type of 
narrative or rhetoric of disaster, one that falls in stark contrast to Michael Bernard-Donals’s (2009) rhetoric of 
disaster that is “founded on a displacement of knowledge rather than its production” (74).3 For Bernard-Donals, 
disaster rhetorics can be characterized in terms of the psychological blind spots that disaster (read: trauma) has on an 
individual’s memory or a cultural psyche. In the personalization of disaster, there remains a gap in experience, a 
suppressed exchange that is either displaced or threatening to re-emerge. Bernard-Donals’s work speaks to the 
difficulty individuals and groups face when they are asked to write an unreachable experience (i.e., the Holocaust). 
While my posthuman approach to disaster here contrasts to the psychological approach taken by Bernard-Donals, 
we are yoked in the belief that our rhetorics of disaster present difficult ethical challenges (for Bernard-Donals, 
trying to write the Shoah presents “impossible ethics” [74]) and in our focus on locating the rhetorical situation of 
disaster rhetorics in the post-event discourse concerned with retroactively framing what happened as it relates to 
public impact.
4 It is useful here to frame the public discussions and understanding of the Deepwater Horizon blowout in a way that 
draws on political theorist Jane Bennett’s distinct between “environmentalism” and her newly-coined term “vibrant 
materiality.” Jane Bennett’s work contributes to a much larger, concerted effort toward the democratization of 
science. In many ways, Bennett is seeking to influence the public understanding of science. Her primary way of 
doing this is by distancing herself from the overly-simplistic and thus inadequate discourses of environmentalism, 
which “leads the call for the protection and wise management of an ecosystem that surrounds us” (111), and instead 
proposing an engagement in the discourses of vital materialism, “which suggests that the task is to engage more 
strategically with a trenchant materialism that is us as it vies with us in agentic assemblages” (111).
1) Unrestrained Exploitation and Expansionism: there is only value in the nonhuman realm when 
it is physically transformed by human agency into economic resource for human consumption.
2) Resource Conservation and Development: resides firmly in the anthropocentric tradition that 
only human interests count, and that value only enters the natural world at the point of its 
transformation into product for human consumption. Unlike the first category, this category 
does concede that nature is not inexhaustible.
3) Resource Preservation: This is a stance which does not seek grounds for preservation of the 
non-human world, but which stays within the assumption adopted in the two previous 
positions: right and appropriate action is deemed to be right and appropriate from the 
standpoint of human interest. 
4) Deep Ecology: Promoting an ecological self as opposed to an individual with a consciously 
appended code of values, this perspective, infused with beliefs of intrinsic value, sees 
sentience—or internal self-direction (Rodman 88)—in all natural beings and this respects the 
interests of each.5  
While Fox only finds the fourth and final category even remotely sufficient in terms of 
ecological responsibility and sustainability, he does concede that the first three are the most 
predominant and that they fall under the larger heading of “Anthropocentric Approaches” and 
“Instrumental Value Theory.” These larger utilitarian philosophies of nature are the frameworks 
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5 These are not new ideas, however, as many seeking to distribute agency across ecologies draw on 17th-century 
writer Baruch Spinoza. Spinoza is largely thought of as the first writer to think about ecology, well, ecologically. 
That is, all things in this world are from the same material substance, not being positioned as either subjects or 
objects but rather as “modes” of much larger Deus sive Nature, which translates to “God or Nature.” Writing when 
he was during the middle of the seventeenth century, Spinoza’s work is definitely imbued with a spiritualized form 
of naturalism; despite this, contemporary posthumanists and materialists hearken back to Spinoza as really the first 
thinker to attempt to legitimately attempt to move away from anthropocentric epistemologies of N/nature and toward 
an ontological-oriented approach to—in borrowing his frame—the mosaic of individual things and thus theorizing 
how things, or “modes,” relate and by what means are they driven.
within which the “vast majority of environmental discussion[s] [are] couched” (Fox 2) and serve 
as the underwritten Modern template for contemporary discussions about human agency in 
relation to ecological resources. 
 The Deepwater Horizon blowout is no exception, as both the judicial and media rhetorics 
around the disaster focused on the notion of human negligence of the environment. As per the 
National Commission Report and a wide variety of other reports, BP was implicated in seven 
federal regulation violations, the foremost being the failure to “protect...the 
environment” (Cressey 2011).  Despite the fact that public stakeholders and the federal 
government allow the drilling of oil at such extreme depths, and with such lax regulations, and 
despite the admission of the high degree of difficulty by hydrogeologists in terms of the 
Macondo well, BP was still and continually publicly castigated as “reckless” (“Gulf spill trial” 
2013), as putting personal economic gains before employee safety and ecological protection, as 
failing to “take care” of the environment it was “granted” in good faith. 
 Those entering the post-disaster parlor then are constrained by the overarching federal 
regulations and Western philosophies of nature that continually assert and reassert corporate 
ethics in terms of human mastery over the complex environments within which they operate. 
Despite the fact that deepwater oil extraction—itself an intrusive process—is not only condoned 
but encouraged by the American government, the smaller operants involved in this large industry  
become the targets of inevitable blame because of their proximity to the incident, because of the 
more explicit connection between a single senior rig operator and a single industrial technology 
(BOP). Due to the fact that the anthropocentric, instrumental theories of value in environmental 
philosophy position humans as the “preservers” of nature, those seeking justice or answers or 
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accountability—whatever the case may be—find themselves operating in a framework that sees 
the humans with the highest apparent degree of agency in a given event (BP) as the most and 
sometimes only responsible entity in an ecological catastrophe. 
Disaster Studies Proper
 Further constraining the topoi of post-disaster discourse are the divisive schisms that 
continually separate the human from the nonhuman in terms of defining what exactly disasters 
are. Disaster studies, as a distinct field of interdisciplinary study, has tried to remedy its difficulty 
in agreeing on a definition of disaster with unproductive categorizations. 
 Relatively speaking, the “official” study of disasters can be traced to the beginning of the 
twentieth century. In 1920 a graduate student at Columbia University, Samuel Prince, published a 
dissertation about the variety of responses from public and social organizations to an explosion 
of an ammunition ship in Halifax, Nova Scotia in 1917, in what is speculated to be the first 
academic study in what would later be called “disaster studies” (Price). This investigative area of 
study would make major academic and political advances in the 1950s, with foundational 
research conducted by members of the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), and the 
Committee on Disaster Studies (CDS) and the Disaster Research group (DRG), the latter two of 
which were both part of the broader National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council 
(Price 6). Each organization sought to analyze the phenomenon of disasters from different 
perspectives, revealing their intellectual concerns: the NORC placed victims as the subjects of 
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their analysis, seeking social psychological data; the DRG limited their scope to group behavior 
during the disaster itself; and the CDS measured and analyzed the responses of a variety of social 
organizations during the rapid onset of disasters, taking up Samuel Prince’s original ideas on the 
Halifax explosion. Following the interview and observation-based research efforts of these 
organizations in the 1950s, attempts were made in the 1960s to summarize these findings, to 
make more generalizable frameworks for how society approaches, grapples with, and recovers 
from disasters. George W. Baker and Dwight W. Chapman’s Man and Society in Disaster (1962) 
tried to draw meaningful connections between what was known about responses to disasters and 
the then-current theories on mental health, seeking a more integrated approach between the 
“natural” and the “human.” Many other attempts were made at this time to codify both 
institutional and personal responses to disasters, (Fritz 1961; Barton 1969) mainly with an 
attunement to the sociological. 
 The first truly multidisciplinary effort that brought researchers and practitioners together 
was in July of 1984 when the University of Colorado began housing the National Hazards 
Research and Applications Information Center. However, the attempt to integrate variegated 
approaches and perspectives (the geological, the psychological, the sociological, the 
geographical, and the meteorological), while solidifying the existence of disaster studies, made it 
even more difficult to “draw themes and conclusions about ‘disasters,’” (Price 7) in large part 
because a fully integrated definition of disaster that meets the needs of all perspectives remained 
elusive. The most often cited definition of disaster, in disaster studies, reads then as:
An event, concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a relatively self-sufficient  
subdivision of society, undergoes severe danger (damage) and incurs such losses to its 
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members and physical appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the 
fulfillment of all or some of the essential functions of society is prevented. (Fritz 655)
Aside from the utter abstractness and relativity of several of the terms in this definition, the 
notion of disaster is unabashedly sociologically-oriented (read: anthropocentric), as opposed to 
say, ecologically-oriented. Disasters are only rendered such because they create a temporary 
malfunction in the machine of society, placing humans and the relevance of their subsistence at 
the center of disaster studies. Anything that does not impinge upon the well-oiled machinations 
of society is not necessarily a disaster in the nominal sense. This definition, while oft-cited and 
widely circulated during the emergence of disaster studies, has been rendered insufficient by 
those within its own parliament as progress in using this definition has not been made. 
Quarantelli (1982) blasted his own field in writing that something is amiss with “a field of study 
which attempts to delineate the characteristics of something, tries to depict the conditions leading 
to that something, and gropes to show the consequences of that something, without having a 
relatively clear conception of what is the something” (ctd. in Aday and Ito 19-20).  
 The nominal stalemate in terms of coherent definition contributes to the need for 
typologies. And categories. And then sub-categories. Kreps (1989) for example uses two main 
categories: “natural” disasters  (e.g., floods, hurricanes) and “human-made” disasters (e.g., 
structural failures, nuclear radiation). These can then be cross-referenced by comparing them to 
event magnitude expressed in absolute numbers (Rubin, Yezer, Hussain, and Webb 1986), or to 
the normative contexts of the events (Geipel 1982), or even psychic trauma (Lifton and Olson 
1976). For these authors, the various measurement methodologies of the impact of disaster are 
contingent upon specific valuations of social make-up. Dynes (1978) has suggested that disasters 
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should be scaled according to the absence or presence of nine features: frequency, predictability, 
controllability, cause, speed of onset, length of possible forewarning, duration, scope of impact, 
and destructive potential (Price 9). Hewett (1983), no doubt tired of definitional heuristics like 
this, argued that disaster definitions predicated on the notion that they are unexpected or 
unmanageable are problematic because they ignore the predictive capacities and material 
protections of the “real” world. While the act of and consensus toward definition might seem like 
a non-sequitur academic exercise, it is actually an inherently political activity as many groups, 
agencies, and parties involved in a disaster evoke the term for political ends: accruement of 
federal resources, media coverage, and the formation of narratives. Whether or not something—
say, an earthquake or a nuclear meltdown—is qualified politically as a natural or human-made 
“disaster” means a significant amount for victims awaiting aid and geographic regions awaiting 
resources and attention. Grappling with what disasters are and how to theorize them after they 
happen is an inherently political, methodological, and thus rhetorical endeavor that is replete 
with differing views on ontology and values. 
 Much work in disaster studies, demonstrated from just the definition example alone, 
consists of various disciplines bringing their respective methodologies, ontologies, and value sets 
to the table. Disaster studies as an entity is the accumulation of an assortment of interdisciplinary 
authors contributing theories from their own field (e.g., psychic trauma) to relate the public 
significance of disaster. Despite the disciplinary differences, stark distinctions between “natural” 
and “non-natural” disasters remain. Because disasters are typically placed under categorization, 
each category has its own conventions of communication and inquiry. However, these categories 
are not always neatly defined (Price 8). For example, if a plane crashes as the result of both pilot 
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error and stormy conditions (see, for example, Air France crash of 2009 over the Atlantic—
further discussed in chapter four), the categorization between human and natural causation 
becomes blurred. The inquiry into causation and singular blame to satiate either a moralistic 
public demand for justice or the source of reparations for the victimized parties in such events is 
not necessarily a direct one and can lengthen the public, scientific, and corporate inquiries into 
singular causality indefinitely (Air France crash is still under review). While a disastrous 
happenstance that is not clearly defined under any disaster category is frustrating in regards to 
the movement towards a concretized and digestible public understanding, incidents like the 
Deepwater Horizon blowout are productive rhetorically because it is through the sparks of 
categories rubbing against each other that the fire of exigency is started. Where for example 
would the Deepwater Horizon blowout fit into the extant disaster studies typologies? How does 
one separate the rig explosion from the subsequent oil spill? How does one trace the “public” 
impact of the blowout when the ecological impacts were nearly as traumatic and long-lasting? 
 The consultant’s words at the beginning of the chapter—how each oil rig has its own 
personality—can be construed as more than just mere anthropomorphizing. His words represent 
a need to move beyond the stifling environmental philosophies and disaster typologies that 
restrict the rhetorical invention in post-disaster discourse. In Bennett’s use of the power grid 
failure of 2003 (the “North American blackout”) as an exemplar, she notes that 
anthropomorphizing material objects (specifically technological ones) “gesture[s] toward the 
inadequacy of understanding the grid simply as a machine or a tool, that is, a series of fixed parts 
organized from without that serves an external purpose” (25). Bennett continues, saying that, to 
the vital materialist, 
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the electric grid is better understood as a volatile mix of coal, sweat, electromagnetic 
fields, computer programs, electronic streams, profit motives, heat, lifestyles, nuclear 
fuel, plastic, fantasies of mastery, static, legislation, water, economic theory, wire, and 
wood -- to name just some of the actants. (25)
The political theorist’s terminology is borrowed from Bruno Latour’s (2004) work on political 
ecologies: that the “natural” and the “social” are non-distinct, un-contained milieux and that a 
better, more posthuman ontology that considers all objects6 as agents within a collection of 
assemblages is a more productive, more nuanced and accurate depiction and articulation of our 
ways of relating. What Bennett wants of us is a more public, ethical, ecologically sound politics. 
This is done, for her, through moving away from discourses of environmentalism that reinforce 
traditional ontologies of the natural and the social and towards seeing events in all of their 
vitality: the vibrant, material connections between individual ideas, technologies, people, and 
ecologies and how close attention to these assemblages—how they’re formed, how they operate
—reveal more distributive models of agency that displace mere individual subjects as the 
effectual causes of events in favor of an understanding of events as the intersection of mutual 
agencies constituting an “array of bodies” (Bennett 31). This move is more than just a matter of 
ecophilosophy and ontology: it is a matter of rhetorical invention. 
Disaster Rhetorics: A Matter of Visibility 
 In this light, the story of the Deepwater Horizon began hundreds of thousands of years 
ago. The ancient hydrocarbons that so powerfully rose to the surface and killed 11 workers were 
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6 Bennett’s indiscriminate listing in the block quote above is quite accurately reflective of what Latour would deem 
objects. 
merely acting upon the energies bestowed upon them by the movement of plates and the heat of 
the Earth’s core. The moment the drill head punctured the Macondo well, a new rhetorical 
relationship was formed: that between the most modern technology in deepwater oil drilling and 
the most ancient of underwater natural forces. For the first time, these hydrocarbons were left to 
deal with an alien, modern technological force that disrupted and altered their natural patterns of 
action. The pressure of the well was altered and another possible direction for the hydrocarbons 
to exert themselves was granted in the form of a 9-3/4” exit from their ancient habitat below the 
seafloor.
 But how can we begin to openly discuss nonhuman agency in intelligent ways if disaster 
studies and (predominant) environmentalist discourses do not have the language, so to speak? 
This issue is a matter of invention, of moving beyond the extant and constraining topoi. This 
approach operates under disaster specialist Beverly Sauer’s articulation of the role of the 
rhetorician in the context of risk and disaster:
 For rhetoricians, the problem of invention is not to make visible the already 
 conventionalized and schematized categories of neo-Aristotelian theory within documents 
 whose governing assumptions are derived from those categories, but rather [...] to make 
 visible those marginalized forms of representation that might not be visible with 
 conventional methods of analysis. (6)
Technical communication, for the most part, has dealt with how communication is involved in 
current risk construction and perhaps even how communication contributed to actual disasters. 
These cover the “geographies” of the sites of disaster themselves. This is what Beverly Sauer’s 
work focuses on. In her book The Rhetoric of Risk: Technical Documentation in Hazardous 
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Environments, Sauer analyzes how communication strategies and practices function in the 
precipitation of disaster. In focusing on the integral role of writing in both determining policies 
and accounting for disasters, she heightens the ethical responsibility of rhetoricians and technical 
communicators in the context of large industry risk contexts (specifically the mining industry). 
A significant component to Sauer’s work in the mining industry is to think about how 
rhetoricians can help in the context of technical communication better account for these 
“invisible forces” that serve as a mode of risk communication and structure relations between 
and among the mining workers. In one particular example, Sauer examines the role of embodied7 
communication between mine workers. Physical gestures, almost impossible to document in 
accident reports and other technical genres, play a significant role in providing safety to workers 
in a mining environment as they use them to communicate messages in the mine itself. This falls 
under the category Sauer describes as “that which is lost when we rely solely on written 
documentation alone.” 
 Sauer’s inclusion of embodied rhetorics in her account of risk communication is couched 
within the Aristotelian method of invention in the defining of rhetoric as the “art of finding out 
the available means of persuasion” (Aristotle 37). Because of Aristotle’s acknowledgement of 
uncertainty in deliberative matters, he was concerned with how individuals [...] employ a 
theoretical framework to discover arguments that might be effective in public deliberation 
(Aristotle 1991, qtd, in Sauer 3). Aristotle’s approach to rhetoric, not unfamiliar in the rhetoric of 
science, technology, and risk,8 allowed Sauer to construct the physical gestures, the embodied 
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7 In Geographies of Writing,  for example, Nedra Reynolds argues that it is important “to understand geographies as 
embodied, and how the process of social construction of space occurs at the level of the body, not just at the level of 
the city or street or nation” (143).
8 See Dombrowski (1992); Herndl, Fennell, and Miller (1991); Miller (1989); Miller (1994); Miller (1998). 
risk communication utilized by the mine workers as more “available means.” While Sauer is 
speaking specifically to the bodily gestures used by miners that are left unaccounted for in 
technical documents, or at least reduced to general “gestures,” this also applies to nonhuman 
entities as well, to those marginalized—what Latour would call “missing”—masses that are 
already always impinging upon our rhetorical interactions. And of course this is no different for 
those involved in framing and attributing certain ideas post-disaster.
 How can rhetoric help make more visible the materiality constituting disasters? What 
does this look like? How can rhetoric help better understand disasters, specifically the Deepwater 
Horizon blowout? These matters are I contend a matter of rhetorical invention, of extending the 
topoi of disasters to be more inclusive of nonhuman forces in accounting for what happened. To 
extend the available means in posthuman accounts of disaster then, rhetoricians and technical 
communicators must move beyond the over-simplistic iterations of “the rhetorical situation.” 
What follows is a discussion of these available means. 
Extending the Situation
 Of course, in the field of rhetoric, so closely wedded to sophistic principles, practices, 
and politics, it can be troubling to concede that a giant whose shoulders we stand so mightily 
upon in Protagoras may have himself been standing in the wrong corner of the agora. The pre-
Socratic rhetor’s claim that “man is the measure of all things” is troubled by contemporary 
surges that situate rhetorical theory and practice squarely in the complex interactions of human 
and nonhuman actors, indeed that seek to displace humans from the top of the rhetorical 
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pedestal.9 These surges, which I identify as posthuman, complicate previous rhetorical 
instantiations of agency. 
 Complicated is Kenneth Burke’s near-ubiquitous uptake of the rhetor as agent, as being 
able to understand humans as self-willed actors in the dramatistic milieux of their lived 
experiences. Burke’s pentad is often used as a heuristic in basic forms of rhetorical analysis: 
“Men have talked about things in many ways, but the pentad offers a synoptic way to talk about 
their talk-about” (Grammar 56). It imports along with it an assumption (fair or unfair) in the 
primacy of human agency as the agent traverses from scene to scene. That being said, Burke was 
concerned with the “rhetoric of substance” (51) and did show a concerted effort to contextualize, 
oftentimes in very material ways (cf. McGee) the processes of rhetorical action. Stark in his 
opposition to Hegelian idealism, which “constructed” substance in thought, Burke saw discourse 
as having essential properties in the sense of us having the ability to empirically observe the 
active ability of language to structure reality in real “substantial ways: for to utter is to either 
distance or make consusbstantial” (51). Burke, while casting human creativity and discourse as 
symbolic and representational, did believe in the material presence of language: 
The design on a piece of primitive pottery may be wholly symbolic or allegorical. But a 
drawing that accurately reproduces this design in a scientific treatise would not be 
symbolic or allegorical, but realistic. And similarly, even when statements about the 
nature of the world are abstractly metaphysical, statement about the nature of these 
statements can be as empirical as the statement, “This is Mr. Smith,” made when 
introducing Mr. Smith in the accepted manner. (Grammar 58)
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9 This move to define posthumanism contra Protagoras mirrors the move made by Mara and Hawk (2). 
In terms of this project, Burke did bring language to the material but did not entirely bring 
materials to the rhetorical, reinforcing our idea of him as a humanist, albeit a pragmatic one. 
Burke was concerned with identifying the internal versus the external loci of motives, with 
identifying the substantive, essential quality that drives motive and action to an end. “Since 
agents require placement in scenes, humanism gets its scenic counterpart from naturalism” (50). 
Burke uses Baruch Spinoza and John Dewey to frame his work in this instance, mainly in an 
effort to move away from agency imbued by the supernatural. Spinoza’s anti-metaphysical 
definition of substance as causa sui (“the cause of itself”) and early Dewey’s formulation of the 
foundationalism of man and nature lead Burke to understand agency as intrinsic to people or 
derivative from nature, respectively. Speaking in terms of Fox’s taxonomy, Burke could be 
placed in the categorizations of nature as having intrinsic as opposed to mere utilitarian purposes. 
 The “derivative motives” humans receive from nature, however, is an admitted blind spot 
for Burke, or is, at least, shrouded in uncertainty. Like Aristotle, Burke was comfortable with the 
uncertain, as “the ambiguity of substance affords, as one might expect, a major resource for 
rhetoric” (Grammar 51); he was less comfortable with people claiming certainty over nonhuman 
processes. Quoting Locke, Burke goes on: “and that the thing they pretend to know and talk of, is 
what they have no distinct idea of at all, and so are perfectly ignorant of it, and in the dark” (51). 
In the dark, unable to access the intrinsic motivational force inherent in the things populating the 
naturalistic scene, Burke locates rhetorical motive and agency in what Quentin Meillassoux 
would coin a “correlationist” framework. Correlationism is the unstated assumption, especially 
prevalent among Continental philosophers, that humans and world cannot be conceived in 
isolation from one other—a ‘correlationist’ is any philosopher who insists that the human-world 
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correlate is philosophy’s sole legitimate concern (Meillassoux 5). Burke must have a naturalistic 
scene within which to locate his humanistic actor, and it is the relationship manifest through this 
interaction that characterized Burke’s philosophy, his rhetoric. Burke is not concerned to 
understand the world outside of human access (Meillassoux 10) and is certainly not concerned 
with assigning motivation or rhetorical agency (regardless of how materialist his linguistic 
formulations are) to the nonhuman beyond the mysterious “derivative” forces found therein.         
 Those challenging such an anthropocentric view of rhetoric would, to use Burke’s own 
terms, locate agency beyond the agent, would envision the scene not as a dramatistic backdrop of 
available means but rather as its own legitimate source of agency working in constant 
cooperation and flux with the “agent.” The agent is not acting in the scene, but rather with the 
scene. This more widely distributed positioning of agency has in the field of rhetoric manifest in 
a motley assortment of object-centered approaches. These approaches examine how things exert 
material and suasive force upon human agents: the sentiment and nostalgia evoked from a toy 
(Hesse; Sommers; Yancey); the shared sense of past brought about by public monuments 
(Dickinson, Blair, Ott; Bernard-Donals); the inclusion of animals as a way to challenge 
traditional notions of rhetoric (Kennedy; Davis; Hawhee; Muckelbauer); and the presence of 
social media to gather people (Bay and Rickert). Such examples reveal the extent to which 
human and nonhuman beings are rhetorically intertwined and are ultimately irreducible to simple 
“subject-object” categorizations. Far from the inert objects or instruments we sometimes take 
them to be, things have their own particular agency that contributes to the gathering of social, 
political, and rhetorical worlds. This trend reveals a shift away from cultural or epistemic 
rhetorics and towards ontological rhetorics: the idea that things matter rhetorically, and, as many 
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argue, impinge upon human activity. By locating agency outside of the human subject, rhetoric is 
opening itself up to the idea that motive and action and ultimately ends are precipitated or caused 
by nonhuman entities.
         There is not a more timely or resonant example that illuminates a posthuman account of 
agency than in the debate concerning firearms: namely, the human relationship to the material 
artifact of a gun. Latour uses this topoi to exemplify his conceptualization of humans and 
nonhumans “folding into each other” (Pandora’s Hope 176).10 “Guns don’t kill people; people 
kill people” is an adage bandied about by the National Rifle Association and proffers what 
Latour calls a sociological explanation of our interaction with the object: “The gun is a tool, a 
medium, a neutral carrier of human will. If the gunman is a good guy, the gun will be used 
wisely and will kill only when appropriate. If the gunman is a crook or a lunatic, then, with no 
change in the gun itself, a killing that would in any case occur will be (simply) carried out more 
efficiently” (Pandora’s Hope 177). This neutering of the gun implies that this artifact is but an 
inactive conduit in a violent exchange between two essentialized beings, lacking differentiation 
from a knife, pencil, or encyclopedia in the act of violence driven by an internal moral ineptitude 
of an individual. “Guns don’t kill people; people kill people” is a cultural maxim that is 
indicative of the anthropocentric view of causality of events and symbolizes (and perpetuates) a 
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10 He does so to contrast his ideas with Martin Heidegger’s articulation of humans’ relationship to technology 
(Gestell): “For Heidegger, a technology is never an instrument, a mere tool. Does that mean that technologies 
mediate action? No, because we have ourselves become instruments for no other end than instrumentality 
itself” (176).  While Latour echoes Heidegger’s call to include technology in our ontology, our very being (Dasein), 
he distances himself from the all-encompassing mastery Heidegger supposes technology has over us as humans. 
There is no room for our mastery of tools or their mastery over us because it is in and during our mutual exchange 
that meaning is made. Heidegger is “mistaken” in his “insuperable” view of technology as dominating all because, 
as Latour would have it, meaning is made through transactions and translations between human and nonhuman 
actors and not through a process of unveiling.
refusal to acknowledge the forces of nonhuman agents and thus over-attributes causality to 
human will and agency. 
 In an admittedly caricatured contrast to this is the materialist version of a human’s 
interaction with a gun, epitomized with the simpler but no less trite slogan of “Guns kill people.” 
Regardless of the moral or behavioral disposition of the person, the gun has irreducible11 
qualities that work in conjunction with the person to alter, modify, or enable the actions of the 
individual. The very material components of the gun add substantially to the encounter: “an 
innocent citizen becomes a criminal by virtue of the gun in her hand” (Pandora’s Hope 177). For 
the materialist (and on a larger scale the posthumanist), the gun is not a neutral conduit through 
which action happens; rather, the gun is an active mediator first in its relationship to the potential 
shooter and then again in its triangulated relationship with the potential victim. On a descriptive 
level, the gun and its irreducible qualities help shape the trajectory of the potential shooter’s 
actions. On an ontological level, there is actually a change in materiality in that “the good citizen 
is transformed by carrying the gun. A good citizen who, without a gun, might simply be angry 
may become a criminal if he gets his hands on a gun—as if the gun had the power to change Dr. 
Jekyll into Mr. Hyde” (177).  Reversing the Platonic moralism that grants sole agency to a 
person’s inherent goodness, materialists are satisfied doling out agency to our nonhuman 
compatriots, acknowledging that the transformation an individual assumes when interacting with 
the material object is sufficient enough to grant a certain level of agency related to the irreducible 
qualities of the artifact—in this case the gun—itself.  
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11 The concept of irreducibility is a foundational one for Latour’s ontology. Artifacts and objects have qualities 
bound to themselves, and cannot be reduced to anthropocentric explanations but only to their ontological status as 
beings with agency.  
 It is in this apparent proclivity of objects to redirect the trajectory of our actions that 
Latour sees a key component to his investigation into the material. But it’s not that simple.   
Measuring the agency12 of objects, difficult in even a strictly human sphere, is done by paying 
close attention to the process of mediation between humans and nonhumans. This alters the 
nature of disasters, particularly the way we and the public writ large understand their causes, by 
challenging the leitmotif of human mismanagement in the unfolding of catastrophic events. The 
idée fixe in disaster discourse of causality being a lapse in the masterful dexterity of human 
control over ecologies and technologies is the same idée fixe in rhetoric’s insistence on 
developing anthropocentric models of analytical thought and action not dissimilar to Burke’s 
pentad. Both discourses locate agency and thus causality in Burkean terms as intrinsic to the 
individual human involved. 
 Agency, then, in a posthuman configuration, becomes distributed ontologically across a 
wide array of things and objects as opposed to the tendency to view agency as centralized in a 
single body driven by human efforts or will. To use a more personal example, Bennett turns to 
her book itself: 
The sentences of this book also emerged from the confederate agency of many striving 
macro- and micro-actants: from “my” memories, intentions, contentions, intestinal 
bacteria, eyeglasses, and blood sugar, as well as from the plastic computer keyboard, the 
bird song from the open window, or the air or particulates in the room, to name only a 
few of the participants. What is at work here on the page is an animal-vegetable-mineral-
sonority cluster with a particular degree and duration of power. (23)
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12 Latour grows weary of this term “agent” as a descriptor and opts for the term actant instead. 
Discourses of environmentalism tend to oversimplify nature as an “object” (Killingsworth and 
Palmer), as something separate from human interaction.13 Theories of distributed agency, like 
those purported by Bennett and Spinoza, embed humans in a larger ecology of agents.  
Rhetorical Ecologies (without Nature)14
 The trope of ecology has been prevalent in rhetorical studies since Marilyn Cooper 
(1986) “introduced” the metaphor for the practice of writing over three decades ago, making 
writers more aware of the natural and social relations constituting their recursive discursive 
processes and making the materiality of “place” and the physical relationships of writers to 
others and their various ecologies significant factors in rhetorical processes. Since then, 
rhetoricians and teachers of writing have became cognizant “of the presence of a material 
dimension in rhetoric and of the rhetorical dimension in the material” (Selzer 9). And while 
“bodily rhetorics” not unlike Sauer’s certainly trace their lineage to the Greeks, particularly 
Isocrates, and thus to writers within our own field (Blair; Hawhee; Ratcliffe), never before have 
rhetoric’s doors been so widely open in their integration of theories and ideas from elsewhere, 
most notably sociology and the hard sciences. The modes of invention, indeed the topoi used by 
rhetoricians in articulating relationships today are increasingly driven by an attunement to 
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13 This is all well and good but it cannot be overstated the degree to which materialist/posthumanist philosophies 
challenge dominant modes of thought, particularly, as Coole and Frost point out, Newtonian physics and Cartesian 
ontology. For Newton, objects move only through an encounter with an external agent (Coole and Frost 7); 
Cartesian ontology casts cogito (mind) as separate from matter, further extended humans’ relationship to materiality. 
This is important because Cartesian ontology dominates much of Western philosophy and has long reinforced the 
notion that sense is made of the world around us through our (human) willful and self-determined measuring of the 
static, inert, passive materiality of nature. This ontology, this framing of the way we relate to nature assumes a 
position of manipulative authority: that humans are master manipulators and users and measurers of nature and thus 
dominant over it. Of course, this ethos of mastery continues today, not the least of which is continued in offshore 
drilling practices.
14 This subheading is a nod towards Timothy Morton’s work, specifically Ecology without Nature (2007), where he 
contends that a properly ecological view promoting sustainability comes, paradoxically, from ridding ourselves of 
traditional conceptions of “Nature” as an entity to be protected and that exists separately ontologically speaking. 
nonhuman entities. Diana Coole and Samantha Frost (2010), in the introduction to their edited 
collection on “new materialisms,” ask quite frankly: Seeing as we inhabit an “ineluctably 
material world...[at] every turn [encountering] physical objects fashioned by human design and 
endure natural forces whose imperatives structure our daily routines for survival, how could we 
be anything other than materialist?” (1). A posthumanist approach to philosophy is not one that 
seeks to theorize and thus set more distance between ourselves and the world, but rather one that 
bridges the gap by putting at the forefront the everyday objects that constitute our meaningful 
experiences. By placing material objects at the forefront and by attempting to analyze the ways 
in which these objects have profound, circumscribing, measurable, “productive,” and 
“resilient” (Coole and Frost 7) effects on the way we think and live, we are granting material 
objects the level of agency that they actually have in our lives in ways beyond Marx and more 
everyday than Heidegger. This granting of agency is, for Coole and Frost and for most of the 
contributors to their collection, an essential component of a posthuman politic and mode of 
analysis. 
 It can also be understood as a key facet of Edbauer’s approach to rhetorical ecologies. For 
Edbauer, the rhetorical triangle is not enough. The “scenes” of disaster, and they are many,15 
require a more nuanced, deep approach to the rhetorical situation. Edbauer’s work on rhetorical 
ecologies might help us think about these issues in that it opens us up to new possibilities for 
analysis by proposing “an augmentation to [rhetoric’s] popular conceptual frameworks of 
rhetorical situation” (9), frameworks that have been effectively critiqued (Vatz; Smith and 
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15 There are many different rhetorical situations in a disaster. For example, as this dissertation is being written, BP, 
Transocean, Cameron, the U.S. government, the MMS (now BOEMRE), local business owners, and 
environmentalist groups are all entangled in a nasty legal battle in the courts, of which its discourse could most 
politely be described as finger-pointing. BP recently pled guilty to 14 criminal charges relating to the rig explosion 
and has agreed to pay $4.5 billion in fines and other penalties (Krauss and Schwartz).
Lybarger; Biesecker; Phelps). As opposed to approaching rhetoric “through the terministic lens 
of conglomerated elements,” which would include speaker-audience-message, ethos-pathos-
logos, and rhetor-audience-constraints-exigence, Edbauer looks “towards a framework of 
affective ecologies that recontextualizes rhetorics in their temporal, historical, and lived 
fluxes” (9). In moving from rhetorical situations to rhetorical ecologies, Edbauer seeks to open 
up our topoi for public situations (read: disasters) to the affective moods and experiences around 
material sites. This widens the possibilities of invention to the various “concatenations” (Warner 
62) of discourse surrounding and constituting events.16 
 Edbauer borrows cultural geographers Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift’s work in cities to 
show how a “city” operates less as a static, discrete physical location (situs) and more as an area 
of movements and processes—from less of a noun (“city”) to more of a verb (we “do city”) 
(Edbauer 11). This movement away from a container model of geographies allows Edbauer to 
apply this same principle to rhetorical situations, to move away from the notion that there are 
discrete, contained means and elements of any given exigence or situation and rhetors are 
constrained by such means and elements. To say that rhetors are constrained by the rhetorical 
conglomerates (e.g., speaker-audience-message) is akin to adopting a “site-model” (11) approach 
to analyzing cities, such as New York or Austin, which would approach cities as containers 
already holding the elements particular to that given city. This approach, Amin and Thrift and 
Edbauer argue, “does not adequately describe the city as an amalgam of processes, or as a 
circulation of encounters and actions” (Edbauer 12). This for Edbauer makes rhetoric less about 
static locations, or place, as about public distribution across and within non-discrete spaces. 
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16 Edbauer uses the example of how the slogan “Keep Austin Weird” countered the urban sprawl that took place in 
her adopted town in Texas.
Breaking the “container” of the rhetorical situation, in and of itself a matter of rhetorical 
invention, is a necessary move if we are to continue including the material masses into such 
rhetorical distributions. 
Public Distributions of Blame: A Brief Example
 But what would this extension of topoi for rhetorical invention look like in terms of 
disaster, and more specifically the Deepwater Horizon blowout and oil spill? While chapters 
three, four, and five all use to varying degrees this question as their springboard, it would serve 
well to briefly touch on an example. 
 When the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore 
Drilling released its Final Report to the President on January 11th, 2011, it was understood that 
the prestigious collection of engineers, scientists, and politicians who published the report would 
outline the event in high detail, culminating into a discourse of “blaming” characterized by 
singular technical causality and stakeholder responsibility. It was understood that internal and 
external contracted engineers would work tirelessly to diagnose, deduce, and attribute the cause 
of the spill to one instance, one fault that acted as the trigger to the deaths and destruction of so 
much, one artifact that did not live up to its expected performance so as to assign culpability for 
this injustice. The report did not disappoint in achieving such tasks. 
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  The dramatic Final Report fit the expected genre17 by narrativizing the Deepwater 
Horizon blowout into three “parts”: I) The Path to Tragedy; II) The Explosion and Aftermath: 
The Cause and Consequences of Disaster; and III) Lessons Learned: Industry, Government, and 
Energy Policy (National Commission Report). What the report inculcates in our public 
understanding of the Deepwater Horizon blowout is that, like many other “accidents” or 
“incidents,” there were a networked series of actions—or inactions—that precipitated the event: 
quality tests were not performed, gas pressures via mud removal from the Macondo well were 
not tested, and the design of the drill itself—a singular tube, as opposed to a double-enforced one
—all point towards poor management decisions made by BP supervising parties and individuals. 
For many, the poor decisions made by BP, feeling pressure from time constraints and daily 
monetary loss of having to conduct more rigorous safety procedures because of a rather new 
environment (deepwater), cast the subsequent spill as not an issue of “if” but “when” (Casselman 
and Gold n.pg). 
 Indeed there were myriad “agentive loci” (Bennett 26)18 identified by the National 
Commission Report filed to the president. These included and potentially should include the 
drilling fluid designed to detect gas in the muddy reservoirs under the ocean floor that was not 
used in testing procedures; the Deepwater Horizon oil rig itself, which was leased by BP from 
Transocean and that replaced a previous rig damaged by a minor hurricane and that was 
continually understaffed; the underwater cement that only works when the drill is perfectly 
centered within the well opening, a setting that Deepwater operators overseen by BP supervisors 
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17 The similarity between the BP report and the Exxon Valdez report to the President in terms of their preparedness-
effects-lessons sequencing of information is strikingly similar. This echoes Beverly Sauer’s (1994) work on the 
“grammar” of disaster reports.  
18 Bennett uses the term to indicate the human/non-human actants involved in the North American blackout. 
ignored (Lustgarten 46); the muddy oil streaming from the Macondo well that was more potent, 
more concentrated with higher levels of gaseous hydrocarbons because of its 18,000-foot-deep 
living quarters; the decision to forego that testing of “mud” (or slurry) that was pre-approved by 
the U.S. Interior Department’s Minerals Management Service (MMS); the congressional 
standards of operability passed a few years before 2010 that kept the gap between industry-
specific minimal practices and best practices quite cavernous; the Japanese government and their 
decision to surrender to close WWII, which then, the next day, led to the eradication of fuel 
rations by the U.S. government; the fuel pump handle at a BP gas station in Detroit, MI that has 
been touched by tens of thousands of people and that facilitates monetary exchange between the 
public and the corporation. The National Commission Report, situating the Deepwater Horizon 
blowout in larger industry, political, and technical contexts, moves beyond the situs model of 
affect by drawing in the myriad social, rhetorical forces involved in the precipitation of the 
disaster.  
 The National Commission, of course, was not the only collective to articulate relations. 
Section 4 of the internal Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report released by BP on 
September 8, 2012 provides an overview of the accident analyses conducted by an internal 
affairs team. The accident analyses are based on interviews, OpenWells database information, 
and email correspondence within the organization, and outline the eight key findings that 
emerged. In their review, they relate that
A complex and interlinked series of mechanical failures, human judgments, engineering 
design, operational implementation and team interactions came together to allow the 
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initiation and escalation of the Deepwater Horizon accident. Multiple companies, work 
teams and circumstance were involved over time. (BP Report 31)
The nine-year-old oil rig named Deepwater was an object constituting a web of “interlinking” 
factors. Indeed, the writers of the corporate report, based upon analyses facilitated by experts in 
the area, attempt to draw connections, attempt to see the connectivity inherent not only to the 
spill but the drilling industry in the Gulf generally. However, this move by BP in their official 
public report to strive for connectivity is an attempt to dilute the blame and at least partially 
circumvent harsh and punitive public and political reprimands. While BP was trying to create a 
distributive assemblage of sorts, it was out of an obvious attempt to reattribute blame across all 
parties that this move took place. Merely drawing connections between poor political judgment, 
blowout preventers, and a risk-taking industry is not constitutive of a posthuman approach; 
rather, a politics such as this must distribute agency among all actants in the assemblage, which 
re-focuses our interpretative lenses to ethics and not moralism (Bennett 38). The Deepwater 
Horizon blowout is not a BP-bad, environment-good scenario; BP was operating in large part by 
government standards of operability, which according to some groups are “woefully 
inadequate” (Oceana 2012) and that actually contribute to an understanding of the relationship 
between government and oil companies as “cozy” (Obama 2010). 
 In terms of rhetorical ecologies, the BP report, unlike the National Commission Report, 
was very place-based, treating the site of the Deepwater Horizon rig as a container for the 
available means of persuasion. Despite both the federal government and BP being culpable 
stakeholders in the disaster, and despite the fact that the reports may be considered different 
variations of a genre, what made the National Commission Report more “convincing” was its 
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ability to attend to the affective “moods” and experiences and histories of the blowout. In the BP 
report, which relegates its object of blame and/or causality to elements on the rig (e.g., engineers, 
valves, mud), there is a clear effort to merely dilute the singular technical causality by dividing 
the blowout into myriad factors. We can account then for the differences in the reports, which 
served the same purpose, by returning to Edbauer’s Deleuze and Guattari-inspired explanation of 
“energized” rhetorics:
 A given rhetoric is not contained by the elements that comprise its rhetorical situation [...] 
 Rather, a rhetoric emerges already infected by the viral intensities that are circulating in 
 the social field. Moreover, this same rhetoric will go on to evolve in aparallel ways: 
 between two “species” [...] What is shared between them is not the situation, but certain 
 contagions and energy. (14)
Disaster rhetorics can be understood in this way, as always already being infected by previous 
and circulating intensities that direct two different entities (“species”) to account for an event in 
fundamentally different, dis-located ways. Rhetorical ecologies, which move beyond not just 
traditional conceptions of rhetorical situations but also more entrenched ontologies of 
environmentalism, provide a framework for understanding how human and nonhuman rhetorical 
forces intersect to create meaning in non-discrete ways. While this brief example does not have 
the purpose of deep analysis, it does serve the necessary purpose of seeing disasters and their 
subsequent framings as being constituted at least in part by rhetorical problems. 
Conclusions and Implications
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 How, then, can we take the consultant’s concern to consider the personality of oil rigs 
quite literally and (re)configure Deepwater Horizon blowout with a more trenchant, rhetorical 
awareness of the political ecologies creating the events that transpired during the early summer 
months of 2010 in the Gulf of Mexico? Disaster studies and disaster rhetorics, which are largely 
situated in discourses of environmentalism—discourses that Bennett and Latour seek to 
eradicate, or at least move beyond—attempt to categorize types of catastrophes into, for 
example, natural and non-natural, and then perhaps stationery and transient within the latter. In 
attempting to relate disasters with broad brush strokes, however, we are neutralizing the 
idiosyncrasies and “personality” of each event or in this case series of events, compromising a 
more nuanced network of ideas in favor of more digestible disaster narratives that are more 
easily funneled through the lens of public understanding of science and technology. What an 
attention to materiality inherent in rhetoric gives us is a disruption of these patterned disaster 
narratives in the hope an articulation of the material and ethical rhetorical relationships 
connecting and upholding the event will alter our relations and improve public understanding 
and practice.
 The implied question lingering here is best worded by Bennett: “if we were more 
attentive to the indispensable foreignness that we are, would we continue to produce and 
consume in the same violently reckless ways?” (113). Bennett’s question, along with much of her 
work, is radical and highly theoretical. But it is worth considering. Realistically speaking, a 
dosage of humility stemming from a sense of foreignness might have slowed the Deepwater 
Horizon engineers and operators from moving along so hastily in their exploration and extraction 
of the unpredictable seafloor terrain of the Macondo well. More realistically, however, and 
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perhaps more modestly, contributing to the enhancement of the public understanding of disaster 
can maybe alter people’s actions. For, as Warner tells us in his articulation of how publics form, 
“[a] public seems to be self-organized by discourse, but in fact requires preexisting forms and 
channels of circulation” (75). The ways in which we retroactively understand and construct 
disaster has impacts on the future situations in those same industries. The exigence for 
posthumanist theories is in large part driven by the ethical and political ecological issues that 
have very real, physical consequences (i.e., global warming). My work here on the offshore 
drilling industry is no different, as it is becoming abundantly clear that modernist ethics and 
usual rhetorical typologies are not sufficient to help address the way we understand our complex 
relationships to emerging technologies and ancient geologies.
 It is my contention that, predominantly, the discourse surrounding the Deepwater Horizon 
blowout is characterized as “environmentalist,” mainly in its focus on the mis/management of 
nature on behalf of humans. This is a rhetorical problem since the topoi of invention in disaster 
rhetorics is restricted. The public concern, from the loud voices to the fainter, revolves around a 
sense of injustice: that BP is culpable and should pay for their failure to hold up their end of 
responsibility in “taking care” of the ecology in which they were drilling. Despite the 
circumventing of environmental regulations that was allowed the very President who reamed BP; 
the corporation's murky and very public track record; the international populace who continued 
to pump gas from BP stations despite such public track record; the industry’s awareness of the 
inherent, heightened risks of deepwater drilling; and even the consistent and real threat of 
hurricanes, the technical and ethical issues surrounding the Deepwater Horizon blowout were all 
filtered down and narrowed to a simplistic paradigm that blamed the spillage of oil on the 
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beautiful Gulf beaches on a corporation that does not care about the “environment” evidenced by 
their cut-corner approach to technical safety issues. There is a need then to extend beyond these 
constraints and attend to the complex rhetorical ecologies constituting the Deepwater Horizon 
blowout. The National Commission report identified the “blowout preventer” (dead man’s 
switch) as the root cause of the explosion. Well, that hydraulic gauge lived up to its name, since 
its failure directly contributed to the death of thirteen works on the rig. Man is dead in more than 
just this one sense, however, as the field of rhetoric ushers in a new era of posthumanism that 
seeks to displace “Man’s” place at the top of the epistemological hierarchy, the Great Chain of 
Being.
 So what does rhetoric as a field bring to existing disaster studies? What would be 
rhetoric’s contribution to the discussion about the public significance of disaster? And how can 
contemporary rhetorical theory, with the relatively recent increase in attunement to the intricate 
relationships between human and nonhuman entities, add another meaningful layer19 to disaster 
studies? Historically, disaster studies as a whole  has concerned itself with debating the diverse 
ways to measure the public impact of disasters. The rhetorical impact of disasters is a difficult 
imprint to trace, but the remaining chapters aim to do just that. 
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19 While I do not have the privilege of having any or enough ethos within the oil industry or the governmental 
ministries in charge of regulation (e.g., BOEMRE) to actually alter practice in any significant way, I do have the 
privilege of being able to use my knowledge of rhetoric to offer and eventually disseminate and enact an informed 
critique of the (what I deem to be) unproductive constructions of blame and causality in avenues that shape the 
public understanding of science (e.g., news media outlets and public technical reports). After all, as Edbauer (13) 
writes, we don’t so much find ourselves in a rhetoric so much as we do rhetoric.
Chapter 3. The Third Divide
       
       “[T]he shadow of the object fell upon the 
       ego.”
          —Sigmund Freud
       “The straight lines of philosophy are of no use 
       when it is the crooked labyrinth of machinery 
       and machinations, of artifacts and daedalia, that 
       we have to explore.”
          —Bruno Latour
Introduction
 To explore the analytic possibilities opened up when we distribute agency to nonhuman 
stakeholders in disaster discourse, this chapter analyzes post-disaster investigative reports 
(accident reports) using a posthumanist framework. The criteria for the posthuman framework 
are not based upon any standalone rubric but rather consists of three features of posthumanism 
that I believe are sufficiently definitive: the acknowledgement of complexity, the negotiating of 
uncertainty, and the belief in the irreducibility of nonhuman objects. My analysis shows that the 
reports do not fully meet the criteria of a posthuman approach to disaster but serve as points of 
departure for considering the larger rhetorical role of objects in risk communication and 
stakeholder theories. 
Posthumanism in Technical Communication
 Posthumanism as a philosophical approach and technical communication as a practicing 
field are not distant from each other. N. Katherine Hayles’ assertion that “we have always been 
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posthuman” (209) resonates with the work technical communication as a field has been 
concerned with for quite some time: situating individuals in larger organizational (Spinuzzi, 
Hart-Davidson, and Zachry 2003; Zachry and Thralls 2007) methodological (Wysocki, Johnson-
Eilola, Selfe, and Sirc 2004; Selber 2004), institutional (Hawk and Reider 2002; Knievel 2006), 
technological (Johnson-Eilola 2005; Wardrip-Fruin and Montfort 2003), pedagogical (Hart-
Davidson and Grice 2002; Hawk 2004; Mara 2006), and communication (Mirel 2003; Albers 
2004) networks. As Mara and Hawk (2009) point out in the introduction to a special issue of 
Technical Communication Quarterly on posthuman rhetorics and technical communication, 
“even when the profession of technical communication was imagined in terms of isolated forms 
or end-of-the-process editing, technical writers were still operating in interconnected, complex 
rhetorical systems [...] From Miller (1984) to Spinuzzi (2003), scholars have been trying to come 
to grips with the complex systems a writer, text, and reader encounter, affect, and live in” (2). In 
light of this, Mara and Hawk argue that technical communication is “perfectly situated” as a field 
to continue to study how complex systems “exert themselves upon the rhetorical situation that 
writers face” (2) and that “the moment is right to explore technical communication’s connections 
to posthumanism, which works to understand and map these complex rhetorical situations in 
their broader contexts” (3). My project takes advantage of this moment as this chapter analyzes 
specifically how the complex systems and also the individual objects within these complex 
systems of disaster in the oil industry “exert themselves” in the rhetorical situations of the 
writing of accident reports. 
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  The Third Divide in Risk Communication
 These rhetorical situations, because they deal with public safety, industry safety 
standards, and ecological impact, are situated firmly in the context of risk communication.1 That 
the accident reports were composed after the fact rather than the usual focus of risk on the 
situations and uncertainties that might lead to disaster does not change the fact that the authors of 
said reports impact the industry safety standards, continued ecological clean-up, and long-term 
affects of the “foreign” substance now percolating through Gulf waters. Risk communication as a 
subfield has achieved important goals in helping overcome, both practically and theoretically, 
two divides: (1) the political chasm separating expert from nonexpert and (2) the scientific 
decoupling of knowledge and communication. This chapter considers—given the role 
technologies play in risk documents such as accident reports—how the role of nonhuman agency  
alters the way risk communication addresses another, very pertinent, “third” divide: that between 
humans and nonhumans.  
 The two extant divides often work in tandem, as being able to lay claim to objective truth 
usually comes with a social position as an expert, and being a non-expert means that one is 
merely communicating science, not doing science. As Julie Staggers, in her award-winning 
dissertation on the rhetoric of risk in the nuclear events at Hanford, writes, with particular 
emphasis on the nature of environmental documentation: 
 the dominant approaches to risk communication within communication studies treat risk 
 as a positivist, objective truth, which can only be determined by experts. This treatment 
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1 The field of risk communication, not unlike disaster studies, is a comparatively young field of study, despite the 
fact that the communicating of uncertainty to concerned citizenry is a rhetorical art that essentially dates back to 
Aristotle. Approaches to risk communication have been widely varied, mainly due to the fact that risk manifests 
differently in different fields, such as financial risk assessment, cognitive psychology, and communication studies 
(the last of which serves as the foundation of technical communication’s uptake of risk).
 of risk is similar to the treatment of risk in technical communication, where the primary 
 object of study has been the environmental impact statement. Technical communication 
 research on [EISs] treats risk as a preexisting truth determined by specialists and 
 transmitted to the public through the skills of the technical writer. (42)      
Staggers’ project delves into the realm of Foucauldian power structures to find out why nuclear 
power workers, aware of risks, continually put themselves and their family in harm’s way; this 
over-simplistic model of risk is applicable but insufficient. As such, she turns to Jeffrey Grabill 
and Michele Simmons’ call for a “critical rhetoric of risk,” which acknowledges the important 
work done over the past few decades on analyzing the socially constructed nature of risk 
(Juanillo and Scherer 1994; Katz and Miller 1996; Waddell 1996; Krimsky and Plough 1988) 
couched within a larger anti-positivist upswing (Kuhn; Latour), and takes advantage of the 
rhetorical potential inherent in value-laden communication in politically-based environmental 
writing. Grabill and Simmons’ critical rhetoric of risk, because of its focus on theories of power 
(Staggers 46), operates very much in the vein of postmodern critique:
 [T]he failure to account for power in decision making about the meaning of risk...can 
 lead to the “oppression” of (typically citizen) audiences. Conceptualizing risk as socially 
 constructed is important because (1) it locates knowledge-making within communication 
 processes, and (2) it considers how power is differentially exercised in such processes. 
 (Staggers 46) 
What an application of Grabill and Simmons’ critical stance on risk affords Staggers is the 
opportunity explicate four key implications of their work not only for her own project on 
Hanford but for risk communication more generally: 1) the elimination of arbitrary divides 
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between assessment/communication and experts/non-experts, 2) the situating of risk in social and 
economic factors, 3) the foregrounding of power, 4) the emphasizing of social processes in the 
construction of risk (Staggers 46). Where Grabill and Simmons fall short for Staggers is in their 
place of application. For Grabill and Simmons, real on-site decision-making processes are 
analyzed to see how the communication of risk actually takes place from beginning to end and 
how the public can be more fully integrated into the decision-making and knowledge-making 
processes. For Staggers, the more important question is figuring out how something like Hanford 
could have happened: “How do people come to act in ways that will harm themselves and 
others?” (51). She seeks to disrupt the divide between experts and nonexperts in their assessment 
of risk.    
 Since I am not concerned with, to use Staggers’ phrasing, “gaining a seat at BP’s table,” 
but rather more concerned with how the disaster is communicated to the public, this chapter does 
not engage in any sort of risk assessment nor trace any specific decision-making process 
(Staggers distinguishes between present tense and past tense risk). Risk applies to this case 
because risk communication is essentially any form of information communicated to a 
stakeholder that pertains to the harm, impact, or connection between factors and events. This 
includes accident reports. Risk communication does not end when disaster begins. Rather, risk is 
a continuing mode of discourse (Sauer The Rhetoric of Risk) which acts as a network that keeps 
all stakeholders, particularly the public, informed about the degree to which there is the 
probability or likelihood of an event happening.
 Like Staggers, I acknowledge and build off Grabill and Simmons’ crucial work but, also 
like Staggers, I move beyond their bridging of the divide between technocratic structures and the 
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public to the bridging of a different divide: the artificial chasm separating humans from 
nonhumans. It is in the context of risk communication that two key divides have been bridged in 
technical communication: the divide between scientific knowledge and the discourse used to 
communicate it and the divide, as seen above, between scientific or industry experts and the 
public. Yet, as threats to public safety become more and more complex, uncertain, more and 
more technologically sophisticated, and as threats become increasingly dependent on the 
functionality of technology, specifically of boundary objects (Wilson and Herndl 2007), there 
emerges a need for more pronounced attention to less human-centered models of understanding 
risk. It is my belief that the “critical rhetoric of risk” developed by Grabill and Simmons now 
faces a third challenge in the context of risk communication: the deeply entrenched ontological 
divide between humans and nonhumans (i.e., animals, nonhuman living beings, technological 
objects).  
 Risk communication’s negotiation of the divides between experts and nonexperts and 
knowledge and communication has significantly reconfigured what it means to be a stakeholder. 
Grabill and Simmons have cast the redefined and more inclusionary notions of stakeholders as 
somewhat of an historical trajectory. Again, the first obstacle was the gap between expert and 
non-expert. Technical communication, acting as an intermediary between the scientific and 
technical experts and the “public,” sought to bridge the gap by arguing for the public access of 
documents and also by taking it upon itself to concern itself with writing about science and 
technology for a broader public deliberative function, not just as an internal discourse 
community function. The second obstacle was the artificial disjoint between knowledge and 
communication. Less of a political and more of an epistemological effort, the Modern divide 
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between what we know and what we say is still to this day a battle that technical communicators 
fight, predominantly in fields such as the the rhetoric of science (Gross). This divide rested on 
the notion that scientific knowledge as an external entity can be obtained without interference 
from subjective perceptions or linguistic constructions. Much of these efforts in risk 
communication have resulted in a reorienting, indeed an extending of stakeholders. The critical 
rhetoric of risk communication Grabill and Simmons call for promotes the inclusion of non-
expert members of the local community to act as an integral part in the creation of scientific 
knowledge. More than relegating citizens to mere NIMBY2 roles, the public citizens inform the 
process by sharing their experiences and by having their own experiences honored. This is turn 
changes the way we think about scientific and industrial knowledge practices.               
 The third “divide,” as I call it, is ontological in nature. That is, an obstacle immediately 
facing technical communication today is the distinction between human and nonhuman actants 
and our related ideations of their agential capacities as the field continues to grapple with how 
humans operate in complex systems. The accident reports outlined and analyzed below use the 
framework of this third divide to see the extents to which the writers challenge traditional 
notions of human agency and technical causality. These reports, in constructing grammars3 and 
narratives about how the public, industry professionals, and scientific experts understand 
disaster, significantly shape and continually reshape theory and practice through the “cycle of 
technical documentation” (Sauer “The Dynamics of Disaster”), legal proceedings, and—as will 
be further considered after the document analyses—the ways in which stakeholders relate to one 
another in the context of an event such as the Deepwater Horizon blowout. But first let’s 
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2 Acronym for “Not In My Back Yard”.
3 Sauer (“Fatal Grammar” 158) discusses the political roles that the writers of these accident reports must occupy.
consider how accident reports as a genre have the distinct opportunity to articulate the nuances 
between human and nonhuman agency. 
   
Accident Reports as Posthuman Documentation
 The complex systems “exerting themselves” on the rhetorical situations of Deepwater are 
ecological protectionism, the technoscientific operation oil industry, and the political regulation 
of the oil industry. Technical communication and writing about ecological risk have a long 
history with one another. It was in the 1960s when political legislation was spurred on by 
environmental groups to make technical reports publicly accessible, with Environmental Impact 
Statements (EISs)4 being the first mandated technical report (Coppola and Karis 2000, xv). Now, 
in a world of public access and environmental awareness, one cannot build a single acre park 
without making publicly available an EIS for the local community to review. 
 Coppola and Karis (2000) point out that environmental discourse and technical 
communication both benefitted from each others’ goals and as a result both saw an increase in 
prevalence and legitimacy around the same time (xv). In fact, James Souther (1989) “credits 
environmental legislation and its required effective communication of technical information to 
the public as a foothold for advancing the profession of technical communication” (Coppola and 
Karis xv). EISs, with the purpose of informing the public about inherent ecological impacts and 
risks in a given government or corporate project, legitimated the role of the technical 
communicator as one “who can help people visualize and understand environmental data so they 
can make informed decisions” (Coppola and Karis xiii). The effective political action of 
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4 EISs were some of the first technical documents used as objects of analysis in the emerging field of technical 
communication (cf. Carolyn Miller).
environmentally-concerned groups, particularly the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
legislated in 1969, helped created a stable role of technical communicators (who were already 
helping scientific and academic specialists compose technical reports). Technical communicators 
were then asked to become experts and mediators between the specialists and the public on 
matters of environmental discourse—a role cemented in 1992 by M. Jimmie Killingsworth and 
Jacqueline Palmer’s seminal book, Ecospeak: Rhetoric and Environmental Politics in America. 
 The work of technical communicators and then of scholars like Killingsworth and Palmer 
showed that ecological issues were just as much a problem of epistemology, ethics, and discourse 
as they were a problem of science, such that the environment cannot be separated from the the 
words we use to describe it—a position further supported by both Cantrill and Oravec (1996) and 
Herndl and Brown (1996). In Herndl and Brown’s introduction to Green Culture, they write, “In 
a very real sense, there is no objective environment in the phenomenal world, no environment 
separate from the words we use to represent it” (1). “The environment” is not the tree getting cut 
down on the lower end of your front yard; rather, “the environment” is an infinitely complex 
network of ecological, technological, individual, and political forces. As noted by the Board 
charged with investigating the Columbia space shuttle accident, “complex systems almost always 
fail in complex ways” (National Commission Report viii). In the same vein, an oil spill is not 
merely a corporation’s irresponsible stewardship over a natural resource; an oil spill is a result of 
a complex web of industry-based, political, ecological, and individual forces and decisions 
reaching a tipping point. 
 There are stark differences when comparing EISs to accident reports, not the least of 
which is the former’s concern to anticipate and account for risk and the latter’s concern to 
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retroactively account for what went wrong and assist in preventing further events. EISs are 
preemptive documents, informing the public in advance of the event to help them make informed 
decisions about how or whether or not the project will and/or should proceed. Accident reports 
are explanatory in nature, expounding for the public a version or account of what happened, and 
are charged with the task of articulating what went wrong and what the main critical factors were 
in the event. As such, the task of the technical communicator in the unfortunate case of disaster is 
to help, along with industry experts, map 5 the events in a way that accounts for the forces 
involved. Different reports account for different forces, a pattern largely informed by legal 
culpability and public image of individual stakeholder writing the report. While it seems 
reasonable in a complex event such as the Deepwater blowout to not over-attribute to human 
decision-making or to not be too deterministic in terms of technical causality, the varying 
rhetorical situatedness of each report make them fall along all points on this “agency” spectrum. 
 Accident reports as a genre follow certain grammars (Sauer 1994).6 They have the tasks 
of identifying technical causes, tracing relationships between stakeholders, providing the 
necessary context, and sometimes even recommending changes to industry practice in the form 
of safety manuals or testing procedures. Accident reports map out the complex networks within 
which the various stakeholders, ecological factors, communicative decisions, technological 
malfunctions, industry deregulations, and individuals interacted to bring about that particular 
catastrophe. If, as Mara and Hawk write, posthumanism “does not usurp the human but extends 
agency throughout the environment” (4), then the accident reports put forth by the writers 
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5 Spinuzzi (2006) would most likely find this metaphor appropriate for the work done by posthumanists. Spinuzzi 
argues that previous writing-based metaphors such as “weaving” are too enmeshed within a humanistic approach to 
discourse, and instead offers his own metaphor of “splicing” to explain how human and nonhuman agents work in 
tandem to build meaning and power. 
6 Sauer (1994) opts to name them “fatal grammars.”
immediately involved with the blowout epitomize what it means to have an opportunity to do 
“posthuman work” in technical communication. 
 A posthumanist approach to the Deepwater Horizon blowout, generally speaking, looks 
not only to the varying levels of personal responsibility and corporate ethical behavior but 
moreover to the roles nonhuman actants played in the precipitation of the events, to the 
technological and natural contexts that frame or “exert themselves” on human interaction. This 
approach understands disaster as a complex interaction between humans and nonhumans, 
without overvaluing the roles played by either (Mara and Hawk 2). Human-centered models, do 
not capture the complexities of contemporary philosophy and science (De Landa 2006; Thacker 
2004), are inadequate for understanding what happened on April 20th, 2010 in the Gulf of 
Mexico, and limit our ability to avoid similar catastrophes in the future. The reductiveness 
characteristic of modern disaster discourse also applies to the oversimplification of technical 
causes and is is insufficient when analyzing the technical documents describing the events. 
 But to what extent do these documents in the Deepwater case actually distribute agency, 
actually meet the characteristics of a posthuman approach? And what precisely does a 
posthumanist approach look like? This chapter analyzes three accident reports from key 
stakeholders in the blowout (a governmental commission, a group of oil industry experts, and 
BP). The characteristics, techniques, and purposes of the reports are considered against a 
theoretical backdrop of posthumanism, specifically three features of the perspective: appealing to 
complexity, negotiating uncertainty, and irreducibility. These features are adapted from the work 
of Jane Bennett and Bruno Latour. The reports themselves are dense, highly technical, and, in 
light of the literature reviewed above, act as political and ideological efforts. They are in no way 
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summarized below, as this is an impossible task. Rather, I have identified several characteristics 
of the report to highlight my analysis. My research suggests that while the reports do at times 
have a posthuman understanding of agency, ultimately they follow the typical grammar of the 
“modern” accident report. After my analyses, my discussion then transitions into how the genre 
of accident reports can help continue to bridge what I am calling the “third divide” (that between 
humans and nonhumans) in risk communication. In doing so, these reports contribute to a more 
complex vision of how we might consider nonhumans as viable stakeholders in the context of 
risk and disaster.   
Appealing to Complexity: Beyond Fault Tree Analyses
 “Mapping” in disaster reports has traditionally been conceived in terms of the linear 
model of fault tree analysis (FTA). Most disaster reports, whether the result of investigations led 
by a government sponsored group (National Commission), an eclectic team of industry experts 
(Det Norske Veritas), a corporate research team (BP), or some combination of these, use FTAs as 
a method of trial and error to track how the disaster precipitated. Each FTA chooses a single 
“critical factor” that may have caused or did cause the event and then seek the appropriate 
contributing factors by “reasoning backwards” (Sauer, “The Dynamics of Disaster,” 401). 
Pictured below (Figure 1) is an example provided from the National Mine Health and Safety 
Academy instructional manual of a generalized fault tree “constructed for the undesired event of 
a miner being struck by a falling roof” (Rankin and Tolley 18). The construction of a fault tree is 
the third step in the five-step method many industries7 use in their accident reports: 
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7 While used in many industries, Rankin and Tolley use the example from the National Mine Health and Safety 
Academy instructional manual.   
66
Figure 1. Generalized Fault Tree Analysis from the NMHSA instructional manual
1. Define the undesired event to be studied.
2. Acquire an understanding of the system. 
3. Construct a fault tree. 
4. Evaluate the fault tree.
5. Control the hazards identified. 
This investigative, reductive model “assumes that investigators can identify a single ‘undesired’ 
cause of the accident” (Rude, “The Report” 398; Ranking and Tolley 15). Even if there are 
several critical factors, or primary causes, many industry manuals will insist that “one event 
should be established that represents all events within each group; this event becomes the 
undesired event to be analyzed (Rankin and Tolley 17). This insistence to reduce disaster to a 
single critical factor reflects the quite literally two-dimensional nature of fault trees (Sauer “The 
Dynamics of Disaster”) and sets up a scenario in which legal proceedings, lawsuits, and public 
responsibility all hinge upon the oversimplification of a complex process. 
 The inclusion of fault-trees in the grammar of accident reports seems to have a “trickle-
up” effect on the nature of investigative inquiry as a whole. In their pedagogy-focused discussion 
of a commuter plane crash, Meredith Zoetewey and Julie Staggers (2004) show, using in part the 
work of Sauer, “just how easily an investigation can become bogged down in the search for the 
‘technical cause’ of a failure while entirely missing the role of communication practices in 
precipitating the failure” (Zoetewey and Staggers). Sauer’s work extended the analysis of 
disasters beyond the singular technical cause to include not only the larger communicative lapses 
but also the nonverbal elements of communication (bodily gestures made by the miners, as 
discussed in chapter two) that are difficult if not impossible to document in the accident reports. 
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For Sauer and others 8 the “fault-tree mindset” has significant implications in terms of future 
inquiries because
the ideas and contexts we learn today form the background of our knowledge base and 
structure our ability to solve problems in the future. Recognizing the importance of 
“grammars” in the structure of scientific knowledge, scholars have examined how 
scientists use socially defined conventions of arrangement, style, invention, and evidence 
to win acceptance for competing paradigms. (“Fatal Grammar” 154)   
The grammatical structure of accident reports frame the relationships between technical 
communication and the involved stakeholders and create habitual patterns of inquiry and action 
that restrict alternate modes of discourse other than the traditional ones that reflect “hidden 
assumptions about risk, authority, and responsibility” (154). These “hidden assumptions” can be 
said to be overly reductive in their conceptualization of technical causality and by extension 
over-attribute causality and blame to single or few agents.  
 These accident report grammars have rather severe political ramifications. Industry 
policies and legal penalties are implemented, altered, or revoked based upon the findings 
threaded throughout these reports. The public understanding of the disastrous events, whether 
they fall into (if you’ll recall) Kreps’ problematic categorization of the natural or human-made, 
are aligned with the one-dimensional model of the “fault-tree,” which fails to accurately 
represent all the complexities and nuances that precipitate the event, opting instead to allocate 
blame to one instance or one person. Each stakeholder involved has its own “fault-tree” and as 
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8 Schwartzman, Ross, and Berube (2011) also speak about the different patterns that emerge as risk communication 
deals with large events. In their case, they distinguish between synchronic and diachronic production and assessment 
of risk. 
such the discourse around disasters becomes increasingly political and away from the real, to 
temporarily invoke Latour. 
 Rhetorically speaking, the grammatical structures of accident reports perform arguments 
for the way we, the public, should view the complex relationships between technology, the 
environment, and human decision-making (Killingsworth and Gilbertson 76; Miller, “Genre” 
159). The adherence to socially defined conventions in terms of report writing “embody 
assumptions about the intended use of the document and about the nature of knowledge [...] The 
genre not only embodies but also directs the approach to knowledge making” (Rude, “The 
Report” 183). A pertinent example here would be how a scientist in his or her field uses the 
grammar of the scientific report (methods/results/discussion arrangement) to learn how to 
conduct experiments (Rude, “The Report” 183). In the same way, readers outside of a given field 
or industry are also directed as to how to understand the nature of knowledge in an event by 
following the grammar of the fault tree analyses, which offer a concrete method for interpreting 
not only the primary causes of a disaster but also public accountability, ecological responsibility, 
and corporate ethics. 
 To counter this linear, reductive way of thinking about causality, Sauer creates her own 
version of a three-dimensional model of accident analysis, still using the Wilberg Mine disaster 
as her example. In this diagram (Figure 2), readers and analysts of the accident reports are able to 
identify the three key variables at work in the precipitating of a disaster (Sauer, “The Dynamics 
of Disaster” 413):
1. The responsibility of human agency in the disaster;
2. The temporal relationship of events in the disaster; and   
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Figure 2. Beverly Sauer’s three-dimensional model of causal pathways in disaster
3. The relative importance or significance of the evens in relation to the outcome. 
Sauer’s three-dimensional approach resembles the concerns of posthumanism as an approach to 
technical communication: to locate competing bodies of agency against each other to capture a 
more holistic systems-oriented approach to an event. In Sauer’s model, individuals and their 
decisions are located in a highly-technical web of causal possibilities that does not discriminate 
between human, environmental, or technical causality. For example, in Figure 2, if the reader 
follows the disaster (“miners die”) all the way to the bottom, they encounter an entire network of 
critical factors or causes that led to the death of miners: the “mgt pushes production” and 
“mineral oil burns” are part of the same quadrant and are both contributing upwards to the failure 
of management to “direct operations.” Both human decision-making and technological 
malfunctions converge in the precipitation of the fire that eventually brought about the deaths of 
the miners. Sauer, in her own words:
 The cause of the disaster, from this perspective, is not merely a single static event (the 
 fire, the failure of management to evacuate, the failure of miners to use SCSRs), but a 
 dynamic constellation of events linked by logical and temporal pathways. The lines of 
 responsibility are not fixed according to rigid lines that separate technical from 
 management responsibility, union from operator. Instead, the model shows how each 
 decision or event interacts with other decisions and events in time to produce a 
 catastrophe. (Sauer, “The Dynamics of Disaster” 415) 
This “dynamic constellation” Sauer conjures possesses the posthuman characteristic of locating 
agency beyond the individual and into the complex systems within which humans operate (Mara 
and Hawk 4). Despite the potential technical value and potential public desire for a 
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straightforward, linear FTA, Sauer insists that—very much in line with Nathaniel Rivers’ (2008) 
Latour-inspired call for technical communicators to act as “spokespeople” for objects—technical 
communicators have a responsibility in the composition of accident reports to attempt to account 
for all forces and agencies at work, be they human or nonhuman. The reductive, “singular 
technical cause” narrative is driven by the completion of FTAs, so, naturally, a concerted effort to 
formulate models that move beyond standard FTAs alters the narrative, and thus epistemology, 
espoused by accident reports. 
 Still, the nature of accident reports simply cannot be reduced to the fault diagrams of 
critical factors. Sauer acknowledges this reality, and actually puts forth a description of what a 
written report, if translated directly from her own three-dimensional critical factor model, might 
look like:
 In translating the three-dimensional model to the written report, writers can discuss the 
 relative significance and temporal relationship of each event in the eventual outcome of 
 the event. Instead of listing events in chronological order with the implied but 
 unarticulated causal connections, writers can articulate the underlying technical, political, 
 and social assumptions that enable investigators to draw conclusions about the link 
 between seemingly unrelated events in the system. In defining a responsible agent for 
 each contributing event, writers could also acknowledge conflicting assumptions about 
 risk and responsibility in...disasters. (“The Dynamics of Disaster” 416) 
In terms of the Deepwater Horizon blowout, the National Commission Report (NCR) 
acknowledges this component of distributive agency, of appealing to the complex and 
multivalent agential forces at work, of aligning with Sauer’s vision for an accident report that 
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draws more “seemingly unrelated” events into the system. The NCR engages in the type of 
articulation Sauer calls for, as it situates the Deepwater Horizon blowout in a larger scope of the 
industry and also does not focus on allocating causality to a singular technical failure for which 
one party is responsible. (In fact, the NCR does not include any FTAs in the entire 398-page 
document.) Yet, despite this appeal to distributive agency, identification of the NCR as 
posthuman documentation is not so straightforward.  
 The NCR is a lengthy, technically-complex but narrative-driven document that 
acknowledges the various roles played by governments (122), industry standards (126), and 
fellow stakeholders (123). If one were to apply Sauer’s thesis to the Deepwater Horizon blowout, 
one would expect all the reports to be “bogged down” about discussion of the blowout preventer, 
or at least the cement casing around the drill that was wrongly inserted. What the NCR does well 
is it contextualizes the events in a larger network of causality, seeing the difference between 
government deregulation by the Bush, Clinton, and Obama administrations and the faulty 
blowout preventer as a matter of degree. While the report does seek to identify responsibility, it 
is not “bogged down” with this one reductive concern; there is an evident concern to distribute 
agency across a wide range of objects, stakeholders, communicative lapses, and managerial 
decisions. This is done by drawing a distinction between “immediate causes” and “root causes”:9  
 Whatever irreducible uncertainty may persist regarding the precise contributions to the 
 blowout of each of several potentially immediate causes, no such uncertainty exists about 
 the blowout’s root causes. (National Commission Report 122). 
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9 This echoes the work of Hannah Arrendt (1953), who, as discussed in chapter four, draws a distinction between 
“cause” and “origin” in her discussion of how political rises of totalitarianism come about.
Here, the writers of the NCR allow themselves an opportunity to become more clear about the 
levels of causes. They are entirely certain that government deregulation, poor safety standards for 
the oil industry, and an ethos of over-zealous production exist as “root causes,” indeed as the 
contextual system that exerts itself on rig operators. They are less certain, as the passage above 
indicates, about the “ranking” of the various technical causes that precipitated the blowout. They 
do not know the “precise contributions” of the many factors. This is understandable, as the NCR 
was published a mere nine months after the initial blowout. Much of the technical information, 
the “black box” information was not fully available at that time. One must wonder whether their 
appeal to complexity and uncertainty was intentional or merely the practical result of the 
conditions at hand. 
 Despite the posthuman feel to the report, the commission is still given the task of finding 
the root cause. This in a way is a mandate of the genre. The NCR does have a responsibility to 
find the technical causes, even if it does not use an FTA to deduce root causality. While they are 
careful to describe their disposition of uncertainty, the report does conclude that the immediate 
cause of the Macondo blowout was indeed the “failure to contain hydrocarbon pressures in the 
well” (115), stating that the three factors that could have contained the well were: “the cement at 
the bottom of the well, the mud in the well and in the riser, and the blowout preventer” (115). 
Each of these factors were the responsibility of several parties: Halliburton was in charge of the 
cement job, Transocean and BP senior rig operators were in charge of using mud to test the well 
pressure, and Cameron and BP were in charge of the blowout preventer, with the two companies 
building and maintaining the part, respectively. When the NCR looks for technical causes, they 
do not divorce them from other “seemingly unrelated events in the system” (Sauer, “The 
74
Dynamics of Disaster” 416); rather, they place them in context with the other more overarching 
causes: “Better management of decision-making processes within BP and other companies, 
better communication within and between BP and its contractors, and effective training of key 
engineering and rig personnel would have prevented the Macondo incident” (National 
Commission Report 122). This is further indicated in Table 1, where the report couches the 
decisions that led to the blowout in the context of risk management as it relates to cost- and time-
saving decisions (125); it then assigns responsibility to the appropriate party by identifying who 
had the final call in terms of decision-making.
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Table 1. National Commission Report’s time-risk decision analysis
More than just placing them in context, the writers of the presidentially-commissioned report do 
something that Sauer, in her assessment of accident reports, wished she saw more of: the drawing 
of specific connections between technical malfunctions and human risk assessment and 
responsibility: “BP’s fundamental mistake was its failure [...] to exercise special caution (and, 
accordingly, to direct its contractors to be especially vigilant) before relying on the primary 
cement as a barrier to hydrocarbon flow” (National Commission Report 118). Ultimately, the 
report implied that BP was the most responsible because of the sheer amount of poor risk 
assessments in comparison to the other stakeholders (see Table 1). The over-reliance10 and 
unfounded confidence imbued in BP management in their technology left the NCR no choice but 
to relate the necessary information that would inevitably serve against BP in the criminal 
accusations of gross negligence. Rather than simply rely on the traditional FTAs, the NCR moves 
beyond linear, two-dimensional notions of causality and instead offers up an interpretation of the 
events that traces the connections between the various stakeholders on and off the rig and the 
technical malfunctions that allowed the blowout and the subsequent spill to happen. However, 
the nature of the genre as an inquiry into causality still has restrictive effects on the writers’ 
ability to circumvent issues of primary responsibility and singular technical causality. 
 My desire here is to congratulate the NCR on doing such a fine job at contexualizing the 
event, differentiating between “root” and “immediate” causes, and tracing the complex human 
and nonhuman assemblages involved in the blowout, specifically as it relates to risk assessment. 
While I cannot truly call the NCR a “posthuman” report, it is also unreasonable to assume that 
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10 This over-reliance was well documented by Lustgarten (2012) and epitomized in BP engineer Brett Cocales’ email 
sent on April 16: “But who cares, its done, end of story, [we] will probably be fine and we’ll get a good cement job. I 
would rather have to squeeze [remediate the cement job] than get stuck above the WH [wellhead]. So Guide is right 
on the risk/reward equation” (National Commission Report 116). 
the composers of this report as individuals have much to gain from radically expanding agency 
to nonhuman forces. So, considering the nature of the genre, and the constraints therein, as well 
as the writers’ ability to trace the nuances of the complex systems “exerting themselves” into 
rhetorical situations, the NCR gets as (to put it bluntly) posthuman as possible considering the 
modern industrial and political frameworks from which the document manifested. 
 Negotiating Uncertainty: Timing and Access
 The first criterion of posthuman analysis—appealing to complexity—was applied 
specifically to the single document of the NCR because it was the only one of its kind to even 
remotely come close to fulfilling Sauer’s posthuman-esque vision. The second criterion—
negotiating uncertainty—is a category that is more widely applicable to all reports and is a bit 
more difficult to assess. The reason why it is more difficult to assess is because of the timing of 
the publication of these reports. The uncertainty of the technical causes of disasters is hard 
enough to resolve years after the event (as recent findings11 change the development of the 
Columbia space shuttle disaster over a decade later); yet the accident reports I am analyzing were 
published less than a year after the blowout, a blowout that is generally understood to be the 
worst ecological disaster of its kind.  When assessing this criterion then, with these reports or any  
other, it is important to learn to differentiate between uncertainty as a philosophical approach and 
uncertainty as a practical reality. The latter does not necessary mean that it is engaging in 
posthuman practice. With that in mind, let’s compare the NCR with the BP report.  
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11 This is in reference to the recently unearthed “Day 2” object (David 2013). 
 One of the key features of posthumanist thought is an embracing of uncertainty, indeed 
the belief that philosophers and scientists should be wary of any account of action that claims to 
attribute agency to a single source, thereby taking that source out of the inevitable relations 
within which it was operating. Posthumanist thinking rejects the notion of “objectified scientific 
analysis in which the analyst is an independent, distanced observer who can rationalize a system 
in which he  [or she] is subject rather than object” (Sauer, “The Dynamics of Disaster” 405; 
Harding; Keller; Hacker; Code). Instead, posthumanism acknowledges the uncertainty and 
contingency humans experience when trying to grapple with the world around them, always 
acknowledging the notion that as mere individual agents within a larger network of other human 
and nonhuman agents, we can never understand a real, true, objective sense of the world around 
us. 
 The NCR, as mentioned above, sends mixed messages about the degree of uncertainty in 
terms of technical causes. The writers are consistently very careful to avoid making any 
definitive statements, no doubt in their interest to remain on the surface unbiased:
 We may never know the precise extent to which each of these missteps and oversights in 
 fact caused the accident to occur. Certainly we will never know what motivated the final 
 decisions of those on the rig who died that night. (115) 
So too did other stakeholder reports (namely the BP Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation 
Report, herein referred to as the BP Report) dwell in uncertainty, despite the fact that they are 
driven by an FTA-type document model or narrative (which is unlike the NCR). The BP Report 
itself developed FTAs and placed them as appendices to the end of their report, which largely 
connected Halliburton to the poor cement casing job. This is the factor the BP Report counts as 
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most critical, this despite contrary claims made by the Det Norske Veritas Report,12 which 
focused almost exclusively on factors relating to the blowout preventer (BOP) as the most 
immediate causes. (It should be noted here that BP was the primary accountable party in relation 
to the functioning of the BOP.) Each report can be understood as identifying different “causes” of 
the blowout, which positions them all in a context of technological dissensus, or what the media 
likes to designate as “finger pointing.”
 The extensive FTAs created by the BP Report (almost impossible to view in the PDF 
format provided) reveal the complexity of an oil spill of this magnitude. The BP team used the 
fault tree analysis critiqued by Sauer to identify the multiple causes of the blowout. Unlike 
Sauer’s work, however, BP would not be reductive in their view of causality:
 The team did not identify any single action or inaction that caused this accident. Rather, a 
 complex and interlinked series of mechanical failures, human judgments, engineering 
 design, operational implementation and team interfaces came together to allow the 
 initiation and escalation of the accident. Multiple companies, work teams and 
 circumstances were involved over time. (BP Report 11)
If we are completely honest, this passage is clearly an attempt to dilute and disperse the 
responsibility that would inevitably be placed upon BP as a corporation. BP has its own right for 
self-interest and for maintaining its public image, and they are aware that this stems from a 
inquiry-based investigation completed by experts who are “on their side,” or who can vouch for 
them in a legal setting. Their uncertainty is less grounded in philosophy and more grounded in 
self-interest.  
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12 The Det Norske Veritas (DNV) Report was written by a private risk management company of the same name. 
DNV was contracted by the collective of the Department of the Interior, specifically its internal department in charge 
of environmental concerns: the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE). 
 Nevertheless, BP did provide a section designed to educate the public and put forth their 
version of what happened. The report shows four distinct fault trees:
1. Well integrity was not established or failed
2. Hydrocarbons entered the well undetected and well control was lost
3. Hydrocarbons ignited on Deepwater Horizon
4. The blowout preventer did not seal the well          
While they are simply too large to copy here, each FTA describes a possible cause to the 
blowout, tracing the necessary steps backwards to possible faults. Now, while it might be 
considered that it is in BP’s best interests to use their accident reports to distribute causality, still, 
the report does not give into the genre expectation discussed earlier that only one cause relating 
to the entire event should be chosen. So, to what degree then is this uncertainty in the posthuman 
sense? How much does corporate interest and public distrust and skepticism frame our 
theoretical interpretations of technical documentation? Certainly the NCR, while it does discuss 
the political failures of past and present administrations, have interest in the outcome of the case 
even if their representatives were not aboard the rig. The BP Report does, it appears, try and 
dilute the responsibility. It is not unreasonable to think that. But it should also be noted that BP 
actually did not have access to the blowout preventer (BOP), which was eventually discovered to 
be the key technical component of the blowout and a component that was ultimately found to be 
the responsibility of BP rig operators to maintain. This is akin to aviation experts trying to 
deduce the cause of an airliner crash without the black box. 
 BP cannot determine which of the four FTA applies because their report is preliminary, 
submitted soon after the accident and without a complete analysis. That is, both the NCR and the 
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BP Report came out less than a year after the blowout took place (BP Report came out in 
September of 2010 and the National Commission Report in January of 2011). Both reports make 
it clear that they are not final reports and have no legal bearing but instead represent the 
respective investigative teams “best judgments” about the events given the information provided 
at the time. Here’s a snippet from the preamble in the BP Report:
 In preparing this report, the investigation team did not evaluate evidence against legal 
 standards, including but not limited to the standards regarding causation, liability, intent 
 and the admissibility of evidence in court or other proceedings. (n.pg)
What this means is that the two public reports with perhaps the most relevance were releasing 
substantial amounts of information about the blowout and spill with only partial amounts of 
information and limited access to crucial technological artifacts that would further enhance and 
provide stability in analysis. (The BOP was actually in possession of Cameron, its maker, at the 
time [BP Report 190].) Despite this precarious position, BP’s investigative team, later on in the 
report, makes it clear their purpose: “While the understanding of this accident will continue to 
develop with time, the information in this report can support learning and the prevention of a 
recurrence.” The writers of both reports, but especially the BP Report, are intimately aware of the 
temporal constraints of these investigative processes and do their best, despite the conditions and 
skepticism of political and corporate self-interest, to grapple with the uncertainty of technical 
causality and organizational agency. 
 In light of these difficulties, it is difficult to check off either the NCR or the BP Report as 
engaging in philosophical uncertainty about agency and human-technological relations 
surrounding the disaster. It is also difficult to discuss authorial intent and political and corporate 
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motivations within the eight months after the disaster and without substantial pieces of 
information. So, while uncertainty is clearly a marker of a posthuman approach to the philosophy 
of science, and it clearly is a key characteristic of the post-disaster cacophony, I read both reports 
as inconclusive in this regard and see the value in my analysis as reinforcing the importance in 
maintaining a nuanced and informed approach to uncertainty in the genre of accident reports.
Irreducibility of Technical Objects: The Blowout Preventer (BOP)
     The final criterion—the irreducibility of objects—is deeply philosophical, and more 
specifically ontological. This criterion encourages readers to think about the specific roles 
individual nonhuman objects play in our ability to engage in various rhetorical situations and the 
degree of “agency” they have in such relationships. 
 The Deepwater Horizon blowout included “four major players,” all of whom had various 
positioning in terms of the technology used to extract hydrocarbons from the well thousands of 
feet below the surface of the Gulf of Mexico. Further, each major player had a distinct 
relationship to the blowout preventer: Cameron International made the part; Transocean leased 
the rig depending on the part; BP was operating the rig and testing the blowout preventer (BOP); 
and Halliburton cemented the drill walls with cement to ensure stability around the BOP. On 
February 25, 2013, in the federal court in New Orleans, the trial over liability, centered around 
identifying the cause and thus public responsibility for the blowout, began (Johnson Jr, Fisk, and 
Feeley 2013). This trial was in large part characterized by determining the relationship of each 
major stakeholder to the BOP, which would then give an accurate picture—in the court’s mind—
of the varying degrees of liability. The BOP was made by Cameron, surrounded by Halliburton 
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concrete, operated and maintained by BP to act as the dead man’s switch for Transocean’s rig. 
And despite BP’s best efforts to emphasize the poor cementing job done by Halliburton, the 
failure of the blind shear rams (BSRs) within the BOP were ultimately—according to legal 
documentation—what allowed the rig to experience a blowout, and thus an explosion and spill.
 Now in order to frame the court’s decision in this matter, it is useful here to turn to Bruno 
Latour’s work on the ontological nature of technological objects and Latour’s focus on the 
relationism characterizing objects. Perhaps the most prevalent and well-known articulation of 
how we can conceive of the relationships between human actants and organizations and 
nonhuman objects is Latour’s Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which has already made its way 
rather substantially into technical communication (Rivers; Spinuzzi; Mara and Hawk; Hawk). 
Latour is concerned with moving away from first principles and instead toward conceiving the 
world as a series of actors interacting with each other, thereby being irreducible to themselves. 
Humans relinquish their privileged role as phenomenologists and instead are relegated to mere 
“objects” themselves, on equal footing with the real world in which they live. All entities are 
interdependent and cannot exist apart from from that system. They are irreducible to themselves 
and cannot be explained as individual objects outside of their networked connections to other 
entities. This system, then, is predicated primarily on the principle of the irreducibility of 
objects,13 of the notion that the agency of an object cannot be merely reduced to the agency of 
another actant or even its own sense of agency. 
 For Latour, objects have been mistreated, or altogether ignored, couched thoughtlessly in 
the disconnected construction of “nature” or “technology” and thereby remaining absent from 
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13 This has led to an identification of Latourian philosophy as an “object-oriented philosophy” (Harman 2009).
humanistic conceptions of rhetoric. They are the “missing masses” from our sphere of thinking, 
lacking any sort of democratic representation in our fields of discourse and realms of philosophy. 
To give voice, so to speak, to real objects, Latour insists that we need to alter the way we 
approach and analyze the world. In his essay, “Why Has Critique Run Out of Steam?” we see 
Latour outlining why criticism as it exists today uses objects as explanatory means for larger 
social issues and realities (241). This is unacceptable, as no single entity (whether it be an idea 
like greed, a disease like cancer, a technology like a smart phone) is capable in and of itself of 
explaining a phenomenon or an event. No single entity, such as the BOP, is capable of being used 
as an explanatory device for causality of a larger event, such as the Deepwater Horizon blowout.
 Rather, Latour, quite disdainfully, points out that objects are used as explanatory devices 
to explain human behavior in a rather self-centered, anthropocentric position. In terms of the 
Deepwater Horizon blowout, the failure of the BOP (“dead man’s switch”) in the single-tubed 
drill inserted into the Macondo well was because of BP’s amoral corporate goals and not because 
of the explosive, humbling powers of the hydrocarbonic gas dwelling deep within the muddied 
well waters. His desire is that we begin to trace through inquiry all the actual relations between 
objects to seek answers to our experiences. The relation between a hammer and the nail holding 
together a table is just as important as the acts of sociability and consumption that take place on 
that very table. 
 Because Latour is concerned to over-attribute agency and causality to any one entity, and 
this includes individual humans, it can be said that the French thinker deals with the 
“democratization of objects.”14 The role of the human in Latour’s ontology is minimized, at 
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times to an equal plane with objects. The philosophical trend to excitedly grapple with the 
democratization of ontology indicates a frustration with cultural and political theories of relations 
that place emphasis on semiotic interpretations of relationships and meaning. An example that is 
often given is a natural disaster or event, like a hurricane. Undoubtedly hurricanes have changed 
the social and political landscape in the areas it affected (i.e., Katrina). This catastrophe brought 
up many political issues (treatment of area by President Bush) and religious issues (disaster 
result of God’s direct punishment) that would indicate that our understanding was focused on 
how a natural event changed our semiotic understanding of our environment. What Latour wants 
to do is grant a level of agency to natural events, casting Hurricane Katrina as an object or an 
entity that exists not in and of itself or independently of our interpretations of it. This framework 
changes the way we understand our relations, particularly with nature, and not only offers a fresh 
alternative to cultural theories and political science theories of our relations, which tend to 
assume monolithic status of cultures and deem objects as being overdetermined by culture, but 
also humbles the agency humans have in ontological frameworks. To even say anymore that 
humans have a relationship to nature is a misnomer in the sense that humans are nature and 
nature is humanity. Each object within our environment is absolutely irreducible to anything else: 
everything has a form of agency that extends beyond the attribution we assign it. To use Latour’s 
example of guns again: 
 You are different with a gun in your hand; the gun is different with you holding it. You 
 are another subject because you hold the gun; the gun is another object because it has 
 entered into a relationship with you. The gun is no longer the gun-in-the-armory or the 
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 gun-in-the-drawer or the gun-in-the-pocket, but the gun-in-your-hand, aimed at someone 
 who is screaming. (Pandora’s Hope 179-80)
The gun is irreducible to itself and its impact on and with the person holding it—and even vice 
versa—must always be considered. 
 Back to the Deepwater litigation. If we take these complicated Latourian ideas and think 
about the BOP as an object that is irreducible and cannot be considered outside its relations to the 
“four major players,” we find ourselves in a position unlike the reductive positions taken by the 
news media and even some technical inquiries. We find ourselves in a position where we cannot 
simply identify the BOP as the cause of the blowout; we cannot simply think that the BOP can be 
chalked up as the culprit in the oil spill and that is has any sort of agency outside of its immediate 
and extended articulations with the stakeholders in contact with it. After the first couple of weeks 
of the liability trial, it was found that Cameron International Corp.—the Switzerland-based 
maker of the BOP—was not culpable for any payments or damages for the Gulf ecosystem or for 
private businesses. It was found that the maker of the BOP was not responsible for its 
malfunctioning during the time of the blowout. On April, 2013, Cameron was dismissed from the 
Deepwater Horizon trial; they were “no longer a defendant in the first phase of a trial designed to 
identify causes of BP’s well blowout and assign fault to the companies involved” (Associated 
Press “Cameron Dismissed”). U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier did not find any negligence on 
Cameron’s part that contributed to the disaster: 
 The evidence is directed not at Cameron itself but rather at Cameron’s customers...[BP 
 and Transocean are] sophisticated customers [...] They specified and selected the type of 
 blowout preventer, the components, the arrangement of the components and made 
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 decisions, whether those decisions in the end were right or wrong or proper or not, they 
 made decisions as to how this blowout preventer would be configured and arranged and 
 its capacity. (Johnson Jr., Fisk, and Feeley 2013)
During the trial there were investigations as to whether or not the part was indeed made with a 
malfunction. No evidence was found that Cameron did in fact make a faulty BOP. Thus, the 
judge ruled that it was the responsibility of the buyers and operators of the BOP to maintain its 
functionality, namely BP and Transocean. 
 In terms of documentation, the BOP as an object was discussed thoroughly in the 
accident reports, and was identified most often as the “primary technical cause.” The accident 
reports, and the witnesses and experts used to compose the documents, were used in the liability 
trial to help determine causality of the event (showing how accident reports serve as part of what 
Sauer calls the larger cycle of technical documentation). The BOP, which was deeply involved in 
the “emergence” (Mara and Hawk 4) of disaster in terms of how the reports were written, was 
found, in part because of the non-posthumanist-leaning accident reports, to be irreducible. The 
courtroom proceedings, mainly the liability trial, focused almost exclusively on which 
stakeholder was most responsible for the functionality of the BOP. The reductive technical 
qualities of many of the investigative reports used as evidence in the trial had the narrowing 
effect of determining culpability based upon one’s proximity to or responsibility with the BOP. It 
was almost as if the BOP was itself the fifth major player—perhaps even a stakeholder—in the 
trial, exerting itself into the complex legal systems involved of the ruling. 
 The final section, in building off the previous criteria outlined, briefly considers the 
prospect of thinking more complexly, perhaps more radically about the idea of viable nonhuman 
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stakeholders. In the section, I ask: How can we begin to think about specific nonhuman actants 
as stakeholders? What affordances does this give us? Does it help us think more rhetorically 
about objects? Does it expand the way we think about stakeholder theory?   
Towards a Notion of Nonhuman Stakeholders
  The classical definition of stakeholder used most often in technical communication     
comes from Andrew Freeman (1984), who defines stakeholders as “any group or individual who 
can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives” (46). This then-
revolutionary way of understanding organizational behavior and public image challenged the 
way people thought of organizations: “The organization itself should be thought of as a grouping 
of stakeholders and the purpose of the organization should be to manage their interests, needs, 
and viewpoints” (Friedman, “Stakeholder” 1). Freeman’s intentionally broad definition leaves it 
up to individual organizations to decide where the lines between “affecting” and “being affected” 
reside. The relationship between what a stakeholder is and who has agency is unclear in this 
work.  
 While not as radical as the Community Environmental Legal Defense Fund’s (CELDF) 
insistence that plants have legal rights,15 there is a cognizance by those using stakeholder theory 
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15 In a special NPR series on “The Future of Nonhuman Rights,” Weeks (2012) wonders whether or not plants have 
the legal right to evolve. Since animals have legal rights, and plants to “exhibit humanlike behavior,” should we not 
respect the “anoetic consciousness” (Chamovitz 2012) of plants? Based on the humanlike behaviors (like chili 
peppers being able to “hear” sweet fennel), CELDF argues that plants have both interests and rights as they continue 
to evolve side by side their animal and human counterparts. Under such a system that grants rights to ecological 
entities, Mari Margil, member of CELDF, claims that “a river may be recognized as having the right to flow, fish 
and other species in a river may be recognized as having the right to exist and evolve” (Weeks 2012). This system is 
certainly in line with perspectives promoting sustainability by advocating for the natural balance of ecosystems. 
Weeks concludes his piece by indicating his position: “And if sovereignty for soybeans is not imminent, our 
awareness of our relationships to plants—and how we treat them—is moving to the front burner.” Put in the 
language of technical communication, CELDF is advocating that ecologies and the nonhumans constituting them are 
stakeholders in the larger scheme of human progress and development.
that the way one “treats” or “frames” the environment is important. For example, BSR is an 
organization devoted to promoting and building sustainable measures through networking 
businesses worldwide.16 They have a specific approach to identifying stakeholders (BSR 1), 
mainly one that involves mapping and charting the levels of influence each stakeholder has. 
What is useful here is that, in their categorization of stakeholders, they have one hodgepodge 
category for all things pertaining to
 Environment (e.g. nature, nonhuman species, future generations, scientists, ecologists, 
 spiritual communities, advocates, and NGOs) 
This broad brushstroke is reminiscent of the discourses of environmentalism discussed in 
chapters one and two in that rather than work towards complexity, it works towards over-
simplicity. The same goes for Henrietta Nickels Shirk (1998) when she speaks of the greening of 
technical communication by having “the environment” as a stakeholder. Indeed, Cantrill and 
Oravec’s (1) assertion in Symbolic Earth that, “Of our environment, what we say is what we 
see,” is really driven home when one looks how at the environment is depicted in stakeholder 
theories. The environment in discussions on stakeholder theories and practices is depicted as a 
static object that must be considered rather than a complex system contingent upon our 
communicative constructions (Luhmann 1989).17 Nonhuman entities have been consistently 
integrated into the legal realm of events and are included in many instantiations of stakeholder 
models of communication. In such cases, they are seen as legitimized things which require our 
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16 From their about page: “BSR works with its global network of more than 250 member companies to build a just 
and sustainable world. From its offices in Asia, Europe, and North and South America, BSR develops sustainable 
business strategies and solutions through consulting, research, and cross-sector collaboration” (BSR). 
17 Niklas Luhmann’s Ecological Communication (1989) works towards understanding environmental dangers in 
terms of how society’s react to the way we communicate about them: “The oil-pumps may run dry and the average 
climatic tempratures may rise or fall. As long as this is not the subject of communication it has no social 
effect” (28-29). 
care. They are part of the larger “environmentalist ethic” and not part of the concern to elucidate 
the suasive force of things. The increased integration of nonhuman natural things into 
stakeholder conversations is the result of ethico-political pressures from other stakeholders 
entrenched in the same issues being discussed. Nonhuman species must be considered a 
significant stakeholder because a civil society organization values their existence and thus 
protection. As such, the “suasive force” (of influence, and not necessary persuasion) of natural 
nonhuman things is indirect, operating as surrogates for the agendas of human-driven 
stakeholders (cf. Morton, Ecology without Nature 4). Human stakeholders give voice and act as 
spokespeople for nonhuman stakeholders. The suasive force of a forest in eastern Washington 
state facing potential deforestation is saved not because of its voice but because of its 
representational value for the concerns of other groups. 
 The more thoughtful inclusion of nonhuman objects into stakeholder theories represents a 
posthumanist ethic that moves towards thinking about the world as moving away from an over-
exaggeration of the agency of human. This resembles Shirk’s (1998) assertion that the integration 
of environmental concerns into technical communication (she posits the environment as a 
programmatic stakeholder) on a programmatic level illuminates the “culture-bearing” qualities of 
the field (76). Including nonhumans as viable stakeholders develops a sense that what we do in 
terms of industrial projects or resource extraction has a necessary rippling effect on a variety of 
other forces and further that these projects are in and of themselves resultant from our own 
partially-determined sense of agency.  
 So then what is to be made of the category of nonhumans in stakeholder theories? Do 
stakeholder models help to more fully account for the suasive force of nonhuman things? 
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Freeman’s definition of stakeholder is far too open for merely simplify “the environment” as a 
stakeholder. Technical communicators have the opportunity to take their responsibility to do 
justice to the complex assemblages they use, study, and theorize and apply it to Freeman’s open 
definition of a stakeholder. Starik (1993), who offers his own definition of stakeholder, sees a 
similar opportunity and approaches stakeholders as “any naturally occurring entity that affects or 
is affected by organizational performance” (22). According to Friedman (2006) and his recent 
and comprehensive book on stakeholder theory and practice, Starik’s definition represents “the 
broadest end of the spectrum,” (9), with the most narrow being a combination of both Freeman 
and Carroll’s (1993) definition: “individuals or groups with which business interacts who have a 
‘stake,’ or vested interest, in the firm” (22). For Starik and his expansive definition, the key 
phrase is still “naturally occurring,” which thus includes only living entities: “animals and plants; 
it also includes non-living environmental forms such as rocks and water, as well as systems of 
such entities including the Sun-Earth system (Gaia) and the cosmos” (Friedman 9). Still, there is 
no active definition in the field of stakeholder theory and practice that depicts nonhuman, 
technological objects as viable entrants into the stakeholder conversation.   
 Yet, if plants and animals are viewed as “affecting and being affect by” organizations, one 
can surely see how, after reading this chapter and perhaps even the ones proceeding it, how 
nonhuman, non-living objects can, under the same criteria, be considered for stakeholder status. 
Just how much power did the BOP have on the organizational decisions made by BP? BP 
engineers and senior rig operators time and time again showed a consistent over-reliance 
(Lustgarten 2012) on the BOP as a back-up plan, indeed as the “dead man’s switch.” The 
technologically-complex safety measures in place aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig manifested 
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as a sense of complacency in the BP workers. The BOP exerted a sense of security that in turn 
led the BP engineers to make high-risk decisions (see again Table 1) about their drilling 
operations. If we are using Freeman’s conceptualization of a stakeholder (as having any degree 
of agency), and putting that alongside Starik’s inclusivity, then how can we not assert that the 
BOP was a legitimate stakeholder in the BP operations of Deepwater Horizon, affecting 
managerial decisions and also, as mentioned previously in the chapter, legal proceedings? The 
BOP has a sense of agency imbued in it that cannot solely be accounted for by human action or 
technical failure. According to Freeman’s definition, the BOP is a stakeholder and according to 
the recent courtroom proceedings should be considered as such.      
 Technical communicators have long wanted the public to see that objects matter, that 
nonhuman things impact and shape and determine us in very rhetorical, meaningful ways. I 
contend that a more complete account of risk emerges when the nonhuman factor is fully 
integrated. The negotiation of the impact of the BOP on the blowout represents in the reports 
outlined above a larger argument for the inclusion of material objects as stakeholders in the 
discourse of disaster through emphasizing the importance of tracing the assemblages from which 
disaster emerge as opposed to identifying the single party from whom the disaster was caused.
Conclusions and Implications
 In a complex ecological-technological-corporate disaster such as Deepwater Horizon, 
current human-centered and “nature as object” (Killingsworth and Palmer) models of stakeholder 
relations are inadequate. Moving beyond these models can help bridge the divide between 
humans and nonhumans in the context of risk communication. Ultimately, this chapter shows 
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how the accident reports composed by various stakeholders of the Deepwater Horizon blowout 
can be viewed in varying degrees as posthumanist undertakings, thus working towards Andrew 
Mara and Byron Hawk’s call for technical communication as a field to continue to research and 
articulate how complex systems—be they ecological, technological, organizational, or 
pedagogical—exert agency on individuals and groups involved in a given event.
 The goal of this chapter was to explore the possibility of conceptualizing nonhuman 
actants as viable stakeholders in the context of post-disaster risk communication and technical 
communication more generally. Current stakeholder models predominantly understand the 
environment as a distinct “object” (Killingsworth and Palmer Ecospeak), separate from human 
affairs, thereby indicating an allegiance to human-centered, humanistic models of thinking. 
Given the field of technical communication’s posthumanist concern to map and theorize the 
complexity of organizational, technological, and ecological systems, stakeholder models that cast 
“the environment” as a single entity are inadequate in their ability to capture the full rhetorical 
forces at work in a given event. 
 This “environmental reductiveness” is, in my mind, rendering the public discourses 
surrounding the event stale. Killingsworth and Palmer, again, write that ecological catastrophes 
are allowed to take place more and more often because environmentalist groups “have been 
unable to create strong communicative links with the mass public, links that would support a 
strong power base for reformative action” (7). This, ultimately, for the authors, is a failure of 
rhetorical identification, a failure on behalf of such groups—be they preservationists, deep 
ecologists, or eco-anarchists—to “form adequate identifications through effective appeals” (7). 
The “Blame and Boycott BP” rhetoric that arose after the blowout is an example of just such an 
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ineffective appeal. Those seeking bankruptcy and eradication of the BP corporation after seeing 
what the damage the millions of barrels of crude oil did to the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem and 
surrounding businesses (a justified sentiment, to be sure) are promoting a narrative no different 
than the one promoted by FTAs in the technical reports documenting such a sad scene. As Latour 
notes in Pandora’s Hope (1999), “the straight lines of philosophy are of no use when it is the 
crooked labyrinth of machinery and machinations, of artifacts and daedalia, that we have to 
explore” (176). Overly-reductive narratives of singular blame and causality about disasters, 
whether they are documented in official reports or yelled from the streets, can be tempered by an 
appeal to complexity: one that reveals the complex interactions between humans and nonhumans 
in the precipitation of disaster.     
 Adopting a posthuman approach to accident reports does have the potential to enact real 
change. Accident reports are in fact key components of the what Sauer (2003) calls “the cycle of 
technical documentation in large regulatory industries” (17). The oil industry if course 
considered one of these industries. These accident reports are second in Sauer’s cycle, which 
consists of, in order: (1) local documentation, (2) accident reports, (3) statistical reports, (4) 
policy and regulations, (5) practices and procedures, and (6) training and instruction (Sauer, The 
Rhetoric of Risk 17; Tachino 219). The statistical reports and policy and regulations, largely 
developed from accident reports, are important in forensic rhetoric when corporations such as 
BP are called to the stand to account for the behavior and to pay reparations for the irreparable 
ecological damage caused by the spill. The narratives constructed in the accident reports play a 
significant role not only in the cycle of documentation but also therefore play an extended role in 
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legal proceedings and political and industry policy changes. Just how news media outlets and 
popular literature presents such changes is the topic of chapter four. 
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Chapter 4. A Posthuman Epideixis
“It was as if God had decided to put to the test every 
capacity for surprise and was keeping the inhabitants of 
Macondo in a permanent alternation between excitement  
and disappointment, doubt and revelation, to such an 
extreme that no one knew for certain where the limits of 
reality lay.”
-Gabriel García Márquez, One Hundred Years of 
Solitude
Introduction
 While the previous chapter focused on technical communication within the oil industry 
itself, this chapter focuses on the rhetorical constructions of the Deepwater Horizon blowout in 
more explicitly public arenas, namely popular literature and national news media coverage. 
Colloquially referred to as the “blame game,” post-disaster coverage is typically reductive in its 
efforts, seeking to find the sole technical cause and the sole responsible party for the catastrophic 
event. With the sheer complexity of disasters and the high amount of stakeholders involved, such 
narrow inquiries inevitably oversimplify the event. 
 Rhetorically speaking, this “blame game” falls within the ancient genre of epideixis. 
Epideictic rhetorics, according to Aristotle (the first one to categorize the genre), are 
demonstrative showpieces that seek to either celebrate or blame an individual or group. The most 
seminal example is Gorgias’ The Encomium of Helen, which sought to exonerate Helen of Troy 
from her position as the cause of the Trojan War. Contemporary rhetorical theorists have noted 
that epideictic rhetorics, more than just hollow showpieces, actually create and maintain social 
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values (doxa). The post-disaster cacophony of discursive acts we cynically call the “blame 
game” is actually a battleground for competing cultural, political, and scientific value systems. 
 Currently, the value system most dominantly propagated in news media and popular 
literature outlets regarding the Deepwater Horizon blowout is imbued with modernist notions of 
blame. Anti-BP literature, coverage of BP boycotts, and even the renaming of the event to a 
misnomer of the “BP Oil Spill” all stem from the fact that it was one of the BP rig operators that 
was in charge of checking the battery life of the blowout preventer (BOP), the malfunctioning of 
which allowed the blowout to turn from a kickback to a major explosion and spill. The clear 
proximity of the rig worker to the malfunctioning part itself, which was largely deemed as the 
“cause,” allowed those covering the disaster to assert that the blowout was caused by a failure of 
human responsibility, that the devastating impact on the Gulf was the result of the moral 
depravity of BP personnel to care ethically for the Gulf waters. Underlying much of the 
epideictic utterances surrounding the blowout is the ideological, even ontological belief in the 
human mastery over technology and the natural environment. The blowout and spill, in this 
modern epideictic framework, locate blame in the will and character of individual human actors. 
 The problem with this reductive moralization of ecological disasters is that it conflates 
two distinct aspects of disaster: blame and causality. “Causality” is a matter of forensic rhetoric 
and analysis. This analysis takes the form of investigative reports and inquiries conducted by 
scientists and industry experts with the end goal of improving the functionality of the given 
technology, in this case the blowout preventer (BOP). In its current form, it is a modernist notion 
planted in a humanist ideology of linear causality from human to machine. In its posthuman 
form, it is a non-modern concept complicated by the distributed model of agency and a 
97
recognition of complexity and non-linear or emergent causality. In application, causality is the 
forensic duty of science.  “Blame” by contrast is a moral concept, a legal determination, and a 
political strategy.  If blame is also causality, it seems to be so only in a sense that “cause” and 
“blame” are too casually taken as synonymous.  Blame is not a scientific concept or deliberation.  
Because these two aspects are conflated, the reductive nature of technical inquiry positively 
correlates with reductive forces of blame. This is a problem, however, because whomever was in 
charge of overseeing the BOP is not the only person or party responsible for the 46 million 
barrels of oil now percolating through Gulf waters. This is a rhetorical problem because the 
politics of blame (epideixis) invests too heavily in a single party based on the technical findings 
of investigative reports. Not only that, but the formulation of the blame is put in moralizing 
terms: greed, corruption, reckless, dishonest, disloyal—which all point towards a modern 
understanding of the relationship between humans, nature, and technology.
 What happens to epideictic rhetorics, then, if we adopt a posthuman approach? How 
would epideictic rhetoric work if, instead of aligning blame with singular causality, we aligned 
responsibility with agential assemblages? What becomes of the relationship between blame and 
causality in an epideictic framework that decentralizes the roles of human agents in favor of a 
more distributed idea of human and nonhuman agency? This chapter explores these questions in 
detail, offering posthuman interpretations of epideictic rhetorics as presented in various news 
media and popular literature sources. My intent with this chapter is to analyze materials that 
contain, as Michael Halloran calls them, “epideictic issues” (“Doing Public Business” 121). The 
materials analyzed in this chapter are largely popular literature and new media sources. Since key 
characteristics of the epideictic are (a) that it takes place during the immediate “present,” (b) that 
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the audience is observing, not participating, and (c) that the discourse is infused with ethically 
and/or morally driven and not technical accounts of the event, journalistic accounts and rushed-
to-the-press disaster narratives—the authors’ own sophistic epideixis—by popular mainstream 
publishers serve as ample content for the primarily theoretical purposes of this chapter. 
 In terms of structure, this chapter begins with an exploration of the epideictic genre or 
form as it existed in classical Greek rhetoric. From there contemporary instantiations of the 
genre, with specific attention on scientific discourse, are discussed in terms of their ability to 
illuminate the social function of the genre. Couched within a posthumanist re-reading of 
Gorgias’ Helen, I then argue that the epideictic genre in terms of application to disaster discourse 
can be understood as a “rhetoric of agencies” in the sense that the genre functions as a tool for 
promoting certain ontologies in terms of technical notions of causality and the parallel moral 
notions of legal culpability and blame. I posit that adopting a posthuman epideictic allows us 
more rich ground upon which to discuss and map social values and attitudes that shape public 
understanding of science. In a posthuman epideictic, where agency is distributed and recourse of 
action focuses on a more full scale approach to individuals and ethics, the problematic conflation 
of blame and causality begins to unravel, and we are given an approach to disaster that would 
“detach ethics from moralism” (Bennett 38). In many current usages of epideictic rhetorics in the 
context of disaster, the application  of the moral concept of blame is entrenched within technical 
and forensic inquiries into causality. Ultimately, adopting a posthumanist approach to disaster 
allows us to look closely at responsibility without having it hinge upon a reductive technical 
cause.
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Epideixis, Classically Speaking
 Before offering a reframing of the epideictic genre, it is necessary to first start such work 
with discussion of the original features and functions of the genre. Like much of Greek rhetorical 
history, it is useful to begin by distinguishing between facets of rhetoric that, as George Kennedy 
so mildly puts it, exist “before Aristotle” and “after Aristotle.” Before Aristotle, Protagoras, 
Gorgias, Hippias, and their fellow sophists sought to provide practical rhetorical training to any 
student seeking to improve his or her verbal capabilities. This training was distinguished by a 
teaching technique called epideixis, “a demonstrative speech, long or short, often flamboyant, in 
which the sophist undertook to demonstrate some proposition artistically” (Kennedy 10).1 The 
content of these demonstrative speeches was of lesser importance than the logical methods and 
stylistic devices that the pupil would seek to imitate for whichever and whatever purposes he or 
she saw fit, be it the courtroom or the countryside. The stylistically focused speeches would 
further be memorized by the pupils, so as to train them in the “gymnastics of the mind”2 and to 
develop an extensive repertoire of rhetorical devices, overcoming what some sophists believed to 
be an overemphasis on native ability in Greek oratorical culture. 
 This “skills over content” approach to rhetorical education3 epitomizes the usual tensions 
that arise between the sophists and other philosophers, perhaps those more sympathetic to Plato’s 
foundationalism. This notion is illuminated in Plato’s Phaedrus, when Phaedrus encounters 
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1 Kennedy’s definition is backed by fellow classicist E.M.Cope’s (1867) definition of epideictic as the 
“demonstrative, showy, ostentatious, declamatory kind: so called because speeches of this sort are composed for 
‘show’ or ‘exhibition’...and their [primary] object is to display the orator’s powers, and to amuse an audience” (An 
Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric 121). 
2 cf. Isocrates, Antidosis (266). In this passage, Isocrates identifies the practical, stylistically-oriented rhetorical skills 
as a mere preparation for real philosophy. 
3 This classification of the genre resembles classical understanding of the panegyric, a “show-off” rhetoric that 
foregrounds the speaker’s ability over the subject matter (Smith, Hermeneutics of Original Argument 23). 
Socrates during his attempt to memorize a singular speech by well-regarded Lysias (228a-b). 
After listening to Phaedrus’ partly memorized, partly recited expostulation of the speech, 
Socrates assures him that there are superior ways to structure a speech, and proceeds to give his 
own. More importantly, Socrates assures Phaedrus that “these types” of speeches that are 
memorized for modeling purposes are “to be distinguished from serious expositions of an 
idea” (Kennedy 11). In the exchange following Phaedrus’ recounting of Lysias’ speech, Socrates 
responds: 
I paid attention only to the speech’s style...For it seemed to me, Phaedrus—unless, of 
course, you disagree—that he said the same things two or even three times, as if he really 
didn’t have much to say about the subject, almost as if he just weren’t very interested in 
it. In fact, he seemed to me to be showing off, trying to demonstrate that he could say the 
same thing in two different ways, and say it just as well both times. (Phaedrus 235a)   
In taking the time to show how to better organize a speech, and then pointing out that these types 
of speeches are not necessarily the work of true philosophers, Socrates’ criticism reflected the 
common belief that an epideixis “was a lecture regularly given by sophists as a public display of 
their oratorical prowess” (Plato, “Complete Works” 792). These public displays, these stylistic 
templates from which to operate were cast as a distinct area of oratory, specifically one not 
heavily associated with the art of philosophy. 
 The insistence that moments of epideixis were mere ornamental deliveries not only 
aligned them with Plato’s version of rhetoric but further complicated the fact that, at times, an 
epideixis would indeed have serious social implications. According to Kennedy, Prodicus’ 
“Choice of Heracles,” Alcidamas’ “On Those Writing Written Speeches,” and Gorgias’ Helen 
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“fell between the extremes” in terms of the social import of content and the focus on ornamental 
features, with Helen “illustrat[ing] a method and expound[ing] some serious ideas about the 
nature of speech and human psychology, but at the end [referring] to the speech as a paignion, or 
‘plaything’” (11). In addition to its intellectual weightiness, Gorgias’ attempt to exonerate Helen 
was an important marker in the public deliberations of Greek social life and cultural history, but 
it was also just as much an exemplar of linguistic showmanship, oratorical experimentation, and 
pedagogical promotion. The merging of the poetic with the pedagogical is most definitely what 
made epideixis a truly sophistic genre and most definitely what made Aristotle skeptical of its 
social value.  
 Aristotle, then, was not the first to identify epideixis but was instead the first to try and 
categorize such speech acts in relation to others. Epideixis is not a term or concept that was 
invented by Aristotle, but it became the genre we understand it to be today (epideictic) through 
Aristotle’s systematic categorization of rhetoric as an art form. According to Schiappa and 
Timmerman (1996), “[p]rior to Aristotle, the word epideixis was used to designate a quality or 
characteristic of discourse rather than a genre of discourse.” Epideixis became a genre only when 
Aristotle’s efforts to systematically organize and arrange the art of rhetoric saw the encomium 
(praise or blame speeches toward a person or institution), the panegyric (festival oration), and the 
epitaphios logos (funeral oration/eulogy) grouped into one larger branch of rhetoric, 
complementing the more easily establishable forensic and deliberative branches (Jasinksi 210). 
In Rhetoric (1358b12-1358b13), Aristotle makes it clear that this hodgepodge of oratorical types 
could be cast into one category because of their three common characteristics. The speech must: 
i) be related to a ceremonial occasion; ii) serve as an elicitation of speaker’s rhetorical technique; 
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and iii) utilize praise and/or blame as the topoi. Unsurprisingly, Aristotle’s uptake of epideictic is 
unsatisfactorily narrow, and by his own admission weak (Sullivan 231), reducing the species to 
its praise and blame ends: “[Aristotle] thought of it as the rhetoric of praise and blame, as in a 
funeral oration or a denunciation of someone, and failed to formulate its role in the instilling, 
preservation, or enhancement of cultural values, even though this was clearly a major function, 
as seen in Pericles’ Funeral Oration” (Kennedy 22). Perhaps Kennedy’s speculation is right 
about Aristotle remaining content with a withering third branch of rhetoric because of his healthy  
distaste for Isocrates and his preference for logical, evidentiary forms of argumentation over the 
performative.4 
 
Modern Recovery of Epideictic Discourse
 Equally likely, perhaps, is that Aristotle’s attempt to categorize the potpourri of non-
logical genres is a task best left for someone else. For example, in Book I of On Rhetoric, 
Aristotle’s discussion of emotionally-laden, context-specific epideictic rhetoric breaks into a 
prescriptive “how-to” in praise and blame speeches, offering various “should” statements about 
the nature of the performance: “one should also use many kinds of amplification” (1368a38); 
“one should try to show [the subject] acting in accordance with deliberate purpose” (1367b32). 
This implies that Aristotle did not squelch the genre so much as we should acknowledge that 
Aristotle’s cautious, rational, and skeptical approach to rhetoric might not have been entirely 
conducive with the sophistic rhetorics being bandied about. 
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4 This is a nod to J.L. Austin’s How to Do Things With Words (1975) and his initial dualistic categorization of 
language into “performative” and “constative” utterances. 
 Regardless of Aristotle’s personal disposition toward epideixis, its underdevelopment 
over the centuries has provided contemporary rhetorical scholars with ample opportunity and a 
high degree of license with which to recover the mode of discourse. In stark contrast to 
Aristotle’s motivation to reduce and simplify the way we understand epideixis, modern scholars 
on the form have taken it in many different, more productive directions. As Dale Sullivan puts it, 
“[i]f we were confined to Aristotle’s conception alone, we would be hard-pressed to make much 
of the genre” (231). This observation stems from the fact that most modern uptake of the genre 
rely on another theorist or the application of other concepts to really develop the potential of 
epideictic rhetoric, affirming Walter Beale’s assertion that the classification of discourse is not an 
absolute categorization but rather is “informed by a great multiplicity of motives” (224). 
Epideictic rhetoric is in large part discussed not as a stable body or genre but in terms of its 
functions or characteristics: Bernard Duffy (1983) as philosophical; Walter Beale (1978) as 
performative; Michael Carter (1989) as ritualistic rhetoric; Lawrence Rosenfield (1980) as 
celebration; and Christine Oravec (1976) as educational. Takis Poulakos (1988) contends that 
epideictic analysis is a “site of a critique or transformation of the social order” (161) while 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) claim that it increases “adherence to the values it 
lauds” (50).  The modern development of epideictic theories has been happening in piecemeal, 
slowly drawing out individual characteristics or functions of a sophistic practice that was 
difficult to theorize and categorize. 
 The common thread connecting these diverse but not disparate epideictic rhetorics is the 
fact that they all stray away from trying to work towards a stable idea of what epideictic is or 
what it does, an effort that, as we read earlier, hindered Aristotle’s approach. The approaches 
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mentioned above all focus on the functions (educative, critique, performance, etc.) of epideictic 
rhetoric in a variety of cultural contexts as opposed to the Aristotelian focus on its conventions. 
Of all the attempts, Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s important work in The New Rhetoric “came 
closest to defining epideictic in terms of its social functions” (Sullivan 231, emphasis added). It 
was the most definitive attempt at understanding how epideictic rhetoric functions socially by 
espousing and maintaining cultural values and at establishing a sense of communion between the 
audience, or observers.5 The social function of the genre, however, does not preclude a focus on 
the core characteristic of praise and blame. On the contrary, the most read exemplar of the genre 
shows how the construction and deconstruction of blame in major social events indeed serves an 
important social function in the shaping and proliferation of cultural values and practice. This 
exemplar is Gorgias’ The Encomium of Helen. 
Reframing Helen
 Now, as stated above, the purpose of epideixis at the time was to both show off one’s 
oratorical prowess and educate. Some speeches carried little social significance, others carried 
greater social significance. Helen is an example of the latter, since Gorgias is not merely 
exaggerating the virtue of one man’s life, nor is he merely exposing his ability to employ the 
technique amplification in his oratory; rather Gorgias takes it upon himself to compose a speech 
that would, if effective, free Helen from all blame levied upon her for “causing” the Trojan War. 
His strategy for decentralizing the tremendous amount of blame on a single party (Helen of Troy) 
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5 What of the distinguishing characteristics of epideictic rhetorics, from the sophists to today, is that the audience is 
characterized as “observers,” as opposed to say a jury in judicial speeches. 
was to speculate about the multiple agencies or actors that added a more complex layer to the 
notion of causality.  
      The fact that Gorgias chose the exoneration of Helen of Troy as his demonstration 
piece speaks to the “serious playfulness” that could at times characterize the genre in the sense 
that: (1) showy, unserious epideictic rhetoric was the mode through which Gorgias chose to 
discuss this culturally hegemonic topic,6 and (2) epideictic rhetoric can be seen as an avenue 
through which the reshaping of public understanding of culturally significant events takes place. 
At the time, Gorgias was going against a rather rich literary and cultural history that by popular 
consensus attributed Helen’s beauty as the direct cause of the 10-year-long Trojan War: Paris of 
Troy, sent out to find the most beautiful woman in the land, was able to convince Helen, husband 
to Menelaus, King of Sparta, to elope with him. Now, as Kennedy writes, “Helen’s role in the 
abduction is not specific in the Homeric poems and was variously interpreted by later 
writers” (251). That is, whether or not she was violently abducted, gently persuaded, or willingly 
lured out of the home of Menelaus we cannot be sure; however, the fact that, had she been “less 
beautiful” she would not have been chosen and thus abducted, was the common opinion (doxa) 
at the time. 
 Gorgias, in true sophist form, takes the contrarian perspective on a ubiquitously-believed 
idea by retracting the blame from Helen and placing onto a variety of other factors. He does so 
by taking advantage of the historical uncertainty about the nature of Helen’s departure from 
Menelaus to Paris, outlining in logical form four other possible causes, each offering different 
accounts: the persuasiveness of speech, the misfortune of love, the power of the gods, and the 
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6 The characters and the events in the story are of course major forces in our understanding of Greek life and culture. 
strength of the abductor. When Gorgias argues for the higher degree of responsibility in the 
barbarian who abducted her, the persuader who duped her, or the gods who overruled her, what 
he is really doing is dislocating agency away from Helen’s essential beauty and towards the other 
precipitating factors involved.7 His method for displacing years and years of culturally-calcified 
blame from Helen was to question the dominant cultural model of agency, which was located 
directly onto the female agent: 
 [I]t is impossible to prevent a god’s predetermination by human premeditation, since by 
 nature the stronger force is not prevented by the weaker, but the weaker is ruled and 
 driven by the stronger; the stronger leads, the weaker follows. But god is stronger than 
 man in force and in wisdom and in other ways. If, therefore, by fate and god the cause 
 had been decreed, Helen must of all disgrace be freed. (Kennedy, Gorgias’ Encomium of 
 Helen 253). 
Gorgias’ exoneration of Helen stems, most effectively, from a movement away from overtly 
anthropocentric notions of agency. Helen is more than just a profit-driven8 demonstration: it is a 
treatise on agency that encouraged, rather radically, the public to rethink what they understood 
caused the most treacherous war in their culture’s history.
 By reading Helen with attention to agency, we can see how one of the cruxes of 
epideictic rhetoric is indeed causality, that the rather tired definition of epideictic as merely 
“celebratory” is inadequate as the form actually serves an integral function in the shaping of 
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7 Now, I must qualify my reading by acknowledging that Gorgias’ four arguments were probably not intended to be 
that serious—hence Aristotle’s critique—and are, to some, rather “unconvincing” (Poulakos 3). Yet, despite 
Gorgias’ playfulness (paignion), modern uptakes of the genre are insistent, and rightfully so, that speeches of virtue 
and vice, praise and blame, are important in the formation of cultural value systems.
8 It’s important to keep in mind here that Gorgias’ Helen was the most famous demonstration for luring students to 
his academy. 
public understanding of the precipitation of major events. While epideictic theorists have tried to 
expand the genre beyond merely praise and blame, it is also useful to reappraise its original 
function in light of more expanded notions of agency and causality. My project, like Gorgias’ 
speech, is an exercise in disrupting culturally-dominant notions of praise and blame.   
Scientific Value of the Epideictic Genre
 While the epideictic genre has long had pertinence in more performative contexts and 
communities, its application to scientific communities has proved a bit more difficult. However, 
with increased growth and awareness of the rhetorical nature of scientific practice and scientific 
communication, the value-laden doxa of scientific communities has been revealed underneath its 
seemingly impervious objectivist shell. Specifically, Sullivan (1991) has demonstrated how 
epideictic rhetoric serves a social function in the context of scientific communities. His premise, 
largely informed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s views, is as follows: “If science is indeed a 
culture, then it should be possible to characterize internal scientific discourse in terms of 
epideictic theory because historically, epideictic rhetoric has been the genre understood to create 
and to maintain a society’s value system” (229). By applying epideictic rhetoric to scientific 
discourse, Sullivan is acknowledging scientific communities as “cultures” that actively seek to 
create and maintain their value systems through patterns and functions of discourse, which, 
contextually speaking, furthered the work done a few years prior by Alan G. Gross (1990).9 
Sullivan’s project analyzes the principles and practices of internal scientific communication—
communication between and among communities of scientists—and argues that it works as a 
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9 Gross’s The Rhetoric of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP. 1990) was a seminal effort in the field of rhetoric 
of science, exploring the “possibility that the claims of science are solely the products of persuasion” (3).  
form of social orthodoxy, borrowing from the work of rhetorician Thomas Lessl (1988).10 
Sullivan isolates five functions of epideictic rhetoric (education, legitimation, demonstration, 
celebration, criticism) and applies them to real communicative practices to reveal how scientific 
discourse works intentionally towards the creation and maintenance of order and common 
opinion (doxa, thus orthodoxy) among its members. This reinforces Gross’s idea that 
 [t]he rhetorical view of science does not deny ‘the brute facts of nature’; it merely affirms 
 that these ‘facts,’ whatever they are, are not science itself...[T]he ‘brute facts’ themselves 
 mean nothing; only statements have meaning, and the truth of statements must be 
 persuaded...As rhetoricians, we study the world as meant by science. (Gross 4) 
Sullivan thus defines epideictic rhetoric as the rhetoric of orthodoxies (232). His work 
overcomes Aristotle’s oversight of the important social function of epideictic rhetoric, 
specifically its ability to shape the cultural values of a community, however defined. 
 Building off of Sullivan and his application of epideictic to the rhetoric of science, my 
work brings epideictic back to the mainstream public terrain from which it originally grew and 
analyzes the epideictic functions of external scientific rhetoric, namely the rhetoric of disaster. 
While Sullivan’s work focused on the “epideictic rhetoric of science,” my work focuses on the 
epideictic rhetoric about science (cf. Miller). While Sullivan integrated Lessl’s work to formulate 
his own understanding of epideictic as the rhetoric of orthodoxies, I am integrating posthumanist 
theory to contend that epideictic can be understood as a rhetoric of agencies. When discussing 
the public understanding or shaping of science, or even scientific literacy, epideictic rhetoric is 
most appropriate because of a key feature of the genre that sets it apart from its judicial and 
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10 Lessl’s “Heresy, Orthodoxy, and the Politics of Science” (1988) while never explicitly mentioning epideictic 
rhetoric as relevant to scientific discourse, outlines, in Sullivan’s mind, “characteristics of an orthodox 
response” (231) sufficiently similar to the characteristics of epideictic rhetoric.  
deliberative counterparts: the fact that the audience are observers, not judges. In the Deepwater 
Horizon case, much of the “blame game” takes place in a courtroom setting, which attorneys 
divide up the blame in portions they see strategically fit. This of course falls under the heading of 
forensic rhetoric. An epideictic rhetorical approach to disaster rhetorics allows us to focus on the 
public communication about science and to analyze how the news media and popular literature 
are shaping the nature of the disaster, specifically how we understand its causes.   
 
Epideixis as a Rhetoric of Agencies
 Following Sullivan’s methodology of using Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca’s 
modernizing of epideictic to apply to the rhetoric of science, the rest of this chapter demonstrates 
how and argues why it is valuable to understand the post-disaster rhetorics of the Deepwater 
Horizon blowout and disaster rhetorics more generally as functioning as a form of the epideictic 
genre by applying the functions of the genre to the Deepwater Horizon incident. Sullivan writes: 
“To apply epideictic to the rhetoric of science, we must first grasp the genre’s dominant 
characteristics and then adapt the genre to the situation being investigated, a task that can be 
accomplished by defining epideictic rhetoric in terms of its social functions” (230). So, what are 
these functions? Well, mine are slightly different from the five Sullivan outlines (education, 
legitimation, demonstration, celebration, and criticism) but I do follow his pattern of identifying 
significant characteristics and functions. Sullivan again: “My theory of epideictic as the rhetoric 
of orthodoxies further suggests that epideictic [...] works to build and maintain the belief system, 
or orthodoxy, of a culture” (232). Now, it is pretty widely understood that science is indeed a 
culture, so Sullivan’s argument about understanding internal scientific communication as a 
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culture is more of a truism at this point. Sullivan contends that discourse, with the scientific 
variety as no exception, can be understood as epideictic if it seeks to create and maintain 
orthodoxy, order, and/or stability. And while in the more cacophonous public sphere the attempts 
towards orthodoxy fall apart because of the diversity of perspectives and the move towards 
debate and not consensus, we can still interpret attributions of blame as value-laden assertions 
indicating how different sources and authors promote a given politics of blame and thus a 
philosophical approach to approach and thus an ontological approach to agency. 
 To interpret such assertions, I need to, like Sullivan did, “go beyond epideictic 
theorists” (Sullivan 231). In Sullivan’s case, he added a layer of theory about orthodoxy. In my 
case, I am adding a layer of posthumanist theory to illuminate a key feature of the genre: 
rhetorical constructions of blame. This chapter uses posthumanist theories from Jane Bennett, 
Bruno Latour, and others to help accentuate and deepen our understanding of disaster rhetorics as 
a mode of the epideictic genre. A posthuman epideictic theory is a rhetoric of agencies; my 
functions are borrowed primarily from Bennett’s work of human/nonhuman assemblages and are 
defined as those that work to build and maintain complex approaches to agency. Praise and 
blame rhetorics can be read as reflections of how cultures understand how human and nonhuman 
agency works. Gorgias’ Helen shows us how the Greeks grappled with assigning agency between 
humans and the gods. Deepwater Horizon public rhetorics show us how American culture 
grapples with assigning agency between humans and things (which, as Latour might add, have 
become our new factish gods).11 From the very beginning, the genre of epideictic rhetoric has 
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11 In the fetishes and factishes surrounding disaster, technological artifacts lifted into epideictic rhetorics are the 
objects of our attention, praise, and worship. The factish resulting from the human and nonhuman interactions in the 
explosion is, as Latour articulates, a byproduct of fact and fetish. The “fact” was produced by the National 
Commission Report, and others, that the blowout preventer was the underlying “cause” of the blowout and thus the 
spill. The fetish that...
dealt with challenging cultural ideas of what constitutes a cause, and thus can be called a rhetoric 
of agencies. 
 Post-disaster discourse, when understood as a genre of epideictic, functions to shape the 
public understanding of causality by espousing utterances of blame, which are not merely 
political finger-pointings but ontological assertions. Viewing post-disaster discourse through the 
epideictic genre brings to the fore key features of the debate that provide inlets for us to rethink 
traditional conceptions of agency in light of posthumanist theory. Below is an articulation of 
three features as played out in the Deepwater Horizon explosion: (1) the conflation of blame and 
causality, (2) the distinction between singular cause and contextual origin, and (3) the value-
laden nature of attribution. Afterwards I argue for why the cultivating of a posthuman approach 
to epideictic is important: namely that a posthuman epideixis splits the conflation of blame and 
causality, ensuring that the necessary reductive nature of technical inquiries into causality do not 
transfer to identifying responsible parties. This, in turn, ensures more productive pathways for 
public-oriented action. 
A Delicate Balance: Blame and Causality
 Fordham University law professor Howard Erichson, when interviewed during the recent 
spring 2013 trials, said that, “[i]n terms of sheer dollar amounts and public attention, [Deepwater 
Horizon] is one of the most complex and massive disputes ever faced by the courts” (Associated 
Press “Gulf Spill Trial”). And with the courtroom occupied with almost a dozen teams of lawyers 
representing the major stakeholders, namely BP, contractors Transocean, Halliburton, and 
Cameron, the US Justice Department and five Gulf states, it is easy to see why. Yet, in 2010, in 
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the months following the spill, and before the courtroom drama, it was not that complicated. For 
the public, there was only one party to look to, and that was BP.    
 Protestors, environmentalist groups, and images of oil-soaked pelicans all contributed to 
the notion that BP, a corporation with a terrible track record, was at fault. Even more than their 
counterparts, BP has been known to “cut corners” to save money, leading people to believe that 
the oil ravaging their local ecosystems, oil that belonged to BP and from which BP would profit, 
was directly BP’s fault. 
 Yet, while it was BP’s oil from which to gain, and while greedy decisions were no doubt 
made, the singular aggression towards the oil giant represented an over-attribution to human will 
and human character. BP was operating in a larger swarm of actants involved, from the US 
government, which overlooked some key safety issues, to leased blowout preventers, which were 
made overseas and leased as a separate component of the rig itself. Protesting one certain 
company over an event represents a belief that agency is located in the moral responsibility of an 
individual’s actions. This Kantian approach to agency casts the “autonomous will,” specifically 
its choice or inability to abide by moral law, as the cause of “evil.” This Kantian approach, 
however, is problematic not because of any theological obstacles but rather because it works 
reductively rather than towards a more comprehensive view of an event. 
 While a posthumanist approach does not deny the impact of a “willing subject,” Bennett 
points out that there is a certain “slipperiness” to a human-centered location of agency:  
 [T]here is not so much a doer (an agent) behind the deed [Deepwater Horizon] as a doing 
 and an effecting by a human-nonhuman assemblage. This federation of actants is a 
113
 creature that the concept of moral responsibility fits only loosely and to which the charge 
 of blame will not quite stick. (28, emphasis added)  
In an effort to move even further beyond the work of Maurice Merleau Ponty (2002) and more 
recently Diana Coole (2010), both of whom proffer theories that extend agency beyond the scope 
of human rationality, Bennett wants to include nonhumans in the demos (30). She wants to do 
this because she thinks that seeking to answer the question “Why?”—representing, like the 
protestors, an inquiry into the moral state of an doer or group of doers—is unproductive because 
it demands reductive moral responsibility from a complex assemblage. Andrew Hopkins, a 
professor and disaster analyst, wrote the book Disastrous Decisions not long after the spill in 
order to give the public a glimpse “inside the heads” of the decision-makers deeply involved in 
the events leading up to the blowout. This is the type of inquiry Bennett finds unproductive 
because it over-corrects, indeed over-attributes the precipitation of an event to the human moral 
compass, sometimes of only one individual. Ultimately, the charge of blame will not stick 
because in reality human actants and their willful decisions play only one part in the assemblage 
of Deepwater Horizon. If, as she implies, the prevention of another disaster requires a series of 
cooperative efforts (30)—such as government regulation, public awareness, longer-lasting 
batteries in the blowout preventer, corporate responsibility, and increased safety measures—then 
really how important is getting “inside the head” of BP CEO Tony Hayward? 
   Bennett thus delivers a theory of distributed agency that does not “posit a subject as the 
root cause of an effect” (31). Simply associating the blackened ecosystem in the Gulf of Mexico 
with a moral decision is drawing a straight line over and through a complex web of interactions 
and intersubjectivities, to borrow Coole’s terminology. Rather, Bennett, like Latour, favors more 
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of a tracing methodology aimed at delineating all the actants involved in the swarm: “To figure 
the generative source of effects as a swarm is to see human intentions as always in competition 
and confederation with many other strivings” (32). A posthumanist epideictic, then, would 
understand the blowout more as the result of competing forces of human and nonhuman actants, 
even if that theory is supported within a more traditional approach to blame. 
 Abrahm Lustgarten’s journalistic account in his book, Run to Failure: BP and the Making 
of the Deepwater Horizon Disaster (2012), is an exemplar of the type of anti-BP popular 
literature quickly sent to press following the highly visible blowout in the Gulf on April 20, 
2010. Lustgarten is an environmental reporter for ProPublica, a self-declared “safeguard of the 
public interest” that produces stories of “moral force.” ProPublica’s mission is quite unabashed: 
“To expose abuses of power and betrayals of the public trust by government, business, and other 
institutions, using the moral force of investigative journalism to spur reform through the 
sustained spotlighting of wrongdoing” (“About”). Right in the introduction, Lustgarten makes it 
clear where his utterances of blame are directed: 
 The causes of the disaster didn’t originate on the Deepwater Horizon rig in the days or 
 weeks before the accident. In fact, the fall of dominoes that would set in motion one of 
 the oil industry’s most deadly disasters and worst environmental catastrophes began years 
 before. The roots of the story of the Macondo failure concern corporate responsibility, 
 business ethics, and leadership and go back at least two decades, to a point at which BP 
 executives sought to redefine the company and reposition it as one of the great 
 corporations of our time. (xvi)
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Very much in the first sophistic tradition of epideixis, Lustgarten produced his great display, his 
masterful demonstration in the form of a book, his first in the field of investigative 
environmental journalism.12 Lustgarten bemoans the vices inherent in the oil industry. He mildly 
doles out responsibility rather publicly to the U.S. government and other overseeing agencies 
(i.e., MMS/BOEMRE), with the aim of trying to evoke some change in an industry that 
continues to remain rather cozy with the federal government despite its unsafe and ecologically 
unsound practices. His focus however is on BP and its longterm operation characterized at best 
in terms of its irresponsibility. In terms of the epideictic genre, it meets the ancient criteria of 
pertaining to blame (in attributing causality to BP primarily and the industry broadly) and the 
more modern one developed by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca of reinforcing a certain social 
ethic of corporate accountability and environmental responsibility.     
 Now it must be understood that Lustgarten’s book is not just a dramatic account of the 
Deepwater Horizon blowout; rather, it is a lengthy condemnation of the greed and hubris of BP 
over the past two decades leading up to the spill in the Gulf. Telling is that it is not until chapter 
15 of 16 that Lustgarten speaks directly to the Deepwater Horizon blowout. Because he locates 
causality primarily in corporate practice and managerial decision-making, and because he seeks 
to publicly hold accountable BP, the blowout in the Gulf is rendered as the final straw in a long 
list of “accidents.” In terms of the epideictic genre, Lustgarten is taking advantage of a present 
topic to promote a doxa of corporate blame.     
 Couched within the comprehensive, scathing, and well-researched treatise deriding the 
British-based oil giant is one of those “inlets for discussion” discussed earlier. It takes place 
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12 Lustgarten did write a book in 2008 on the nationalization of Tibet and its relationship to China. 
during Lustgarten’s chapter on Deepwater where he chooses to focus on the hubris BP showed 
toward drilling on Block 252 in the Mississippi Canyon, the future site of the Macondo well, 
Deepwater’s extraction base. The Macondo well was originally supposed to be what 
hydrogeographers and those in the oil industry call an “exploratory well” because, while 
geologists expected the reservoir to contain more than fifty million barrels of oil, the Macondo 
was both in a difficult area of the gulf to drill in and, by BP’s own admission,13 was covered with 
sediment and salt that acted as a barrier to the seismic and sonic waves of their geological 
instruments (Lustgarten 288-9). Regardless, Lustgarten writes that BP purchased the rights to the 
well in 2008, Hurricane Ira then shut down production in November 2009, and oil extraction 
returned in 2010 with the seven-year old Deepwater Horizon rig to complete the task they could 
not complete. 
 In order drive home just how overly confident BP was about its ability to handle the 
uncertain underwater terrain,14 Lustgarten takes time to express just how uncertain, 
unpredictable, and unsafe the Macondo site was. Offshore deepwater drilling is a relatively new 
practice in the industry (increasing dramatically in the last decade or so), and, for most 
companies (including BP), the technology has not caught up with the increased drive for profits 
that force competing oil giants to drill further and deeper. Lustgarten frames BP’s technological 
interaction with the unpredictable well as a “delicate balance” (288), less between managerial 
hubris and raw goods and more between the ill-equipped pipe liner designed for exploratory and 
not extraction purposes and the million-year-old deposit of active hydrocarbons literally bubbling 
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13 BP’s vice president of gulf exploration David Rainey described the salt barrier as presenting “the same barrier to 
our seismic imaging capability that a pane of frosted glass presents to our eyes” (qtd. in Lustgarten 289). 
14 BP’s response plan for the well boldly asserted that “in the event of an unanticipated blowout resulting in an oil 
spill...no significant [environmental] impacts are expected” (Gulf of Mexico Regional Oil Spill Response Plan). 
beneath the ocean floor. Lustgarten casts the relationship between the “brute force and immense 
machinery” of the Deepwater drilling pipe and the “inward pressure” of the geologic formation 
in terms of a battling of agencies:
 Far beneath the waters of the gulf and under the immense weight of miles of rock piled 
 on top, the natural pressure from the earth constantly threatens to collapse the well, or 
 force water, oil, or gas trapped in pores in the rock into the wellbore. If hydrocarbons 
 under pressure hit the well—and if they find their way up through either the drill pipe or 
 the long open annulus—they are likely to rush out toward the top in a violent kick, 
 risking a blowout. To control that dynamic, drilling companies use a heavy mud—a dirty 
 mixture of viscous synthetic fluids, polymers, oil, and chemicals with a lead-like heft—to 
 balance that pressure inside the well. (296)               
This description is a missed opportunity for Lustgarten to lessen his attack on BP, to realize the 
inherent danger of offshore drilling and the natural underwater conditions make the very fact that 
the government allows for such exploration quite problematic. The natural force of a deepwater 
hydrocarbon is upwards. It is always striving, always being pressured into arising to the sea floor. 
The further offshore the hydrocarbon pay zones are, the more highly pressurized they become. It 
is possible then that an oil company could be using the experience and technology of drilling 
closer to shore in deepwater environments, which would lead someone to note that the 
technologies are inadequate. Motivated by the larger pay zones further offshore and deeper under 
water, Lustgarten describes how BP migrated outwards, pushing the envelope with hubris, 
confident that their technological tools will be able to harness the ancient powers of these 
hydrocarbons, which are thousands or even tens of thousands of years old. For an ancient 
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hydrocarbon deposit, which was unnamed until recently (Macondo), the entrance of a BP tube 
into its confines is the first “external” transaction these hydrocarbons have. The pressure within 
the drill is a “delicate balance” between high pressure and low pressure. Too much pressure and 
the well is compromised; too little and the hydrocarbons are able to follow their intended 
trajectory upwards—what petroleum engineers call a blowout and what the public calls murder 
and what corporations call a profit-loss. While the delicate balance is between harsh underwater 
conditions and human consumption, Lustgarten sees the delicate balance as between the rig 
technology and the hydrocarbon well, both under control by humans, namely BP senior rig 
operators. 
 Since the faulty batteries on the dead man’s switch (National Commission Report 115)—
the back up mechanism of the blowout preventer (BOP) that shuts out the flow of oil during an 
emergency—was what allowed the oil to continue to spew into the Gulf after the blowout, 
Lustgarten spends considerable time outlining the series of poor, unfortunate decisions made by 
BP management as it related to the proper maintenance of the safety mechanism, to the proper 
care-taking of the “delicate balance.” As BP shifted the Deepwater Horizon rig weeks before the 
explosion from exploring a well to producing oil, which is one of the more challenging technical 
feats in the industry, there was a sense that BP management aboard the rig were heavily 
influenced by the sense of security the BOP imbued in them. The BOP, sitting on the ocean floor, 
is the object that facilitates the “delicate balance” the most, as it is equipped with multiple blind 
shear rams that cut the drill pipe in the case of a blowout of hydrocarbons from within the well 
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and through the well opening (Figure 3). Time and time again, whether through overruling the 
rig’s chief mechanic, Transocean’s senior installation manager, the senior toolpusher for the well, 
or the rig’s most senior driller (Lustgarten 316-7), BP supervisors were insistent that the BOP 
would function in a way that would allow the rig to continue producing oil, despite the faulty 
pressure tests (National Commission Report 115) and unconventional decisions based on 
corporate pressure (Lustgarten 303). Contrary to Lustgarten’s acknowledgment that Shell’s 
model of designing “wells so that you don’t have to rely on the blowout preventers for well 
control,”15 BP’s decisions revealed for Lustgarten an over-reliance on the BOP. This over-
reliance is characterized in terms of the BOP as an object capable of ensuring the lack of 
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15 Quote from Joe Leimkuhler, senior offshore design engineer for Shell (qtd. Lustgarten 308). 
Figure 3. Inside the blowout preventer (BOP). (Credit: TrialGraphix; National 
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling)
disruption of the “delicate balance” between underground hydrocarbons and modern offshore 
drilling technology. 
 Despite Lustgarten’s reaming out of BP’s ability to properly assess risk and ensure safety 
and health for living creatures, and the subsequent heavy-handedness of moral culpability, his 
epideixis—specifically as it pertains to the hubris of BP’s supervisors in terms of the BOP—had 
the opportunity to move towards a distributive model of agency because in some ways it, as 
Bennett puts it, depicted “human intentions as always in competition and confederation with 
many other strivings” (32). However, his move to point out BP’s hubris is contingent upon the 
BP’s intimate relationship to the primary technical cause: the failure of the BOP. Lustgarten’s 
public declaration of blame and corporate vice towards BP, when looked at specifically through 
the lens of epideictic form and specifically deeper notions of agency, can be read as conflating 
blame with causality. While it was the BOP, in and of itself an object associated to varying 
degrees with other stakeholders,16 that failed to maintain the delicate balance of hydrostatic 
pressure at the entry point of the well thus causing the blowout, Lustgarten focuses on the 
personal hubris required in relying on such a failsafe mechanism. In doing so, Lustgarten locates, 
perhaps even over-attributes agency not in the nonhuman/ecological relationship of the BOP, 
drill pipe, and Macondo well, but instead in the overly-confident, dismissive, profit-centered 
attitudes of the BP rig managers. Despite the sheer complexity of the ecological and 
technological components involved in the blowout, Lustgarten’s book intentionally reads as a 
condemnation of BP, not only for the Deepwater Horizon, but as an entire corporation run by 
greed and characterized by hubris. 
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16 Halliburton cased the pipe with cement, while Cameron assembled the part. 
 The problem with drawing explicit causal connections between the personal moral 
qualities of a group of individuals and the functioning of an intricately-designed piece of 
machinery thousands of feet below sea level atop a highly pressurized ancient oil well is that in 
an effort to moralize disaster the inherent complexity and forces wielded by technoscientific 
instruments is located outside the scope of agency. In an attempt to dole blame upon a single 
corporation, Lustgarten has no choice but to regard the failure of the BOP as a human failure, 
thereby ignoring a vast web of factors involved in the precipitation of the blowout. Rhetorically 
speaking, Lustgarten took the results of the reductive inquiries into technical causation (such as 
the technical accident reports covered in chapter three) and applied the same reductiveness to the 
proliferation of blame. Lustgarten took the outcomes of the forensic/analytical branches of 
disaster discourse and haphazardly imbued his epideictic with the same form of singular focus. 
In doing so, the readers of his book are left with, aside from a narrow view of responsibility, 
seemingly but one pathway to action: to alter the corporate morality of BP. Since businesses 
respond best to economic sanctions, people might feel compelled to boycott BP or protest their 
managerial practices to sway public opinion and maybe the courts in their decision. 
 In a posthuman epideictic, blame and causality need not be conflated or even taken so 
nonchalantly as synonymous because agency is seen as emergent rather than as a moral quality. 
This is not to say that posthuman approaches to disaster do not seek justice. As Bennett writes, 
there should not be an effort to release BP of any legal culpability: “Outrage will not and should 
not disappear, but a politics devoted too exclusively to moral condemnation and not enough to a 
cultivated discernment of the web of agentic capacities can do little good [for]...[i]n a world of 
distributed agency, a hesitant attitude toward assigning singular blame becomes a presumptive 
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virtue” (38). Her theory of distributed agency calls us to be more attentive to the specific agentic 
swarms involved in the given event. If a posthuman approach to causality were applied to 
Lustgarten’s thinking, or even Hopkins’, the intimate bond cast between BP and the BOP, blame 
and causality, would be deteriorated under a new ontological understanding of agency as 
emerging from a complex web of factors. Under a posthuman framework in which the goal is to 
discern the varying degrees causality, Lustgarten would be unable to pin any sort of moralizing 
blame onto BP. In a posthumanist framework, the task of the rhetorician or writer in his or her 
epideictic is not to unethically hone in on one single agent like a technical investigator. Rather, 
the task is to negotiate the “delicate balance”: How to negotiate the centripetal forces of blame 
with the centrifugal distributive forces of causality when these two opposing forces are 
seemingly so closely, positively correlated with each other? The identification of a singular, 
technical cause in the midst of disaster drives the inquiry process because it is the fulcrum of all 
legal, moral, and epideictic discourses. The legal accountability and public responsibility in large 
part is understood and doled out by an identification of who “allowed” the technical malfunction 
to occur, but, as Bennett points out, a “federation of actants is a creature that the concept of 
moral responsibility fits only loosely and to which the charge of blame will not stick” (Bennett 
28). A posthumanist approach to disaster leaves rhetoricians then with the following task: to 
account for the wide range of human and nonhuman forces involved in the precipitating of a 
disaster while still remaining firm in the ethical accountability of its stakeholders. This is 
underwritten by the notion that the acknowledgement of the agential capacity on nonhuman 
objects within larger assemblages renders the task of assigning singular blame (1) impossible 
because the human-centered notions of disaster, as propagated by Lustgarten, rely on a conflation 
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between blame and causality that posthuman approaches work to detach, and (2) unproductive 
because it does nothing to enhance the accountability of all stakeholders involved in the 
precipitation of the event.
Cause v. Origin: Where to Begin?
 While a posthumanist epideictic does dilute the intensity of singular blame and single 
technical causality, it also challenges to the core the very idea of what constitutes a “cause.” In 
doing so, news media sources aimed at educating the public on the technical nature of the 
blowout become problematic but also serve as points of departure of what could even be 
considered as viable “causes.” 
 As was discussed in chapter three, the most prominent, immediate inquiries into disasters 
focus almost exclusively on the singular technical cause. For once “the cause” is identified, once 
the black boxes of obliterated commercial jets are opened, the most pending questions get 
answered. At the time, before the legal and courtroom battles begin, technical experts are granted 
full access to find the singular cause. Take the case of the Air France flight 447 (AF447) airline 
crash of June 2009. When the plane made impact with the Atlantic Ocean just northeast of the 
Brazilian coast all 228 people on board were killed. Initially, aviation experts believed the plane 
to have succumbed to severe turbulence, based in large part on a meteorological analysis done 
two days after the crash that confirmed that a mesoscale convective system (MCS) was occurring 
at an altitude of 50,000 feet during the time and in the flight path of AF447.17 Two years later, 
when the black box was recovered, it was found that there were a sequence of events which led 
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17 Based upon the findings of two different independent studies: Vasquez (2011) and “Air France Flight 
#447” (2009). 
to the disengagement of autopilot, leaving two lesser experienced co-pilots to manually engage 
the plane in responding to the turbulence (BEA “Final Report”). Then, in March 2013, it was 
discovered that the two co-pilots were left alone to deal with overcoming the turbulence because 
the captain left the cockpit for a rest break, since he was operating on only one hour of sleep 
(Kuruvilla). So, in this case, one must ask: where does causality “begin”? At what point do 
epideictic rhetorics of disaster “draw a line”? If ice caused the autopilot to disengage, and the 
MCS caused the turbulence that made autopilot necessary, and the lack of sleep from the captain 
caused the inexperienced co-pilots to handle the situation on their own, making critical mistakes 
before the captain could return, where does the cause of the disaster lie? Do we extend as far 
back as we rationally can until we find the most likely scapegoat, which could have been 
disruptive neighbors keeping the captain up all night, or do we move in the other direction, 
towards reductive ideas of technical causality? Approaching epideictic rhetorics through a 
posthumanist lens forces us to grapple with where, in a seemingly infinite amount of relations, 
the line of causality is drawn. Of course, each disaster has its own unique milieu, and certain 
“causes” are more pronounced than others. If we move in the latter direction, then blame 
becomes easier to dole out. However, if we move toward a more dappled, distributed view of 
causality, blame, as Bennett puts it, becomes difficult to stick. 
 To help draw some sort of line, or provide at least a heuristic, Bennett’s posthumanist 
approach to causality draws some important distinctions. In terms of locating causality, Bennett 
distinguishes between efficient causality and emergent causality. Efficient causality can be 
understood as a “chain of simple bodies acting as the sole impetus for the next effect” (32), and 
is, according to her, “impossibly rare”: “Is George W. Bush the efficient cause of the American 
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invasion of Iraq? Is Osama bin Laden?” (32). Efficient causality assumes that events operate as 
chains,18 as discernible, linear, hierarchical systems of cause and effect and “rank[s] the actants 
involved, treating some as external causes and others as dependent effects” (33). Emergent 
causality, by contrast, “places the focus on the process as itself an actant, as itself in possession 
of degrees of agentic capacity” (Bennett 33). Most often in epideictic rhetorics, efficient cause 
takes precedence because of the forensic and analytical nature of legal culpability. In the Air 
France 447 example, we see this as people try and figure out which cause ranks highest: the 
disengaging of autopilot or the fatigue of the captain? 
 Bringing it back to Deepwater Horizon, we see this version of ontology present in 
journalistic accounts of the one, singular cause, usually with the intention of educating the 
public.19 On June 10, 2010, The New York Times published their own impressive, demonstrative 
epideixis—an interactive, multimodal, six-page write-up of the key areas of public concern 
regarding the blowout (Gröndahl et al. 2010)20: where the oil is; where it made landfall; the 
efforts being made to stop the leak; the effects on wildlife; the final moments of the rig; and of 
course the investigation of the cause. Appealing to the public concern, The New York Times used 
experts21 from the field to “get inside” the BOP, to show every single last component of the 
complicated back-up safety mechanism, to the blind shear ram within the BOP, and even further 
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18 Rather ironically, in borrowing the chain concept, BP would later write in their own internal report that it was a 
“sequence of failures” that led to the subsequent spill: “BP's internal reports said “a sequence of failures” involving 
“multiple companies and work teams” caused the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion that killed 11 workers and led to 
the Gulf of Mexico oil spill (Durando 2010). 
19 As mentioned before, education is also a key characteristic/function of the epideictic genre, as outlined by 
Sullivan. While interesting and rife with potential in this topic, it is not covered here. 
20 The work is accessible here: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/06/21/us/20100621-bop.html
21 Of these experts was Cameron, the officially manufacturer for nearly all BOPs used in offshore drilling. 
to the faulty shuttle valve with the shear ram. While this move does lend itself to the idea of 
nonhuman agency (BOP as actant), is still over-attributes agency to a very local level.  
 What this investigative effort is doing, within the context of the epideictic genre, is 
reducing the idea of causality to as reductive an object or sequence as possible. This epideixis 
came out before the final consensus about the technical components of the blowout, and thus 
merely discussed what investigators were then focusing on, the BOP: “A risk analysis 
commissioned by the manufacturer of the blowout preventer identified this valve as one of the 
weakest links. As the fluid flows through the system, it has two possible pathways until it reaches 
the valve. So if the valve fails, the well will not be sealed” (Gröndahl et al).22 Working towards 
the weakest link of the BOP, and reducing the explosion to such a minute interaction, signals an 
attempt to restrict causality to a moment in time, which is, according to Bennett, a problematic 
characteristic of efficient causality: “If one extends the time frame of the action beyond that of 
even an instant, billiard-ball causality falters” (33). Journalistic attempts to identify the “initial” 
cause in lay language rests on the implicit ontological assertion that, in the chain of agency, 
identification of the technical cause reigns supreme atop the hierarchy of agencies and, more 
importantly, that other utterances of blame are entirely contingent upon the identification of that 
initial cause. Rather than view the Deepwater Horizon blowout as an entity with its own 
emerging agentic capacities, epideictic rhetorics in the context of disaster can err towards more 
efficient causalities of identifiable cause and effect. 
 The function of narrow, reductive approaches to causality manifests in a problem of how 
we come to think of the relationship between cause and origin. Viewed through the lens of 
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22 As it turned out, the shuttle improperly rationing the amount of hydraulic fluid feeding into the shear rams (Figure 
5) turned out to be confirmed as true.
efficient causality, if the malfunctioning shuttle did not properly ration the hydraulic fluid into 
the shear rams, and BP was the supervising force over that component, then the path to origin 
continues ad infinitum past the day of former BP CEO Tony Hayward’s birth and into the 
unknown. Hannah Arendt, in her essay “On the Nature of Totalitarianism,” points to the 
problematic notion of a cause as it relates to large scale sociological events. To do so, she 
differentiates between “cause” and “origin,” the latter of which is singular and direct in its 
effects, the former of which is a “complex, mobile, and heteronomous enjoiner of 
forces” (Bennett 33):
 The elements of totalitarianism form its origins if by origins we do not understand 
 ‘causes.’ Causality, i.e., the factor of determination of a process of events in which 
 always one event causes and can be explained by another, is probably an altogether alien 
 and falsifying category in the realm of the historical and political sciences. Elements by 
 themselves probably never cause anything, They become origins of events if and when 
 the crystallize into fixed and definite forms. Then, and only then, can we trace their 
 history backwards. The event illuminates its own past, but it can never be deduced from 
 it.23       
But what are the possibilities if we shift from an efficient causality view to one of emergent 
causality? What happens to the epideictic genre if one of its core features of identifying causality 
(remember Helen) gets shaken? What is the value of the New York Times piece on the BOP in 
terms of its epideictic function? I would argue that cause is an “altogether alien and falsifying 
category” (Arendt) in the realm of the rhetoric about science as well as it is presented to the 
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23 cf. The Hannah Arendt papers at the Library of Congress: http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ampage. 
public through epideixis. The preceding events that crystallize, allowing an event (the blowout) 
to happen, are rendered agential: the bill deregulating offshore drilling, the exploration of the 
Macondo well, America’s reliance on oil, the assembling of the BOP by Cameron—all are 
“elements,” to use Arendt’s term, separately constituted, that have crystallized into origins of one 
event. What a distributed theory of agency allows us to do is to work against the reductive grain 
and towards the illumination of the past events. How would epideictic rhetoric change if, instead 
of aligning blame with singular causality, aligned responsibility with agential assemblages? The 
ancient spirit of epideictic rhetoric is one of undoing reductivist doxa on causality. Is believing 
that Helen’s beauty alone caused on the Trojan War any less ridiculous than over-attributing the 
Deepwater Horizon explosion on the BOP?
Maintaining Doxa: A Matter of Attribution
 As shown thus far, Bennett’s posthumanist approach to disaster provides a useful ground 
for further developing epideictic rhetorics, rhetorics that are concerned with all but promulgating 
particular notions of blame and causality. Why Bennett is particularly useful here is because her 
push to develop more distributed theories of agency represents a concern not only to promote 
hesitance in the assigning of singular causality, a hesitance that is a “presumptive virtue,” but 
moreover a concern to disassociate heavily moral judgments in the midst of disaster: “An 
understanding of agency as distributive and confederate thus reinvokes the need to detach ethics 
from moralism and to produce guides to action appropriate to a world of vital, crosscutting 
forces” (38, emphasis added). One such guide to action might resemble the thinking of journalist 
Thomas Friedman (2010), who wrote mere days after the blowout and subsequent spill that 
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“there is only one meaningful response to the horrific oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico and that is 
for Congress to pass an energy bill that will create an American clean-energy infrastructure and 
set our country on a real, long-term path to ending our oil addition” (Safina 71). Friedman’s 
epideixis, while stemming from deep frustration, promotes an ethic of sustainability rather than 
engaging in a moral derision of BP and others’ shirked responsibilities based upon reductive 
technical causes. Beyond that, it exemplifies Sullivan’s hitherto mentioned position that 
epideictic rhetorics reinforce social doxa: “epideictic builds cultures by establishing and 
maintaining beliefs, values, and ways of seeing that serve as a form of life for everyday 
activities” (232). In the context of disaster, attributions of causality are in fact value-laden 
assertions, philosophical (232)—though one could argue more ontological—in nature because 
they do not focus “energies on the justice or expediency of a particular case” 232). In Gorgias’ 
case, he was trying to establish a value system based upon where he located agency: relocating 
agency from the beauty of Helen to brute force of her captor or the persuasive language used to 
lure her or the overruling fate of the gods is an ontological move that reflects the building of a 
value system. 
 For Bennett, distributing agency and thus pinning the locus of political responsibility in a 
human-nonhuman assemblage (36) reflects a larger value system that resists reductive 
attributions. In her examples of Middle East conflict, this reductiveness often leads to violence. 
On the great North American blackout, she writes: “Though it would give me great pleasure to 
assert that deregulation and corporate greed are the real culprits in the blackout, the most I can 
honestly affirm is that corporations are one of the sites at which human efforts at reform can be 
applied, that corporate regulation is one place where intentions might initiate a cascade of 
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effects” (37). Bennett intentionally withholds the temptation to dole out blame to individual 
parties because for her “[a]utonomy and strong responsibility seem [...] empirically false, and 
thus their invocation seems tinged with injustice” (37). If considering the Deepwater Horizon 
blowout, one can anticipate Bennett feeling uncomfortable with the anti-BP protestors or the 
hypocritical heavy-handedness with which the Obama administration levied out blame and 
subsequent penalties and fines. This is, again, because her distributed ontological/philosophical 
purview of the disaster produces a less reductive approach to blame. Posthumanist approaches to 
events are in some ways just offering their own version of a well-established psychological 
theory of attribution,24 mainly the work of Fritz Heider (1958), which argues that the ways in 
which people attribute reasons to certain behavior reflects a certain worldview.  
 While I am not positing my own theory of attribution, Heider’s work is important because 
it gives us evidence that the way we attribute causality or intentionality or even agency is 
reflective of a given worldview, and even more narrowly, a certain politic. Take, for example, the 
issue of global warming and the debate about the amount of anthropogenic (or “man-made”) 
greenhouse gases. As many have recognized, fluctuations in global climate are not the only cause 
in the rise in temperature for fluctuations “can be caused by small shifts in the tilt of the earth’s 
axis, variations in the earth’s orbit around the sun, volcanic activity, and fluctuations in the sun’s 
energy output” (Seethaler 84). The paralleled increase in the levels of carbon dioxide and the 
Industrial Revolution are still, scientifically speaking, a correlation but are convincing as a causal 
linkage because much of the research falls within a plausible “mechanism” (Seethaler 84). That 
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24 In 1958, Austrian psychologist Fritz Heider published The Psychology of Interpersonal Relations, a book that 
stands on record as being the first to posit a coherent theory of attribution. Theories of attribution concern 
themselves with studying the processes by which we as perceptual creatures interpret external and internal events 
and subsequently assign causality. 
is, scientists can document that our planet has an atmospheric greenhouse effect, and that an 
increase in gases underneath the carbon dioxide ceiling would have an impact, but still cannot 
conclusively draw a causal link, leading the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
in 2007 to report that: “Most of the observed increase in globally averaged temperatures since 
the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic greenhouse gas 
concentrations” (Seethaler 85, emphasis mine). 
 While it would be ignorant to disbelieve that our global climate is indeed changing, it is 
not ignorant to disbelieve the notion that there is a causal link between human behavior and 
climate change, despite the seeming ubiquity of its message. There is a break between scientific 
status of causality and public perception. Those who attribute the increase in global climate 
temperatures to over-industrialization coincide with an ethic and even politics of sustainability; 
those who attribute the increase in global climate temperatures to more natural atmospheric 
trends coincide with more “anti-scientific” politics. The notion that debates about global climate 
change fall largely along political lines in America is indicative of how attributing causality and 
scientific authority are inherently ethico-politcial decisions. This echoes Killingsworth and 
Palmer’s (1992) argument that one’s environmental actions are driven by a person’s 
epistemological rendering of “nature,” which for them falls along a continuum: Nature as Object; 
Nature as Resource; and Nature as Spirit. All can be held, but one typically predominates over 
another (Coppola and Karis). What a posthuman approach to epideictic encourages, then, is the 
acknowledgment that seemingly innocent attributions of causality are in fact ontological 
assertions deeply enmeshed in larger value systems and debates about public doxa. 
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 To help “locate” where certain valuations and ontologies reside, I have devised a visual 
diagram to show the various relationships between epideictic utterances around the Deepwater 
Horizon blowout exist. This diagram is informed by the more robust posthumanist spectrum, 
which seeks to include narrowly attributed and widely distributed agency across both human and 
nonhuman entities. What an application of distributive theories of agency allows epideictic 
rhetorics to achieve is a more complicated, but ultimately more productive framework for how to 
negotiate blame, causality, and agency in human and nonhuman assemblages. Mapping out 
where different epideictic utterances fall along a greater spectrum of causality will provide a 
richer picture where social values and doxa in the midst of disaster sit. The self-designed 
diagram below (Figure 4) shows the range of possibilities in assigning agency in the event of a 
disaster. Epideictic rhetorics falling more in line with the BP-centered utterances of blame would 
tend to fall more on the right-hand side of the diagram, since they are attributing causality to a 
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Figure 4. Agency-plotting diagram
more singular, human-centric source. Now, singular causality, as we saw above with the New 
York Times, can also be nonhuman, hence the division of the diagram into the upper and lower 
halves. As epideictic rhetorics become more distributed in their approach, the distinction between 
human and nonhuman tends to be less evident, hence the fading of the line into whiteness as it 
moves left. 
 Scatter-plotting where the popular literature and news media epideixis fall in terms of 
these distinctions would provide an accurate snapshot of where cultural values reside. Now, 
while scatter-plotting all utterances of blame in the Deepwater Horizon explosion is beyond the 
scope of this project (since my aim is not to provide a comprehensive account), it would be 
useful to plot where some of the sources I used for this project which fall within the genre of 
epideictic would be located. John Konrad and Tom Shroder’s book Fire on the Horizon: The 
Untold Story of the Gulf Oil Disaster (2011) is a rather dramatic, person-centered account of the 
blowout. In their author’s note, they explain why they chose to focus on the people’s stories, and 
make it clear that the book is not a political argument or “even a judgment on the ultimate 
responsibility for the disaster” (xiv):  
 In the massive coverage that followed, in the finger-pointing and eye-crossing dissection 
 of technical blame, I saw only jagged fragments of the full reality of the tragedy. I came 
 to believe that what happened on the Deepwater Horizon, over block 252 of the subsea 
 geological formation known as the Mississippi Canyon of the Gulf of Mexico, could 
 never be completely understood without placing it in the full context of the powerful, in 
 many ways inspiring, but also intrinsically flawed and little-understood culture of 
 offshore drilling. (Konrad and Shroder xiv) 
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Contrast that approach with Lustgarten’s, The New York Times’, and other accounts (see 
Appendix for brief summaries of plotted texts below) in popular literature meeting the epideictic 
genre (Figure 5), and we are given a picture that begins to prompt some discussion: If this 
process were to go forth and plot all public epideixis, then we would have an accurate view of 
the value-set held by those writing about the Deepwater Horizon blowout. 
Conclusions and Implications
 So, what then does happen when we adopt a more posthuman approach to epideictic 
rhetorics in the midst of disaster? What does it buy us? I have argued that epideictic rhetorics, 
when reconfigured historically and contemporarily as a “rhetoric of agencies,”open pathways for 
discussion about how attributions of blame and causality operate as ontological assertions that 
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Figure 5. Agency-plotting diagram, with plots
maintain—or even disrupt—social doxa about the nature of disasters. I then articulated how three 
important features of disaster epideictics (conflating of blame and causality, distinctions between 
cause and origin, and the value-laden nature of attribution) become further articulated when 
infused with posthumanist theory. This is achieved by revealing the limitations involved and the 
reductiveness and even unjust over-attribution to single entities. 
 As I am writing this dissertation in the spring of 2013, almost three years after the 
deepwater hydrocarbons shot up through the drill, exploding the rig and killing crew members, 
Transocean Inc. and BP Plc (and myriad others) are still entangled in legal debates over who is to 
blame in the blowout and spill. For example, on February 14th, 2013 it was reported that 
Transocean (the owner of the rig) offered a plea agreement for their role in the blowout, which 
was then accepted by Judge Jane Triche Milazzo (Krauss 2013). The plea was based upon the 
interpretation given by many governmental and private reports that Transocean workers were 
negligent in their execution of pressure tests that would have anticipated a blowout and thus 
would have stopped the blowout from even occurring. The ways in which causality is 
constructed is the turning point, the fulcrum so to speak of legal and political actions. The 
determining of causality is such a high-stakes process and these legal actions are (as shown in 
chapter three) connected to larger ideologies and rhetorics that seek to continue to articulate the 
notion that causality and blame are connected; culpability is dependent upon where you locate 
causality, upon where you choose to begin counting. However, the very nature of the Macondo 
well is just as much a cause: but how do we blame a well? How can our epideictic rhetorics 
continue to associate causality with blame when a portion of causality is at least doled out to the 
objects? In Bennett’s words: “Perhaps the ethical responsibility of an individual human now 
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resides in one’s response to the assemblages in which one finds oneself participating: Do I 
attempt to extricate myself from assemblages whose trajectory is likely to do harm? Do I enter 
into the proximity of assemblages whose conglomerate effectivity tends toward the enactment of 
nobler ends?” (38). Being more inclusive in our nonhuman factors can help rupture the 
problematic link between human will and blame and causality and begin to see “blame” as a 
“delicate balance” between humans and nonhumans, but it also deeply challenges what we as a 
an industrialized culture define as responsibility.
 Practically speaking, a posthumanist approach to epideictic rhetorics in the case of 
Deepwater Horizon not only reveals but moreover focuses on the complex workings of an 
industry that has been continually allowed to thrive despite its tumultuous histories because of 
singular attributions of blame on individual corporations. So long as the epideictic rhetorics 
reflect the interests of the oil industry writ large, and propagate their values, the public 
understanding of oil spills (doxa) and ecological disasters will continue to be reductive and 
anemic and the pathways of action will be limited. The post-disaster activity of severe penalties 
for BP and the protesting of the public against BP is indicative of how reductive notions of blame 
permeate cultural understanding of this event. This reductiveness leads the public to act upon the 
only target they know (BP) with the only means they can (economic boycott/protest). A 
posthumanist approach to disaster can help us move away from the reductive epideixis that 
delimits public understanding and thus action by simplifying the event. Fully engaging a 
framework that distributes agency has the potential to diversify the actual opportunities for 
action and consequently provides more opportunities for actual prevention in the future. 
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 So, while many try and move beyond the “mere” praise and blame characterization of 
epideictic rhetoric, there is still social power in this particular characteristic. Michael J. Hyde 
(2001), for example, uses Aristotle’s ideas on praise, specifically the connection between 
emotion and rhetoric, to illuminate the “call to conscience” imbued in rhetoric generally and 
misunderstood in Heidegger’s rhetoric specifically. The call to conscience, or the taking of action 
out of the arousal of moral discourse, is for Hyde “the primordial form of rhetorical (that is, 
epideictic) discourse” (84). Hyde conceives of epideictic rhetoric in its original Greek meaning, 
which is to disclose, evoke, display, or show forth (94), to focus on the enthymematic potential 
of the genre, and uses Aristotle to back up his point: “To praise a man is in one respect akin to 
urging a course of action” (Rhetoric 1358b-28). So, while others see the defining praise/blame 
characteristic of the epideictic genre to be one of the obstacles in its development, a more 
attuned, more thorough investigation of what praise means—and the calls to conscience and 
actions that this praise and blame enacts—to Aristotle and the demonstrating sophists, and more 
importantly how it functions, is justified. As Bennett writes, “there is not so much a doer (an 
agent) behind the deed [spill] as a doing and an effecting by a human-nonhuman 
assemblage” (28). A posthumanist epideictic provides the framework for articulated the doings, 
and provides an avenue for an individual’s figuring of their place in such a doing. 
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Chapter 5. Posthuman Prudence
       “Since we ‘call’ things by their names, 
       why should they not answer?” 
       —John Dewey, Experience and Nature 181
       “It is difficult to get a man to understand 
       something when his salary depends upon 
       his not understanding it.”
       —Upton Sinclair
Introduction
 Chapter one framed the Deepwater Horizon blowout a problem characterized by 
unproductive “reductiveness,” a characteristic manifested through problematic environmentalist 
views and false dichotomies between human and nonhuman agents. Chapter two showed how 
this reductiveness is a fundamentally rhetorical problem and argued for seeing the role of 
rhetoricians and technical communicators in the midst of disaster as engaging in rhetorical 
invention and being more inclusive in terms all entities with the capacity to exert agency. 
Chapter three situated this role in industry-based risk communication practices, specifically in 
the composition of accident reports, which have the potential to contribute to real policy changes 
by being attuned to the nuanced relations between humans and nonhumans in the context of risk. 
Chapter four signaled a shift away from writing disaster to writing about disaster, and argued that  
news media outlets and popular literature sources fall into the ancient rhetorical practice of 
epideixis and thus construct social doxa, mainly the beliefs we as a culture have about causality 
and blame. Applying a more distributed notion of causality to disaster, as outlined in the previous 
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three chapters, moves us from a reductive framework of individual and corporate blame to a 
complex view of social responsibility. The next and final move I make is to take a step back and 
view this social responsibility and practice through the lens of John Dewey’s “naturalistic” 
political pragmatism, an approach that “makes responsibility more a matter of responding to 
harms than of identifying objects of blame” (Bennett 101-2, emphasis added). If attunement to 
nonhuman objects helps us with our tasks of articulating and realizing connections, then how 
does this attunement help us translate these new forged relationships into productive practice? If, 
as I have shown, posthuman approaches alter our hermeneutical and analytical practices in the 
midst of risk and disaster, then how do they alter our practices? And to what or whose benefit? 
Put simply: How does the acknowledgement of the role of objects in public deliberations affect/
change our methods for communicating? 
 In “What’s Practical about Technical Writing?”, Carolyn Miller argues that technical 
communication is a “practical rhetoric” that entails “arguing in a prudent way toward the good of 
the community, [toward] socially responsible action” (23). In chapter three, I argued that the 
work of technical communicators in accidents reports has the potential to move towards the 
“good of the community” by tracing the complex connections between many human and 
nonhuman bodies, not by being reductive in blame and pigeon-holing opportunities for 
experiences and social action (read: BP protests). By articulating these connections, technical 
communicators provide a map of the multiple publics mobilized for such an event to happen.
 This fifth chapter, then, explores what it means to integrate nonhuman entities more fully 
and meaningfully into political deliberation about and social action towards technoscientific 
problems in what Ulrich Beck calls a “world risk society.” This chapter begins with a discussion 
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of how Dewey links social “problems” (e.g., the Deepwater Horizon blowout and subsequent oil 
spill) to the development of publics. I then transition into how, despite contrary views, Dewey’s 
publics can be understood to be inclusive of both human and nonhuman entities. In adopting a 
Deweyan approach to “naturalistic” publics, analyzing deeply just what Dewey’s publics look 
like, this chapter frames the Deepwater Horizon blowout as a “problem” that has particular ways 
of forming publics and of being responding to. Dewey’s outlining of his cultural naturalism 
expands theory on publics to be more inclusive of nonhuman entities. This integration of 
nonhuman entities into the formation and circulation of publics sets better conditions for 
communication and thus for the development or productive democratic habits (phronesis). 
Dewey’s work then fully integrates nonhuman entities into experience and inquiry and promotes 
a form of posthuman praxis. I argue that Dewey—misread as an anthropocentrist who did not 
fulfill a rhetoric legacy—and his articulations of the role of nonhuman entities in the formation 
of publics and patterns of inquiry allow us to see how objects circulate in public and how objects 
in and of themselves can create publics.
 
The Public and its Problems
 Much as I argued in the previous chapters, disasters are in part rhetorical problems. 
Dewey would no doubt agree with this sentiment. In The Public and its Problems (1927), Dewey 
discusses how the people’s1 ability to articulate their own needs and interests are stifled by larger 
political agendas (e.g., corporate capital, special interests). In distinguishing between the “state” 
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1 I am fully aware of the more nuanced approaches to the “public,” specifically Jürgen Habermas’ (1962) and 
Dewey’s other arguments (elucidated further in The Public and its Problems) that the “public” does not exist so 
much as the world consists of multiple publics that gather around specific events and are driven by certain purposes 
and that can interact meaningfully with each other, a reality brought about by the crumbling of Modern boundaries 
that once separated the public from the private (indeed, Dewey would argue that publics do not exist until they are 
brought into life but humans and nonhumans—publics emerge).
and the “public”—the former of which being granted far too much power in creating social 
realities—Dewey not only laments the general powerlessness of democratic citizens but the 
subsequent impotence or difficulty of enacting productive public deliberation. While others 
writing at the time, specifically Walter Lippmann,2 did not believe that the “public” had the 
rational capability of engaging in democratic methods of communication, Dewey remained 
hopeful and optimistic. For Dewey, the “public”—more as a concept than an identifiable entity—
was to regain its voice, indeed re-empower its very sense of self/selves through communication: 
“The essential need, in other words, is the improvement of the methods and conditions of debate, 
discussion and persuasion. That is the problem of the public” (208, emphasis in original). 
 Now, despite his insistence about the need for effective communication in reconfiguring 
sociopolitical realms, Dewey has been accused of not fully articulating or perhaps even being 
equivocal about the specific methods of debate (Diggins 1994; Danisch 2007).3 However, 
Dewey’s work, from all three epochs of his writing (his works are divided into early, middle, and 
later) shows a consistent concern to fundamentally reconfigure the conditions of debate. If 
persuasive methods can be understood as situation-based prescriptive techniques for effective 
communication, then the conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion can be understood as 
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2 Lippmann wrote The Phantom Public (1925), in which he argues that the existence of a democratically-active 
public is virtually nonexistent. Dewey’s Public, published two years later, can be read as a direct response to 
Lippmann’s ideas. 
3 John Patrick Diggins, who outlines this moment more thoroughly in The Promise of Pragmatism (1994), chooses 
to frame Dewey’s reserved response at Cooper Union to the Japanese aggression in the Pacific as the failure of 
pragmatism to uphold what he deems to be the bold tasks of its philosophy. If knowledge, including communicative 
acts, is viewed instrumentally as a tool to help the public deliberate through difficult—more precisely, 
“problematic”—situations, then why would Dewey withhold such requisite tools from a public in such immediate 
need of assistance and direction? From a fundamentally philosophical perspective, Diggins lays claim to the idea 
that pragmatism’s consistent fringe status is due in large part to its failure to practice what it preaches, to enact on 
the instrumental usage of the fairly radical ideas it promulgates. For Robert Danisch (2007), however, this 
apparently underwhelming moment in New York City stemmed not from a failure of pragmatism so much as it was 
that “Dewey failed as a rhetor” (Pragmatism 1). In that very public, kairotic moment, Dewey made a choice to 
“remain beholden” to philosophy’s pursuit of knowledge at the expense of responsive rhetorical practice in the form 
of public oratory.
the social structures, philosophies, and material realities within which said methods are situated. 
To use my earlier analogy of Whac-a-Mole, Dewey wants less to show individuals how to best 
pound the animals and more to disassemble the game altogether.  
More Money, More Problems
 The game, however, requires more than just a simple screwdriver to disassemble. 
Dewey’s words ring true even today, as we still see a rather wide chasm between the “state” and 
the “public” with regards to the oil industry in America. A recent study conducted by the 
University of New Hampshire (UNH) found that a significant number of Gulf coast residents4 
who were directly affected by the oil spill in some economic capacity indicated changed views 
about major environmental issues (Science Daily 2012). Explaining the study, Dr. Lawrence 
Hamilton, professor of sociology at UNH, claims that
 If disasters teach any lessons, then experience with the Gulf oil spill might be expected to 
 alter opinions about the need for environmental protection. About one-fourth of our 
 respondents said that as a result of the spill, their views on other environmental issues 
 such as global warming or protecting wildlife had changed [...] This proportion rose to 35 
 percent among those most affected economically by the spill. People reporting changed 
 views also expressed greater concern about sea level rise due to climate change, more 
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4 From the study: “The research results are based on surveys of 2,023 residents of the Gulf Coast conducted in the 
aftermath of the explosion on the BP Deepwater Horizon oil rig in April 2010. Telephone interviews were conducted 
with 1,017 residents of Louisiana's Plaquemines and Terrebonne parishes and 1,006 residents of Florida's Bay, Gulf, 
and Franklin counties. Most of the interviews took place between the successful capping of the well in July 2010, 
and the completion of a final relief well in September 2010. All told, an estimated 4.4 million barrels of oil escaped 
from the well, some of it washing ashore on wetlands, barrier islands, and beaches of Louisiana, Mississippi, 
Alabama, and the Florida Panhandle” (Science Daily 2012). 
 support for a moratorium on deepwater drilling, and were more likely to favor alternative 
 energy rather than increased oil exploration. 
Out of the midst of unfortunate events comes the changing of minds on important political and 
ecological issues. A group of individuals who had material experience with the oil in some 
capacity were led to engage in some form of inquiry and rethink their views and, if it comes to it, 
actions at the polls.  
 However, when looking deeper into the comparisons between responses from individuals 
in Louisiana and those in Florida, we see that the larger political forces at work—the very same 
forces Dewey critiques—are restricting publics’ ability to articulate their long term interests. 
Participants were asked if they were in favor of a moratorium on offshore drilling, which would 
then lead to an increased use in alternative energies. Participants in Louisiana, though more 
extremely affected by the spill than their Florida counterparts, were less likely to favor a 
moratorium. The reason why becomes clear when looking at the amount of state income deriving 
from offshore drilling. Louisiana, and its open laws on offshore deepwater oil drilling, benefit 
somewhere in the neighborhood of 65 billion dollars per year from the oil industry. Florida, on 
the other hand, “actively opposed offshore drilling, which is currently banned in state 
waters” (Science Daily  2012). In explaining why coastal Louisiana residents were still generally 
pro-deepwater drilling, Dr. Hamilton continues:
  The pattern of responses from coastal Louisiana, where many more people reported 
 effects from the spill, extreme weather, or threats from climate-related sea-level rise -- 
 but fewer supported a deepwater moratorium, alternative energy, or resource conservation 
 -- reflects socioeconomic development around oil and gas. Specialization has been 
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 channeled partly by physical characteristics of the Louisiana coastline itself. (Science 
 Daily 2012)
Without engaging in the type of reductiveness I critique in the previous chapters, the differences 
in state viewpoints can be explained by two general patterns: the actual geography of the coasts 
(Florida coasts are more conducive to other industries, such as tourism) and the larger corporate 
and governmental benefits in Louisiana derived from the high-risk processes of deepwater 
drilling. The short-term gain, long-term risk approach enacted by the Louisiana state government 
is precisely the conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion that stifle the publics’ abilities to 
articulate their own needs, desires, and protections. For those individuals who changed their 
mind about larger environmental concerns because of the very real, very deep impact of the spill 
on their lives, there is not an avenue to promote an ethos of alternative energy in a political 
context where the state’s budget and the functioning of its citizens relies on the ethos of its 
opposite. For Lippmann, the problem was that the “public” did not own a rational capability to 
enact change; for Dewey, the “public” does have this capability, it’s just that they are restricted 
by conditions that are out of their control. 
 So, what to do? BP, a corporation who works very closely with the Louisiana state 
government, has a lengthy record of producing deadly technical failures and heavily impacting 
American families; it is woven into the narrative of their existence as a corporation in America. 
Rather than feed into the boycotts and protests that seem to happen every decade or so towards 
BP, it behooves rhetoricians to provide a different framework for the public to both understand 
and act on the events that transpired in April 2010. It begins, in a way, with the realization that 
the blowout and spill is not just on BP’s dime and that it did not just begin in April of 2010. The 
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roots that brought us to where we are today—still polishing oil off Florida panhandle rocks—
penetrates deep into a culture dominated by politically-influential, affluent corporations, stifled 
citizens, and a government who is generally content to look the other way. Spills are not 
catastrophes so much as symptoms of the publics affected by them unable to articulate their 
needs in the larger scope of the closely knit ties between the federal and state governments and 
the oil industry. Until the fundamental conditions are changed, until the public refuses to abide 
by the belief that the 4.9 million barrels of oil dispersed throughout the Gulf water was the result 
of corporate greed, oil spills will happen and the corporations and stakeholders primarily 
involved in the event will continue to exist (read: thrive). A head will roll, and we as a culture 
will move on, integrating the event into our psyche but not pronounced enough to alter our 
everyday actions.  
Deweyan Publics
 The improvement of the conditions of debate, discussion, and persuasion for Dewey 
resides in a fundamental alteration in just what constitutes a public, or the public, or the publics. 
Wearisome of his own artificial distinction between the “state” and the “public,” as well as the 
wide-spread acceptance of Lippmann’s notion of refusing the very existence of a rational public,  
Dewey used his earlier theories on “naturalism” (cf. Experience and Nature) to expound an 
articulation of publics that at times is rather analogous to the natural interactions in a given 
ecosystem or collection of ecosystems. Jane Bennett, drawing parallels between Latour’s 
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political ecologies5 and Dewey’s publics, also sees Dewey’s thinking on political action as a kind 
of ecology (Bennett 101). For Dewey, if we could move beyond the stifling and false 
dichotomies of the state and the public, then individual citizens and groups of citizens would be 
in a better, more empowered position, able to mobilize through the creation and re-creation of 
multiple publics. 
 According to Dewey publics do not, however, preexist. Publics are not simply willed into 
existence. They arise or emerge in response to particular problems; enrollment of individuals into 
these publics is characterized by induction rather than willing volunteering. Because they emerge 
as responses to events, as responses to problems, they can be characterized in terms of their 
shared harm. A public “consists of all those who are affected by the indirect consequences of 
transactions to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences 
systematically cared for” (Public 16). The participants in the UNH study described above 
constitute a public because they are a group that emerged out of shared harm, provoked together 
by the “indirect, serious and enduring [consequences of] conjoint action” (Public 16). Conjoint 
action can be best understood as the unintentional effects of a given interaction, an interaction in 
which “no efficient cause of the problems it generates can really be pinpointed” (Bennett 100). 
 Let’s return for a moment to Jane Bennett, who sees Dewey’s explanation of political 
systems as analogous to natural ecosystems and uses theories on publics to “[pave] the way for a 
theory of action” (103). Bennett, a political theorist herself, reads Dewey as ahead of his time in 
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5 This can be compared to Latour’s notion of “political ecology,” which, as he describes it, exists by definition as an 
“enigmatic emblem” that allows him to refer to the “right way to compose a common world” (Politics of Nature 8). 
This common world is constituted by the integration of nature (commonly defined), people, and science, in such a 
way that there is no distinction between scientific ecologies and political ones: “[N]ature becomes knowable through 
the intermediary of the sciences; it has been formed through networks of instruments; it is defined through the 
interventions of professions, disciplines, and protocols; [...] it is provided with arguments through the intermediary 
of learned societies” (Politics of Nature 4).
terms of addressing the complicated intersections of humans, technologies, and ecologies, stating 
that even current theories of democracy are not equipped to address or explain such nuanced 
relationships: “Theories of democracy that assume a world of active subjects and passive objects 
begin to appear as thin descriptions at a time when the interactions between human, viral, animal, 
and technological bodies are becoming more and more intense” (108). Bennett, who uses Dewey 
because of his naturalist version of politics, does not think Dewey fully acknowledges the 
important of nonhuman entities in such politics: “[I]n naming a problem (rather than an act of 
will) as the driving force behind the formation of a public, Dewey (almost) acknowledges that a 
political action need not originate in human bodies at all” (102, emphasis in original). She admits 
that he “flirts” with the posthuman and, in Art as Experience, “comes close to saying that even 
human initiatives are not exclusively human” (102), but ultimately sees Dewey’s ideas as a 
generally useful but incomplete model for understanding the place of nonhuman entities in the 
creation of publics. 
 I disagree with Bennett on this point. I think Dewey sees political action arising from 
publics as possibly emerging from and with nonhuman entities. What’s more, I see in Dewey the 
notion that human experience with nonhuman entities changes minds and alters communicative 
possibilities. What follows is a rather dense theoretical excursus into the notion of understanding 
Dewey as an anthropocentric thinker. Once I—and, well, Dewey himself—show otherwise, I 
then move into the possibility of thinking about a posthuman praxis through Dewey’s articulation 
of the important concepts of experience, inquiry, and habituation. This is contrasted with other 
rhetorical uses of Dewey, past and present, with the purpose of showing how the changing of the 
conditions of “debate, discussion, and persuasion” is a matter of changing our understanding of 
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how publics form. This, in turn, changes how inquiry happens and thus how habits—
democratically productive habits, understood as a mode of phronesis—form. Including 
nonhuman entities in publics is an important point to explore because it is, in my mind, the lack 
of attention paid to the mobilization of nonhuman entities in the midst of “problems” (read: oil 
spill) that causes problems in the first place. Dewey saw nonhuman agents as active members of 
various publics, and I will let Dewey speak for himself on this topic, since Bennett is not the first  
to charge Dewey with hints of anthropocentrism. 
Dewey Responds to Critique of Anthropocentrism
 In Part II of Problems of Men, John Dewey responds directly to the criticism leveled at 
him by his friend and colleague Morris Cohen, who claimed that Dewey’s ideas were too 
“anthropocentric”: 
It is expressed in the saying that my absorption in human experience prevents me from 
formulating any adequate theory of non-human or physical nature. In short, it is held that 
the fact - which is not denoted to be a fact - that experience involves a human element 
limits a philosophy that makes experience primary to human affairs as its sole material. 
(195-6) 
While in previous iterations of Deweyan thought this point might have seemed non-sequitur, 
never has being clear about Dewey’s ontology of nonhuman objects been such an important 
element in keeping pragmatist thought a main player in contemporary philosophical discussions. 
Dewey uses this point of criticism quoted above as the setting for articulating his view of the 
relationship between experience and nature—a view that is defined by its quality of continuity 
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between the two—and his positions that grow out of this belief.6 Because man lives within the 
complex network of ecological and material relationships and not outside of it, Dewey refuses to 
offer up a hierarchy of significance in certain experiences over others. The notion that qualities 
and values are considered fused with the material they define has brought about the very crisis 
Dewey was seeking to overcome: “the bifurcation expressed in the dualistic opposition of 
subjective and objective, mind and matter, experience and nature” (197). The equal valuation of 
every experience, indeed every increment of growth and development in his theory of the 
continuity nature and experience reveals Dewey’s concern to shed the “anthropocentric” label 
placed upon him by his colleague.7    
 In Experience and Nature (1958), Dewey makes it clear that we should not be so naive as 
to think that when we turn our back, things cease to form relationships with other things. Things 
not only have relationships outside of our own, but Dewey even goes so far as to say that these 
relationships are primary:
A tool is a particular thing, but it is more than a particular thing, since it is a thing in 
which a connection, a sequential bond of nature is embodied. It possesses an objective 
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6 At the time of his writing, realists distanced themselves from Dewey because there was no stable foundation of 
experience nature, no way of categorizing the different “things” that supposedly exist (Crick 31). 
7 It is understandable that someone would walk away from a reading of Dewey with the maxim “objects in the world 
that we understand to be ‘real’ are only made such because we as humans experience them.” Dewey has been read as 
suggesting that objects in part change ontological status after being experienced (McGilvary 1939). This position 
complicates Dewey’s relationship to Kantian philosophy, which was of course precisely the type of thinking Dewey 
sought to depart from. In his account of Dewey’s metaphysics, Raymond D. Boisvert points toward Robert Dewey 
(no relation) and Richard Rorty for the proliferation of such a view. An object such as a table, Rorty asserts, “is for 
Dewey ‘neither an ugly brown thing whose hard edges bumped people, nor yet a swirl of particles, but something 
common to both - sheer potentiality, ready to be transformed in a situation” (Boisvert 59). Robert Dewey and 
Richard Rorty accuse Dewey as being Kantian in the sense that there are unknowable objects beyond the realm of 
experience, or Dinge-an-sich (idealism). These objects are beyond the immediate experience of humans. They point 
out that Dewey failed to distinguish between things as existents and things as experienced and thus fell into anti-
realist notions that materials are based and reliant upon our perceptions of them, and that there is a separation 
between mind and matter. David L. Hildebrand (2003), in his book Beyond Realism and Anti-Realism, asserts that 
Deweyan metaphysics avoids the distinction between realism and anti-realism and in fact offers a strong alternative 
to this debate by casting experience (knowing) as taking place within nature, and not apart from it, while still 
hesitating to grant “full” ontological status to things not experienced.
relation as its own defining property.8 Its perception as well as its actual use takes the 
mind to other things. The spear suggests the feast not directly but through the medium of 
other external things, such as the game and the hunt, to which the sight of the weapon 
transports imagination. Man’s bias towards himself easily leads him to think of a tool 
solely in relation to himself, to his hand and eyes, but its primary relationship is towards 
other external things, as the hammer to the nail, and the plow to the soil. Only through 
this objective bond does it sustain relation to man himself and his activities. A tool 
denotes a perception and acknowledgement of sequential bonds in nature. (123, emphasis 
added) 
This important passage disrupts the tendency for readers of Dewey to see him as overly 
anthropocentric and it is in this passage that we can see Dewey responding to Cohen’s criticism 
leveled at him in Problems of Men. Dewey wants us to recognize that humans are but one bond 
in this long sequential series of transactions marked by continuity. Dewey continues, in the usual 
process of critiquing classical philosophy for striking a dualism between means and ends, that 
“[t]hings have potentialities or are instrumental because they are not being, but rather Being in 
process of becoming. They lend themselves to operative connections that fulfill 
them” (Experience and Nature 123). Things are literally “acting out” on their potentialities in the 
process of inquiry, in the “transubstantiation” from event to object, and this oftentimes gets 
hidden behind the fact that it is happening during the act of experience. But just because a human 
is using a hammer and that hammer is known through experience does not mean that the hammer 
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8 One might make the connection here to Latour’s irreducibility of objects, where the object’s meaning is linked only 
to its relations and articulations. 
and the nail do not have a separate relationship when the human turns around or when they 
operate outside the realm of experience.     
 Richard J. Bernstein (1966), in his exposition of Dewey’s work, supports the notion that 
experience is not limited to living beings. While outlining the three different levels of natural 
transactions Dewey describes in Experience and Nature (the physico-chemical, the psycho-
physical, and the level of mind or human experience, which are based upon levels of complexity) 
Bernstein touches upon the reason why Dewey does not need to articulate non-natural categories:
There are no sharp breaks within nature that demand the introduction of “non-natural 
categories.” For most of his life, Dewey was concerned primarily with the level of natural 
transactions that are exhibited in  human experience, and he sought to delineate some of 
the major varieties of human experience. But he never would have accepted the 
consequence that there is nothing more to nature or reality than what is manifested at the 
level of human experience. Indeed, experience is in nature; it is one type of natural 
transaction embedded in a much wider range of natural transactions. Experience is of 
nature; it is a type of transaction in which the variety of other natural transactions 
participate. (Bernstein, “Dewey” 87)
Dewey makes it very clear that experience is only one type of interaction, among a wide range of 
other interactions within nature. The fact that there are no “sharp breaks” in nature indicates an 
understanding of Dewey’s philosophy that cast “nature” as all-inclusive; there is no split between 
human and world because they are inseparable, one and the same. Trying to label Dewey a 
correlationist, to again borrow Meillassoux’s term, is not a straight-forward task because he can 
conceive of relations and events outside of human experience, but simultaneously makes the 
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relationship between human experience and nature his (almost) sole concern. However, human 
and nature are not separate entities so while this relationship is his main concern, Dewey does 
not craft the same bifurcation that correlationists are accused of making. According to the 
passage above, non-living entities can have relations to each other that are just as important if 
not more than the actual human experience of it. What this does is it encourages us to read 
Dewey as a thinker who saw nonhuman entities imbued with a certain level of agency in a larger 
ecology constituted by humans and nonhumans. 
 We can turn back to Bernstein and Dewey’s Experience and Nature for further (a) 
evidence to support the idea that “things” involved in the process of experience do have 
“rhetorical” agency, and (b) to provide a heuristic for how we can think of Dewey’s rhetorical/
problematic situation through the lens of experience, or, “levels” of experience. Bernstein 
identifies three types of action in Dewey’s text: self-action, interaction, and transaction. “Self-
action” designates the type of action where an entity is thought to act solely under its own 
powers, independently of other entities (Bernstein, “Dewey” 81). The second type of action is 
interaction, which relates primarily to relative fixed entities and that sees action as taking place 
among entities and by entities. The third type of action is transaction, which views entities 
gaining their specific character from the role it plays in the transaction. Bernstein argues that the 
concepts of self-action and interaction presuppose a restricted notion that entities have 
“independent existence” (Bernstein, “Dewey” 83) that until they engage in transaction that can 
be viewed as separate and distinct things that move within nature. More meaning is made with 
these entities in transaction, but the fact remains that entities are given a type of “self-action” in 
the process. Dewey’s concept of “self-action” as one of the three modes of action in nature 
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affords the opportunity to speculate about the degree of volition granted to non-human entities, 
and the extent to which we “meet halfway” with the objects of our experience. Hickman supports 
this notion when he writes that Dewey functionalizes objects by characterizing them in terms of 
their roles in continuing inquiry (Hickman, Post-postmodernism 218). Objects are not 
understood in terms of their individuality, as being cut off from each other. Rather, objects are 
always understood and made meaningful through their relations to other objects in the process of 
inquiry. Nonhuman entities have agency in taking active roles in the processes of inquiry and 
experience and also possess relationships more primary outside of human experience and 
transaction. Dewey grants agency to things during the act of becoming, during the temporal 
space of transaction in which the actors or those involved are quite literally transubstantiated 
(Crick 40). Nonhuman entities play an active role in our transactions and help continue inquiry. 
Metaphysics of Experience: Cultural Naturalism
 This re-configuration of Dewey as not an anthropocentric thinker is important because it 
now opens up the possibility of using Dewey’s most seminal work—his work on experience—as 
a framework. Dewey’s articulation of experience, which is central to his corpus as a whole, 
shows how an individual’s physical interaction with his or her environment is the foundation of 
philosophy, a philosophy not bogged down in traditional metaphysical disputes. In 1915, in “The 
Subject Matter of Metaphysical Inquiry,” Dewey publicly announced his intention to reconstruct 
metaphysics as a naturalistic enterprise. For him, metaphysics should abandon the attempt to deal 
with first causes and devote itself to the empirical study of the irreducible traits of nature. A 
reconstructed metaphysics would supplement the various sciences, each of which deals with only 
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a subset of existences, by inquiring into the “irreducible traits found in any and every subject of 
scientific inquiry (MW 8:4). The traits of diversity, interaction, and change, for example, are 
found in every subject-matter of inquiry. Through inquiry into these irreducible traits, Dewey 
wrote, “we shall be saved from the recurrent attempts to reduce heterogeneity to homogeneity, 
diversity to sheer uniformity, quality to quantity, and so on” (MW 8:7). Despite the human focus 
in ontology, Dewey’s “metaphysics” focused on the emergent continuities between nature and 
culture, thereby distancing himself further from Meillassoux’s correlationism (LW 1:50, 52, 308). 
While the capitalization of “Nature” speaks to some uneasiness in contemporary application, 
Dewey did view Nature as “pluralistic, nonreductive, dynamic, relational, and polymodal and 
[was] supportive for those developing an ecological ontology” (Alexander, Eco-Ontology 14). 
Dewey advocates process philosophies that reject “ultimate atomic substances” as well as 
atemporal first causes. Dewey’s thoughts are “conducive to developing ecological habits of 
philosophical reflection, which the various traditional ‘metaphysics of identity’ are not” (“Dewey 
and Buchler”).
 Dewey’s most loaded articulation of his general position of “cultural 
naturalism” (Alexander, “Dewey” 184),9 which echoes Bennett’s description of understanding 
Dewey in terms of ecosystem, is in Experience and Nature (1925). It is through the vehicle of 
cultural naturalism that Dewey is able to address the heritage of and sabotage dualisms, namely 
the chalking up his work to either a sort of “Hegelian idealism” or reductive naturalism 
(Alexander, “Dewey” 184). Always for sententious titles, sans the moralizing, it is in this book 
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9 It should be noted that Dewey begins the book letting us know that he possess a “close enough” mentality: “The 
title of this volume, Experience and Nature, is intended to signify that the philosophy here presented may be termed 
either empirical naturalism or naturalistic empiricism, or taking “experience” in its usual signification, naturalistic 
humanism (Experience and Nature 1a). 
that we find Dewey’s seminal discussions of experience, which are most often couched within 
discussions of scientific, specifically anthropological or geological, nomenclature:
[E]xperience is of as well as in nature. It is not experience which is experienced, but 
nature—stones, plants, animals, diseases, health, temperature, electricity, and so on. 
Things interacting in certain ways are experience; they are what is experienced. Linked 
in certain other ways with another natural object—the human organism—they are how 
things are experienced as well. Experience thus reaches down into nature; it has depth. It 
also has breadth and to an indefinitely elastic extent. It stretches. (Experience and Nature 
4a)
What constitutes experiences for Dewey are not merely the sense perceptions of passive 
spectators of the world but rather the dynamic participation, the continuing process of an 
organism’s “adjustment” not simply to environing conditions but within a social and biological 
environment. In the process of experiencing, something happens: an organism actively 
encounters a world within which it must adjust (MW 10:9). Dewey, distancing himself from anti-
realist connotations and fully embracing materialist ones, posits that there are antecedent, 
objective conditions which affect the organism in certain ways. The organism, in turn, causes 
changes within the environment, it interacts with the environment, it does something to effect 
alterations in antecedent conditions—it attempts to gain control over its surroundings. 
 The meaning Dewey assigns to experiences takes place along the spectrum of “events” 
and “objects”; actual, tangible, sensual experiences are coined events, while the end result of the 
process of transubstantiation, which uses communicative and rhetorical means, is an object, or, 
the “larger,” “social” meaning that then not only defines the event but is the event. The best way 
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to approach what Dewey means by transubstantiation in this context is by way of example, for 
then we can see how Dewey’s formulation of what Crick calls the “ontology of becoming” 
meaningfully shifted discussions from what a thing “‘is’ to what it ‘becomes’ as a result of 
changed conditions, actions, and understandings.”10 In typical fashion, Dewey chooses a rather 
quotidian example to illustrate his points:
I start and am flustered by a noise heard. Empirically, that noise is fearsome; it really is, 
not merely phenomenally or subjectively so. That is what it is experienced as being. But, 
when I experience the noise as a known thing, I find it to be innocent of harm. It is the 
tapping of a shade against the window, owing to the movements of the wind. The 
experience has changed; that is, the thing experienced has changed [...] This is a change 
of experienced existence effected through the medium of cognition. The content of the 
latter experience cognitively regarded is doubtless truer than the content of the earlier, 
but it is no sense more real [...] It is only in regard to contrasted content in a subsequent 
experience that the determination “truer” has force. (“The Postulate” 158, 160)
Dewey wanted to draw stark distinctions between what was real and what was true, which he 
identified to be a stifling debate in the formulation of adequate philosophies. In the example 
above, the noise, upon first hear, was fearsome. That is real. However, after inquiry and 
reflection (or, at times, what Dewey calls abstraction), the more “truer” force began to appear, 
namely, the “object” (knowledge/idea) that the noise was caused by a simple, harmless breeze. 
Truth for Dewey resides in the value that object has for future experiences. The “real event” was 
the sensation of fear; the truth of the experience, or the only thing with value, is the notion that 
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10 Crick, p. 37. 
next time he hears that noise, he will attribute that event to something more rational, based on 
experience. What is most important here is that the “realness” of situations cannot be altered in 
any way; all we can do, or all that is worth doing, is to “alter what is experienced to be real in the 
future” (Crick 37). Objects and things transform in our interactions with them: The faulty 
window sealant, which allowed the window to enter, causing the shade to move and make noise 
against the sill, was the catalyst behind Dewey’s inquiry into the event. While the event was 
transformed into an object through critical reflection and repetition, the exigence for action was 
determined by the material thing constituting part of the event. Situations that require inquiry or 
critical reflection or communication —rhetorical situations—exist in large part in the experiences 
we have with the objects of this world. 
Problem Habits: The Rhetorical Situation
 The meaning of our experiences are further refined as we continually, over and over 
again, develop habits in our interactions. Not unlike the muscle memory of the mind that 
Isocrates championed, the habits we form in our interactions constitute truth-meaning for Dewey 
simply because they represent concerted actions towards what works. For Dewey, habits are the 
conduit for meaning, indeed that which guides our actions, and habits are acquired from our 
social and material environment (Crick 48-9). In Theory of Valuation, Dewey asserts that “[v]
aluation takes place only when there is something the matter; when there is some trouble to be 
done away with, some need, lack, or privation to be made good, some conflict of tendencies to 
be resolved by means of changing conditions” (Bitzer, “Functional” 26). Habits are what 
“patterns of experience” are for Kenneth Burke. Burkean patterns result from an organism’s 
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adjustments and adaptations to their environments. Any modification to an environment would 
thus impact the individual’s creation of meaning within that environment; through this, Dewey’s 
materialist tendencies are revealed. However, we also have the power to change our own 
environing conditions through our own exigencies. The value we attribute to events and things 
always takes place in the context of “situations” or “exigencies.”  Dewey calls them 
“problematic situations,” which, after experiencing a felt need, individuals are driven to adjust 
the conditions through whatever means possible. 
 Dewey’s problematic situations, and the subsequent habits our experiences with these 
exigencies produce, is the closest one can come to a formalized “rhetorical situation” in Dewey’s 
work. Crick’s smart articulation11 of the rhetorical processes in Dewey’s philosophy highlights 
the importance of the holistic relationship between organism and environment. For Crick, the 
organisms (citizens) are both created by and create the democratic world (environment) in which 
they live. A Deweyan rhetoric for Crick casts rhetorical processes as aesthetic processes, with 
successfully rhetorical citizens embodying a radicalized “ethics of democracy” that moves 
beyond Dewey’s simple theories of communication and into the more complex, nuanced ways 
Dewey presents experience as an inherently aesthetic phenomenon that responds, often through 
modes of advocacy, to the conflicts and urgencies of the world. 
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11 Crick attempts to further our understanding of this by placing Dewey in the debate between Lloyd Bitzer and 
Richard Vatz. Bitzer’s work in 1969 helped the field of rhetoric expand itself beyond the confines of mere 
persuasion, for, according to Bitzer, the “practical justification of rhetoric is analogous to that of scientific inquiry: 
the world presents objects to be know, puzzles to be resolved, complexities to be understood [...] Hence the practical 
need for rhetorical invention and discourse” (Bitzer, “Rhetorical Situation” 13-4). Vatz (1973), however, argued 
against Bitzer’s iteration of the rhetorical situation, claiming that it was merely an “academic exercise” that defined 
rhetoric as the ability to understand the situation “correctly.” Instead, Vatz argued that rhetoric actually creates the 
world we live in, as much or instead of altering or “skewing” our perceptions of it. The Bitzer/Vatz debate is an 
inherently epistemological and ontological one. Ultimately, Crick deems this debate as insufficient in describing or 
placing Dewey rhetorically in terms of his “problematic situations.” 
 Crick would not disagree that the naturalistic interaction between organism and 
environment is the context of rhetorical meaning. Communicative processes, oftentimes shared, 
translate or “transubstantiate” the event into an object. This process is achieved through 
rhetorical means, namely reflection and the development of assertions. The point here is that 
Crick begins to think about rhetoric when humans begin to cognitively address through the 
reflection as experience of an event (e.g., window shade). I am interested in seeing rhetoric as 
being present in the things and materiality that framed and caused the event in the first place.
Publics, Re-Imagined
 The purpose for this dense theoretical excursus is to show the theoretical viability of a 
notion of Deweyan publics that is inclusive of nonhuman objects and that foregrounds material 
experience with said objects as the roots of inquiry and thus action. Having reached a point in 
rhetorical history that can be known as post-postmodernism (Hickman Post-postmodernism) or 
posthumanism (Mara and Hawk 2009), we are given the opportunity to re-theorize and re-
organize Deweyan rhetorics in very basic, materially-oriented ways that are not pigeon-holed 
into agonistic political debates, modernist/postmodernist impasses, or incommensurable 
epistemologies. As Danisch writes, “Dewey provides the theoretical grounds for a reconstruction 
of rhetoric in greater variety than oratory” (64). Many writers, particularly in the field of rhetoric 
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and composition, have successfully thought of and used Dewey in rhetorical ways.12 Mailloux 
(1995) suggested that neopragmatism can be viewed as a postmodernist form of sophistic 
rhetoric, echoing Richard Rorty’s anti-foundationalist, pragmatist critique of traditional 
epistemology by juxtaposing “conversational” and “confrontational” explanatory models: 
“accept that our certainty will be a matter of conversation between persons, rather than a matter 
of interaction with nonhuman reality” (Mailloux, “Introduction” 14). Schiappa (1995) aligned 
Dewey’s pragmatism with Isocrates to accentuate the—and Stanley Fish would agree—techne 
nature of a pragmatist rhetoric. Cornel West uses Dewey in the form of “discourse as social 
action.” Yet, because these efforts were done without careful attention to the material objects that 
facilitate these processes, Dewey is left standing in the public square without some of his most 
valuable and productive assets: the artifacts with which we interact. Further attention to the role 
on artifacts in communicative processes not only recovers what Latour refers to as the “missing 
masses” but further places them squarely where they belong: in the mix of public conversations 
about science and technology. What is unique about Dewey, and what has been ignored in 
previous rhetorical projects based upon him, is his concern for the function of nonhuman objects 
in the formation of publics and in the process of inquiry. Logically speaking, if the oil spill was 
not, as I argued in previous chapters, due to the moral ineptitude of a single corporation, then it 
follows that the oil drifting to the shores and citizens of Louisiana was in fact a nonhuman 
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12 There is a temptation when studying pragmatism generally and John Dewey specifically to note that the seminal 
educationalist is underrepresented in the field of rhetoric and composition. This desire stems from encountering the 
main topoi of the field (such and citizenship education, service learning, habits of mind, etc.) and realizing that 
Dewey has something to say about most everything but then seeing nothing but white space in between the Derrida 
and Elbow citations. Lest proponents of the most influential philosophical movement assemblage in American 
history play the victim card, it is important to understand why a thinker who is “everywhere in our work” (Janet 
Emig) occupies such an indeterminate place in the field. Where is this “everywhere”? And why is Dewey’s influence 
so tacit? What is needed—and what I provide in this chapter—is an explication, indeed a re-situating of Dewey’s 
place in our field and a subsequent argument that our field’s treatment of Dewey is incomplete, not yet fully treating, 
accounting for, or showing  Dewey’s potential contributions to rhetoric, specifically a material rhetoric. 
experience that acted as an exigence for inquiry, and thus the changing of minds. In Dewey’s 
configuration of human/nonhuman publics, the experience with the oil suggests, to use Dewey’s 
terminology, another relationship—a relationship with greater environmental concerns spurred 
on or originating from a real material experience. 
 There are, unsurprisingly, substantial disconnects between technoscientific research and 
public understanding (Cox 2012). The rhetorical apparatuses being used, and the 
contradistinction between them, offer an opportunity for those interested in the rhetoric about 
science (cf. Carolyn Miller) to develop a more refined approach to how we can understand the 
conditions for the public and technoscientific deliberation about disaster. Danisch (2010), in an 
article covering Ulrich Beck’s notion of “world risk society” and how it applies to political 
rhetoric, asserts that 
 both the kind and degree of uncertainty that we now face have changed the relationship 
 between science and public culture. The tremendous ‘success’ of scientific research and 
 technological development now acts to produce uncertainty, fear, and danger. As such, 
 science and technology stand at the center of contemporary political rhetoric in a 
 radically different way. (172)  
Ulrich Beck, in his book of the same name, World Risk Society (1999), argues that the conditions 
for scientific discussion and controversy today are characterized most aptly in terms of 
contingency and uncertainty and subsequently involves experts and citizens making choices 
based upon their level of knowledge about a given topic or “fact.” This runs contrary to the 
Enlightenment and modern approach to science and technology, where the aim was to dominate 
the natural world with high functioning tools that were to, in all the glorious human hubris, work 
162
against uncertainty and contingency (Hughes 2004; Beck 1992). According to Danisch, the “idea 
of ‘scientific knowledge’ was understood over and against consistent and probable 
knowledge” (177). Beck’s “risk society,” in acknowledging the place of uncertainty and 
contingency in scientific controversies and more over the place of rhetoric within that, breaks 
down the distinction between the public sphere and the technical sphere. This is simply because 
public well-being is too integrally linked with technological and scientific production: 
 Beck consistently claims that contemporary Western societies are living through a 
 transitional period, in which industrial society is becoming “risk society.” The most 
 notable fact about this transitional period is that the production of wealth is accompanied 
 by the production of risks, which have proliferated as an outcome of modernization. 
 (Danisch, “Political” 178)      
The main issues Western citizens face in this risk society is the “management and minimization 
of risks, not the production and distribution of goods” (Danisch, “Political” 178). Survival in 
contemporary society, for Beck, is based entirely on being able to sift through socially 
constructed risks, which are based on material reality, and use public access knowledge to make 
prudent decisions. In Beck’s risk society, there would be no separation between governmental, 
scientific, and public spheres, which would then facilitate a more productive, comprehensive 
assessment of risk based on conflicts that can be “debated and judged” (World Risk 5). 
 One of the obstacles, of course, is that rational deliberation is stifled by technological and 
scientific progress that is both productive and risk-causing, what Beck calls manufactured 
uncertainty: “For example, epidemics of bacterial infections are caused by medicines that have 
created antibiotic resistant bacteria; the cause of floods, landslides, or famines can be traced back 
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to global warming, which in turn can be understood as the side-effect of 
industrialization” (Danisch, “Political” 179). Much like the Deepwater Horizon example, which 
was a rig that produced oil to fund the state of Louisiana but then also manufactured a risk for 
the Gulf of Mexico ecosystem, a certain amount of scientific literacy, of rhetorical prudence is 
necessary for operating in Beck’s world risk society. An attunement to material causality, to how 
our actions and others’ actions are impacting our well-being and those of others, and how our 
interaction with technology and science is building society, is the key component life in such a 
society. 
 John Dewey knew this. According to Hickman, “Dewey repeatedly emphasized his view 
that failure of artifacts to do their work is not necessarily due to the lack of productive skill on 
the part of the artist, but may me due to the lack of such skill on the part of the person who is 
confronted with and called upon to take account of produced artifacts” (Pragmatic Technology 
67). It is important to keep in mind here that for Dewey an artist was both a factory line worker 
and a sculptor. We, as citizens in a world risk society, are those who are asked to take account of 
produced artifacts, to have a prudence and ethics about our consumption and/or use of any given 
technological artifact. While my example is of citizens who consume oil, Dewey, dating himself, 
uses a different example:
 Productive skill is required on the parts of the mining engineer and smelter in order to 
 effect the transformation of natural materials such as ores into artifacts that possess 
 intrinsic as well as extrinsic meanings. Productive skill is required on the parts of 
 individuals going about their quotidian business in order to effect the transformation of 
 the raw and immediate materials of focus and context, enjoyment and routine use, into an 
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 experience that exhibits enlarged meaning and significance. And productive skill is 
 required of those who appreciate and use art objects in order to effect the transformation 
 and appropriation of those objects into sources of renewed delight and refined insight. 
 (Hickman, Pragmatic Technology 67) 
This passage, far from merely generously doling out the blame of the oil spill to all those 
involved, to all those who have every pumped gas, is contending that the failure of artifacts—
say, an oil rig—is a failure of collective inquiry, a failure on behalf of society to create the proper 
conditions of debate and access of risk for all those impacted: “One of the principle causes of 
failure of inquiry is neglect of the reciprocal connections among means and ends” (Hickman, 
Pragmatic Technology 67). The conditions for properly assessing risk and for properly attuning 
oneself to the material reality of industrial progress were just as faulty, in Dewey’s view, as the 
hydraulic liquid switch deep within the blowout preventer. Dewey’s material approach to rhetoric 
and to our relating to objects echoes Coole and Frost’s (2010) insistence that attunement with the 
everydayness of materiality, with the artifacts that shape our existence, offers a productive 
reorientation to the world—one that is surely appropriate for the world as Beck sees it.  
 More than that, this world risk society dominated by our relations with materiality is 
inherently rhetorical. As Dilip Gaonkar (2001) reminds us, “the contingent is the unproblematic 
scene of rhetoric” (151). This then, for Danisch, offers an inroad for improving the scientific 
literacy and rhetorical prudence of citizens in Beck’s neo-industrialized society:  
! [T]he task of the rhetoric of science is to argue for civic training that includes the 
 development of a scientific prudence. A fuller articulation of the constitutive features of 
 this prudence would be required, but still the practice of political rhetoric would seem to 
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 rest increasingly on that form of reasoning. Cultivating such a scientific prudence would 
 return the location of judgment to the citizenry and move us beyond the vision of a 
 technocracy of experts articulated and sought at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
 (Danisch, “Political” 191) 
Embodying the judgment of Dewey at Cooper Union, while acknowledging the stark change in 
processes of industrialization by Beck, can help one facilitate a more productive politic as it 
relates to technological and scientific artifacts. This of course, according to all—Danisch, Beck, 
and Dewey—requires a commitment to providing forums and opportunities for deliberation 
(Danisch, “Political” 190).   
Conclusions and Implications
 For Dewey, communication13 is not about symbolicity, not about aesthetic representation. 
Rhetoric denotes a practical skill that enacts changes in environments. Artistic creations on 
Parisian museum walls are no different than Ford cars populating the lines in Detroit factories. 
The value of objects, even paintings, is not found in authorial purposes but rather in the actions 
that are spurred on by citizens’ experiences with the object (Hickman, Pragmatic Technology 
70).  In this respect, Dewey can be configured as an “object-oriented” rhetorician, as one who 
seeks to identify value and meaning in the material interaction between objects and humans. The 
value Dewey assigns to these interactions has been cast as “use-value,” but a more nuanced 
approach to Deweyan rhetoric would consider the value of these in terms of contributing to 
public discourse and improving the material and communicative conditions and methods of a 
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13 “Rhetoric” is absent from Deweyan indices because of his utter disdain for dichotomies, of which the false 
separation between logic and rhetoric is one. I have felt comfortable using this word as a synonym for Dewey’s 
communication because in our field the Ramusian divide between logic and rhetoric has effectively been bridged.
modern society. I contend that Dewey’s materialist approach to communication has much to offer 
the field of rhetoric and composition, namely through placing a stronger emphasis on the 
conditions of deliberation as well as, and perhaps more importantly, demanding practical 
examples of this form or model of communication in action. Our field has made a turn away 
from the symbolic, away from Burkean and Peircean models of thinking, and towards 
materiality. By using Dewey here my dissertation provides a concrete example not only of what a 
material approach to rhetoric towards large events looks like but also provides an approach that 
is grounded in the concerns increasingly relevant and pertinent to our field, namely public 
discussion on science, education, and experience. 
 If, as Richard Bernstein so confidently states in his essay “The Pragmatic Century,” the 
ideas of pragmatism have dominated twentieth century thought, then it is my wish and my belief 
that pragmatism has the legs to continue the same trend into the twenty-first century as well. 
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Epilogue. Closing Remarks
So, What Really Happened?
 “So, what really did in the rig: human error or faulty technology?”
 This question posed to me during a casual Sunday brunch still echoes consistently in my 
mind and is a persistent point of frustration for me. I understand the reductive nature of technical 
investigations, but reductiveness towards a tremendously complex event such as the Deepwater 
Horizon blowout in public conversations must be addressed. How we discuss disaster is 
tremendously important, for “[a]s we draw on genre rules to engage in professional activities, we 
constitute social structures (in professional, institutional, and organizational contexts) and 
simultaneously reproduce these structures” (Berkenkotter and Huckin “Rethinking” 478). 
 My research suggests that nonhuman entities play an important, though under-theorized 
role in (post-)disaster rhetorics. This includes both the publicly-circulated technical 
documentation (e.g., accident reports) and news media coverage. What this role, or more 
accurately these roles encompass is less apparent. This is similar to Sauer’s goal of uncovering or 
inventing embodied rhetorics in the context of mining disasters: “we cannot determine whether 
this information can contribute to risk management and assessment until we can actually see and 
interpret what miners are representing with their hands” (7). In a similar move, I argue that we 
cannot determine how a posthumanist approach to disaster can help risk management and thus 
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help prevent future disasters until we fully understand what role nonhuman entities play in the 
rhetorical construction of disasters. 
 My research also suggests that posthumanist theories have helped those in rhetoric and 
technical communication more fully account for the wide array of bodies and elements involved 
in a rhetorical situation, or more accurately, what Jenny Edbauer calls “rhetorical 
ecologies” (2005). My role here has been to employ a theoretically-focused rhetorical framework 
that provides a more inclusive basis for constructing meaning and arguments in the midst of 
disaster. This rhetorical framework is infused by posthumanist theory so as to include and even 
foreground nonhuman elements in the deliberation, judgment, and evaluation of disasters. 
 Like much posthumanist work done, the rhetorician’s role in the context of disaster is to 
use invention to increase inclusivity to provide a more complete account of what happened. My 
role here has begun through the building of an approach to disaster that more fully accounts for 
the emergent forces involved in the construction of meaning and arguments about the nature, 
causes, and responsibility of disasters. 
Why Deepwater Horizon?
 So, why Deepwater? It might be evident by now why I have chosen the Deepwater 
Horizon blowout as my object of analysis. Beyond just the conflation and complication of 
seemingly stable, ontological categories, why I have located my dissertation on material rhetorics 
in the blackened Gulf waters is because of its relative size and silence. That is, Obama 
confidently labeled the spill as the worst environmental disaster in American history1 and the 
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1 Naturally, Obama would have political motivations to make such a statement as making the “cozy” relationship 
between government and corporate, specifically oil industry, interests less cozy is part of his platform. 
EPA designed the spill as a Spill of National Significance (EPA), a move that, like outlined 
above, has positive political and economic repercussions, but still represents the scope of the 
incident. Again, unlike the Challenger disaster or Hurricane Katrina, the latter of which was 
highly politicized, a concern to disrupt the patterned disaster grammars and rhetorics should be 
of deep concern because the Deepwater Horizon blowout offers a unique opportunity based upon 
its integrated configuration and connectivity between the ecological and the technological, the 
human and the non-human. A more suitable scientific prudence is required; as much, we need to 
dwell within the public discursive realities.
 The Deepwater Horizon blowout was not chosen because of its unique circumstance or 
particular political intrigue. Despite its rather significant impact, and President Obama’s bold 
assertion, the Deepwater Horizon blowout itself was, admittedly, rather lackluster in terms of 
media frenzy, integration into pubic discourse, and public pressure when compared to the Exxon 
Valdez or Hurricane Katrina. The Deepwater Horizon blowout was chosen precisely because of 
these observations. The “patterned response,” right from the immediate events to the sporadically  
updated “Gulf Update Blog” on BP’s website, was notably stale. My work does not have the 
privilege of significant hindsight or historical reconsideration or document recovery. My work 
does have the privilege of recency and of theorizing the still-lingering remnants of the publics’ 
understanding of the Deepwater Horizon blowout. The theorists underlying my work are 
inseparably attached from the everydayness, mainly because they both saw colloquial and 
overused modes of discourse to be infuriating—Dewey from the use of “nature” and Latour from 
the use of “social,” to name just two instances. This dissertation, in fully embracing the 
speculative, has sought to contribute to the answering of a crucial question posed by Bennett: “if 
170
we were more attentive to the indispensable foreignness that we are, would we continue to 
produce and consume in the same violently reckless ways?” (113). And how does this change the 
way we approach and study disaster? Bennett couches this question in her argument for us to 
consider the world, and ourselves, less as “embodied” and more as “an array of bodies” (112). It 
is also a question that is representative of the much larger task posthumanist rhetorics have in 
front of them: to take up their own calling for more participatory and engaging models of 
rhetorical practice in order to affect public understand and action towards “matters of concern.” 
 This task is not unlike rewiring synapses in a person’s brain, although I am unsure how 
apt psychological metaphors are here. The patterns of environmental discourse in terms of 
human-centered models of interpreting disasters or “accidents” need to be retooled with new 
connections and now considerations and ethical responsibilities. This dissertation has framed the 
public communication about the Deepwater Horizon blowout as an insufficient model that is 
based on unproductive methods employed by impotent “environmental discourses” and in this 
light argues for and displays new methods based upon posthumanist rhetorics and a polytemporal 
application of John Dewey. How can we use “familiar” or “patterned” events so deeply ingrained 
in the public understanding of the “natural” and the “scientific”? In this light, the Deepwater 
Horizon blowout raises a troubling question: How are rhetoricians supposed to counter the 
political forces that continue to disseminate and reinforce discourses of environmentalism that 
sees scientists, engineers, and politicians who are cognizant of the risks continually engage in 
destructive activities? These are the questions that drove my dissertation. 
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Appendix: Scatter-Plotted Epideixis: Brief Summaries of Popular Literature
 To supplement Figure 5 from chapter four, I have provided brief summaries of the 
literature not covered in chapter four, with specific focus on where each work locates agency.  
Antonia Juhasz, Black Tide: The Devastating Impact of the Gulf Oil Spill (2011)
Juhasz’s goal in Black Tide is to accurately capture the deep and 
wide reverberations felt by the communities most affected by the oil 
hitting the Gulf waters and beaches. As such, her goal is not to go in 
depth about the technical elements of the blowout but rather recount 
the ongoing adverse effects brought about by the spill. She goes in 
depth in terms of individuals’ stories in relation to the victims as 
well as trials experienced by so many fishers. Juhasz, who has 
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Figure 5: Agency-plotting diagram, with plots
written two books previous investigating the government agencies and the oil industry, makes it 
clear that the Deepwater Horizon blowout resulted from a complex web of forces that involved 
far more than just one company, BP, or one government agency, the MMS (Mineral Management 
Service, now BOEMRE). She couches the blowout as part of a larger industry-driven problem of 
government deregulation and corporate profit motive. 
   
Carl Safina,  A Sea in Flames: The Deepwater Horizon Oil Blowout (2011)
Like Juhasz, Safina’s work begins right at the blowout and 
painstakingly yet engagingly traces the events of each month as the 
millions upon millions of barrels of crude oil continued to fill the 
Gulf. For as then Florida governor Charlie Crist put it, “it’s not a 
spill, it’s a flow.” Safina, who admits that we as a culture are all 
responsible for what took place on in the spring of 2010 in the Gulf 
because of our reliance on oil, writes in the preface, “[this book] is 
not just a record of a technological event. It’s also a chronicle of a season of anguish and panic, 
deep uncertainties, and the emotional topography of the blowout” (ix). In painting a vivid 
topography, Safina’s passion towards the issue resonates with the reader, as he calls into question 
the assumptions the public and the media might have about the causes of the blowout and 
subsequent devastating oil spill and also is rather polemic in his interpretation of government 
actions and “interventions” but most of all in his scathing critique of BP operations.     
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Bob Cavnar, Disaster on the Horizon: High Stakes, High Risks, and the Story Behind the 
Deepwater Horizon Blowout (2010)
It is appropriate that Cavnar, with thirty years of oil and gas 
operations experience, hones in on regulatory issues that dominate 
the oil industry. He positions the spill less in terms of technical error  
and more in terms of an inevitability, clearly stating that the oil 
industry “didn’t have the slightest clue” (xiv) as to how to approach 
the disaster once it happened. As his title indicates, the high degree 
of resistance to regulation by the major oil companies in the United 
States ensured that something as catastrophic as the Deepwater Horizon blowout was just a 
matter of time. In terms of accountability, Cavnar claims that “the disaster on the Deepwater 
Horizon that was drilling [the Macondo well] is a direct result of a number of complex failures, 
mostly human” (xiii). For him, the blowout was the result of both government and corporate 
arrogance, and was “caused by bad design, bad judgment, hurried operations, and a convoluted 
management structure” (xiii). Cavnar’s insightful, “inside” epideixis places the onus on the 
human end of the spectrum.    
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